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Dissertation supervised by Ronald M. Polansky 
Few conceptual discoveries rival the impact of the idea of nature on the development of 
ancient Greek philosophy.  The famous φύσις-νόμος debates of the fifth-century B.C. pit nature 
against custom as the ultimate guide to human life.  Plato’s timeless theory of justice is grounded 
on a conception of nature dictating what is best.  Aristotle likewise develops his systematic 
understanding of the natural world according to the idea that nature is an inner principle of 
motion and rest that acts as a final cause.  In each of these cases, nature is understood as 
teleological, i.e. oriented toward an end.  But the idea of nature as a way to explain the existence 
of the cosmos and the identity, growth, and behavior of the entities within it emerges in Greek 
philosophers that precede Plato, the so-called Presocratics.  How did the earliest philosophers 
conceive of the idea of the nature of things? And to what extent, if any, do the earliest 
conceptions of nature display purposive features? 
 v  
 
 This dissertation tells the story of the origins and development of the idea of purposive 
nature in early Greek philosophy.  Over the course of six chapters, I develop accounts of 
substantially different conceptualizations of nature found in ten of the earliest Greek 
philosophers.  Contrary to long-standing scholarly opinion, I argue that no single “Greek concept 
of nature” in fact exists among the Presocratics, but rather that the idea of nature emerges more 
dynamically, evolving through critical debate as different thinkers put forth competing theories 
about what nature is and what it implies.  In each theory, however, the unique facets of these 
different conceptions of nature are marked by elements of purposiveness.  Far from being anti-
teleological, then, the Presocratic polysemous concept of nature serves as a vital first step in the 
development of early forms of purposiveness in nature into the more robust teleological 
conceptions found in Plato and Aristotle. As my account demonstrates, the idea of nature 
becomes more explicitly purposive over the course of the Presocratic period.  Finally, this 
reading of the early Greek period paints a picture of the way the Presocratic engagement with 
nature leads to the various “corrupted” views of nature in the φύσις-νόμος debate among the 
Greek sophists, and ultimately to the suggestion that the Platonic and Aristotelian defense of the 
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There is no small bit of irony in the fact that authors spend near countless hours of 
intense labor drafting and editing several hundred pages of dissertations and yet only a paltry few 
pages, likely dashed off at the last minute, to thank those whose continual efforts and support 
generally not only dwarf the author’s efforts by comparison, but made the project possible in the 
first place.  Although few may read these acknowledgements of all the care and effort that has 
made this study possible (though perhaps still more than will read the dissertation), I have 
endeavored not to commit this error. My apologies in advance if you were not expecting the 
dissertation to start precisely here. 
I wrestled for quite awhile with the dubious distinction about to whom I ought to dedicate 
this work. Mostly this is because I think Joan Thompson, the department administrator, is as 
deserving as anyone of the highest thanks I can offer for all that she does for young academics 
and for me in particular.  Joan has made so many dissertations at Duquesne possible by her 
careful attention to detail, and her ability to masterfully mix a caring approach with tough love 
when necessary.  I was a direct beneficiary, even from several hundred miles away, as she would 
go out of her way to call me about an approaching registration deadline or policy 
change.  Having spent a fair amount of time among academics of all stripes, I can say that 
philosophers are a particularly tough breed to deal with, especially where it concerns vital but 
mundane administrative details that fail to rise to the level of enduring metaphysical 
mysteries.  Joan handles all of this brilliantly, and every student and faculty member that has 
passed through Duquesne’s Philosophy Department owes her a very deep debt of gratitude. 
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I owe great debts to my fellow graduate students in the Philosophy Department at 
Duquesne as well. Roughly a year out of the Army, and not long back from war, I wasn’t quite 
sure what to expect when I started graduate school in philosophy in the Fall of 2008. The 
experience was intense from the get go, but the people, faculty and students alike, were equal 
parts inspirational and supportive. I knew I had landed (somewhat by sheer luck, I think) in a 
really terrific department.  My first attempts at presentations and papers were extremely 
awkward, but my peers demonstrated a tremendous amount of charity and encouragement in 
their responses.  Although there were many who helped, some individuals really stand out. My 
particular cohort--Stephanie Adair, Chelsea Harry, Nalan Sarac, and Clancy Smith--all excellent 
philosophers, often had me scrambling to keep up and “prove my worth.”  Two very dear friends 
have been role models for collegiality and insight: Becky Vartebedian and Kelsey Ward each 
played a significant role in how I approached the history of philosophy and teaching 
students.  Kelsey’s encouragement and insight during our language studies was more than I 
could ask.  And Becky was, perhaps unbeknownst to her, one of the first of my peers whose 
engagement with students I watched closely and tried in certain respects to mimic.   
I cannot say enough about the philosophy faculty at Duquesne.  Jim Swindal was 
encouraging from the moment we first spoke on the phone and continues to be so today.  I 
learned a tremendous amount about so much of the history of philosophy from Drs. Bates, 
Bonin, Harrington, and Rodemeyer.  And in many of Anaxagoras’ other worlds, or Leibniz’s 
possible worlds, my alter egos have written various dissertations on Descartes or Spinoza under 
Dr. Dan Selcer.  His passionate approach to early modern philosophy hooked me early on, and I 
think I took whatever class he offered every semester I was at Duquesne.  I continually hope that 
my passion for philosophy is as transparent to my students as Dan’s is to his.      
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I would also like to thank my colleagues at Ohio Dominican University and The Ohio 
State University for their encouragement and all that they do for students and faculty.  Katie 
O’Keefe and her excellent philosophical mind had the misfortune of suffering through much of 
my rough ideas on early Greek philosophy. Her patience, insight, and love of learning make 
every environment she is a part of a better place.  Happiness Mapira is an unparalleled advocate 
for students who manages to simultaneously hold their feet to the fire when needed. I am not sure 
how she does it, but I know that this dissertation would not have progressed as much as it did 
during my time at ODU without her ability to solve problems and allow me to think more about 
philosophy, and less about student issues with faculty.  Karen Gray is one of the best leaders in 
higher education that I have come across.  I am extremely fortunate to have had the privilege to 
learn from her.  I hope many more junior leaders in academia get the chance to benefit from her 
experience and wisdom.   
Of all the people that I have learned from at Duquesne and the many valuable friendships 
I have formed, none means more to me than my friendship with Chelsea Harry. She is, simply, a 
model teacher, scholar, and human being.  And she makes it all seem so damn effortless.  In all 
likelihood, I probably owe the fact that I passed my comprehensive exams entirely to the fact 
that I studied for them with her, but am more recently in her debt for reading and commenting on 
this dissertation.  Like any excellent teacher, she always simultaneously pushes and encourages 
me, and for that I could not be more grateful.  Her support, erudition, and patience with my naïve 
questions on Aristotle have been instrumental in finishing this dissertation. 
It was perhaps not the wisest decision to choose a dissertation topic about which I knew 
very little, while being several hundred miles from my committee members.  I survived such a 
decision mostly because of my colleague and mentor at Ohio Dominican, Dr. Michael 
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Dougherty.  In the years I was struggling to cobble together very rough drafts of chapters, Mike 
provided a true model for how to approach scholarship, and more specifically, the craft of 
writing.  He provided meticulous and thorough comments on every chapter of this 
dissertation.  Through him I have come to realize just how invaluable great colleagues are, 
especially those who are willing to read and comment on your work.  Although his efforts have 
improved nearly every aspect of this work, much of the writing was driven by one of his first 
pieces of advice: “Don’t write a boring dissertation.”  It was an aside, but I took it to heart in the 
painstaking way I approached revision. I hope I have lived up to that advice.  
When I started this dissertation, I knew virtually nothing of the Presocratics and I lived a 
long way from anyone who would have been willing to teach me about them.  So, I owe a special 
debt of gratitude to the many brilliant scholars from whom I learned about early Greek 
philosophy through their published work.  Although my ideas have been influenced by many 
who have worked in the field, a few deserve to be singled out given the enormous impact their 
thinking has had on mine.  In my view, Patricia Curd is sine pari in the scholarship on early 
Greek philosophy.  I say this not just because I happen to agree with her position on many of the 
disputes and issues in early Greek philosophy, but also because her prose is a model of clarity 
and her engagement with the literature is so remarkably thorough.  She is, quite simply, the kind 
of scholar of the Presocratics that I aim to be.  Daniel Graham and Charles Kahn have also 
played significant roles in the formation of my understanding of early Greek philosophy and how 
to write about it.  I am grateful to these and many others whose work has been so helpful in 
inspiring a passion for early Greek thinkers and provided a model for how to engage in studying 
them.        
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I imagine that those of us who pursue a doctorate in philosophy all have that faculty 
member who first inspired and challenged us and whose model continues to do so (almost 20 
years later, in my case).  In so many ways, I would not be who I am without the guidance of Dr. 
Timothy Sean Quinn.  In a philosophy department at Xavier University that is filled with 
extraordinary teachers, he is unequivocally the best.  His grasp of the history of philosophy and 
the ability to integrate and relate the ideas of various thinkers is something I will spend many 
years trying to emulate. The same is said for his ability to hold the attention of his students and 
make them feel as though they are in a direct dialogue with the greatest minds in history.  I am 
deeply grateful for all of his guidance and wisdom over the years, and for the role he played in 
this project as well.      
Prior to attending my first class with Dr. Ron Polansky in the Fall of 2008, I had never 
remotely considered the possibility of writing a dissertation in ancient Greek philosophy.  So, on 
some level, he is mostly to blame for this.  I received excellent advice from a former student of 
his to take whatever Dr. Polansky offered in graduate school. It is some of the best advice I have 
ever received and I followed it ever semester at Duquesne.  He teaches his students how to think 
about and write philosophy, often through his absolute brutal honesty in comments on papers and 
chapters. I will be forever grateful for everything that he has done to shape me as a scholar and a 
person.      
My deepest thanks is reserved for my family that has been a part of my intellectual and 
personal development for many years.  To my parents, who have always been brilliant examples 
of passionate professionals making the world a better place, I hope to be even half as inspiring to 
my children as you are to me.  And to my aunt for letting me live with her during my first year in 
Pittsburgh and supplying me with a steady diet of antagonism about philosophy and Little 
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Debbie Swiss Cake Rolls until I couldn’t stand the sight of them: you are my favorite 
sophist.  Finally, to my dearest wife, Rachael, who is the best partner I can imagine: thanks for 
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Introduction: Origins of the Philosophical Discovery of Nature 
 
It is always foolish to assume that whatever is interesting in Greek philosophy is Platonic or later. 
        –Martha Nussbaum 
 
To write the history of thought is sometimes to write the history of a series of misinterpretations. 
–Pierre Hadot 
 
The origin and development of the idea of nature in Greek philosophy is one of those 
stories best told by starting nearer the end than the beginning.  In the middle of the 5th century 
B.C., the most interesting philosophical debate in ancient Greece centered around a deceptively 
simple question: should custom or nature guide how one should live?  More broadly the Greeks 
asked whether justice in political communities should be modeled on nature or are laws best 
understood as a necessary counterbalance to the destructive aspects of human nature?  The 
dispute is a contentious one, if Plato is to be believed, framed in part by the sharp contrast 
between sophists and philosophers.  But the answers to these questions extended well beyond a 
simple dichotomy.  Some believed, and argued passionately, that the old ways were superior, that 
law or custom was “lord of all” and provided the most well-established path to the best life be it 
for the individual or the community.  No doubt this view was more easily held by those who had 
traveled widely and witnessed the pervasive influence of convention across cultures, despite vast 
differences in particular laws and customs.  Such a view was in fact, even at that time, a very old 
one in holding that all things, not merely human beings, operated in “customary” ways.  Of 
course, among those who believed in the supreme power of custom, most were keen to 
understand their customs as invariably superior to those beliefs and practices of other cultures, 
while some maintained a more relative understanding: to each his own, as we might say.  But 
there were also those who contended that the way of nature was superior because it transcended 
particularities of time and place, providing universal guidance for how all men ought to live.  But 
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this camp was also divided over precisely what was meant by “nature” and what it implied 
regarding how humans should live and be governed.  Some of these thinkers argued that custom 
or law was imposed as a way to regulate or mitigate the nature of the strong who might “justly” 
seek to take more than their fair share.  Others held that customs and laws should be engineered 
in such a way as to enhance what was naturally superior, rather than restrict it in order to level 
the proverbial playing field.  In short, though the debate seems on the surface to center on the 
conflict between nature and custom, a closer reading of the specific ideas and arguments of these 
Greek thinkers suggests that it is the particular features of this new idea of nature that is still 
unsettled and yet makes all the difference.  The idea of custom, it seems, is relatively straight-
forward; the idea of nature is not. 
Where did this idea of nature come from?  What does it mean to “have a nature” and in 
what ways does nature really establish or suggest norms?  The Greek thinkers engaged in this 
debate were not the first to discover or to wrestle with this idea.  While the idea of nature is an 
old and familiar one to the modern student of the history of philosophy, the first attempts at 
conceiving of the entities in the cosmos in terms of natures represented a seismic epistemological 
shift.  In many ways, modern readers are misled by the way the beginning of philosophy is too 
often described as the movement from superstition and supernatural explanations to the use of 
reason.  Such a simplistic account leads to mischaracterizations of the break between the archaic 
age of Homer and Hesiod and the “rational” age of the earliest Greek philosophers that infects 
the rest of the story of the beginning of philosophy.  After all, plenty of the rational exists in the 
works of Homer and Hesiod, and plenty of the mythical survives in Plato’s dialogues. Though 
perhaps still too simplistic, a more accurate narrative understands the founding philosophical 
period not as a shift from the mythical to the rational, but rather as the move from the 
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supernatural to a natural framework for making sense of all things.  Such a paradigm shift is 
driven by fundamental questions.  What would it mean to be able to give an account of all things 
through natural explanation?  What would it mean to conceive of a cosmos in which things 
happened in fixed, reliable patterns that were accessible to all, not just those “touched by the 
gods”?  The answers to such questions require an idea of nature.  
But the idea of nature as an attempt to say what things are and where they come from is 
never truly independent of the human longing to understand why things are this way.  In the 
mythic age, the gods and their actions provide the ultimate answer to this question.1  With the 
attempt to uncover an underlying, recognizable, natural structure or pattern in the cosmos, the 
first Greek physiologoi also had to supply answers to this question of why, this question of 
purposiveness. Even still, although these students of nature sought new understandings and 
explanations for natural phenomena, they were nevertheless still rooted in a tradition that 
embraced and celebrated supernatural explanations.  As a result, many of their theories are thus 
complex and mysterious mixtures of both natural and divine elements.  Of course, the same 
might be said for the subsequent philosophy of Plato, who also seeks to incorporate myth and 
divine notions into the emerging practice of philosophical dialogue.  In some ways then, it is the 
idea of nature in the Presocratic philosophers as a gradual development that serves as a bridge 
between the views of the Archaic Greeks and the philosophy of classical Greece.  Broadly 
speaking, this dissertation explores the earliest conceptions of nature and purpose in Greek 
philosophy, and the connection between these ideas.  I begin here with a brief examination of the 
Archaic roots of the notion of nature since the story of φύσις begins with the single use of the 
word in Homer’s Odyssey. 
                                               
1 See Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, trans. 
Catherine Tihanyi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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PHYSIS IN HOMER  
 
 The first recorded use of the term most often associated with “arguably the most 
important concept in Greek philosophy” is in reference to a flower.2  The deceptively modest 
beginnings of φύσις parallel the hidden power of nature in the story.  Narrowly escaping a tribe 
of cannibalistic giants, Odysseus’ ship and exhausted crew arrives on Aeaea, the home of the 
enchantress Circe.  Adept in the use of evil drugs (κακὰ φάρμακ᾿), Circe deceives a portion of 
Odysseus’ crew and then transforms them into swine.  Upon hearing of their plight, Odysseus 
sets out alone on a journey for Circe’s house, only to be stopped by the god Hermes in the 
middle of the woods.  Warning Odysseus that if he continues upon this path he should meet the 
same fate as his men, Hermes offers Odysseus a “potent herb” that will “ward off from your head 
the evil day” (Odyssey x.287-288).3  Describing in detail “the deadly wiles of Circe,” Hermes 
lays out a plan for how Odysseus may overcome her. Since the plan hinges on the potent herb 
counteracting Circe’s own drugs, Hermes does more than simply give the antidote to Odysseus.  
Instead, the god handed over the herb by first “pulling it out of the ground,” after which, as 
Odysseus recounts, he “showed me its nature” (ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας, καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε, 
303).  The nature of the flower is limited to a description of its parts: “at the root it was black, 
but its flower was like milk”; its divine name: “Moly, the gods call it”; and a comment about 
how it is acquired: “it is hard for mortal men to dig; but the gods can do anything.”  With this 
Hermes departs for Olympus, leaving Odysseus to his task. 
What precisely should be understood as the φύσις of the Moly flower remains unclear, 
yet “what is important is that it has a nature and the gods’ power arises from the knowledge of its 
                                               
2 Patrick Lee Miller, Review of Gerard Naddaf’s The Greek Concept of Nature, Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007): 165-
169. 
3 Homer, Odyssey, Books 1-12, trans. A.T. Murray, revised by George E. Dimock (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard 
University Press, 1924), p. 378.  All translations from Homer’s Odyssey are from this edition. 
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nature and of all other things.”4  As an idea, the φύσις of things originates from the gods; 
Odysseus could not have made this discovery on his own.  When extended beyond the flower, 
however, the metaphor of unearthing the roots as the discovery of the nature of something 
illustrates the possibility that man can achieve this kind of knowledge.  Such knowledge for man, 
if possible, is hard-won only through toil and contrasted with the ease by which the gods acquire 
it simply by way of who they are.  In this case, knowledge of the φύσις of flower is given to 
Odysseus by way of a demonstration from a god.5  Thus the story holds out not just the 
possibility of human knowledge of the φύσις of things by the hard work of investigation, but the 
further qualification that the nature of things can be communicated in an understandable way.  
The origin of φύσις in Homer thus extends a tantalizing invitation to mankind: the idea of φύσις 
as secret, divine knowledge that can be both discovered and shared.  Taken up by the earliest 
Greek philosophers, the discovery of the nature of things becomes the dominant intellectual 
pursuit of the age. 
NATURE AND PURPOSE IN THE PRESOCRATICS 
 
This dissertation presents a series of interrelated studies of Presocratic philosophers that 
tell the story of the origin and development of the idea of purposive nature in early Greek 
philosophy.  In what follows I attempt to navigate a difficult path.  The journey through 
Presocratic philosophy is fraught with significant gaps in our historical and textual knowledge as 
                                               
4 Seth Benardete, The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1997), p. 86. 
5 On several counts Benardete’s interpretation of the Homeric account of φύσις exceeds the limits of reasonable 
interpretation.  The knowledge Odysseus gains from Hermes is not knowledge of φύσις generally speaking, but only 
the φύσις of the Moly flower.  In doing so, the idea that things have a φύσις and that men may discover it emerges, 
but to infer from this that what Odysseus learns, and what ultimately saves him from Circe, is “the knowledge that 
the mind of man belongs together with his build” is an imaginative reading that supposes far more in the text than 
can reasonably be found, The Bow and the Lyre, p. 86.  What saves Odysseus is instead his fore-knowledge of 
Circe’s methods and the precise plan to counteract them, all of which have been given to him by the divine 
messenger.  
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well as long-standing controversies of all sorts that threaten to bog down a broader historical 
inquiry such as this.  In aiming to tell the story of nature and purpose among the Presocratics, I 
therefore treat such controversies or familiar points of dispute only insofar as I believe they 
impact the story.  Similarly, my aim has been to let the early Greek philosophers speak for 
themselves as much as possible, and so I emphasize those fragments that capture their own 
words while minimizing my reliance on second-hand reports of their views, which suffer from 
greater concerns of reliability.  The account that results challenges a number of standard 
narratives, both of the Presocratic period as a whole but also in some cases of the views of 
individual philosophers. 
The earliest recorded engagement with the idea of nature after Homer takes place in a 
small city on the western coast of modern day Turkey.  The first chapter deals with the 
philosophical origins of the concept of nature in what is known as the Milesian school with 
Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.  Both ancient and modern attempts to frame the 
Milesians as holding the same idea of nature are flawed, however.  Instead, I argue that beyond 
simply offering different material principles of the natural world, the theories of the Milesians 
illustrate significantly different grasps of what the nature of things actually entails.  In short, 
Thales aligns the nature of things primarily with their material source, while Anaximander 
initiates the idea of nature as process through his idea of the apeiron as the cosmic arbiter, Time.  
Anaximenes enacts a synthesis of the two ideas by describing air as the material origin of all 
things with an immanent process of condensation/rarefaction.  Even from the first philosophical 
attempts to explain all things in terms of the idea of nature, there is little or no consensus about 
what this specifically entails.  And yet each theory bears different elements of purposiveness.  
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In the second chapter, I turn to a thinker long held to be anything but a philosopher. 
Xenophanes of Colophon, whose life spent as an itinerant poet produced ideas on topics ranging 
from the material composition of natural things to critical social commentary, is the first thinker 
that clearly uses the idea of nature repeatedly to classify various entities in the world.  Although 
he offers some speculation on the nature of all physical entities, the most important distinction 
Xenophanes makes is the one between divine and mortal natures.  Xenophanes uses the idea of 
nature as what something does to reason to particular, and shocking, attributes of the divine that 
differ markedly from traditional understanding.  In so doing he also better defines the limits of 
mortal nature with respect to knowledge.  Thus with Xenophanes the idea of nature extends 
beyond explaining the origin of the cosmos and the existence of natural phenomena, as he 
develops the first “theory of everything.”  
But we can only infer the idea of nature from the context of Xenophanes’ many 
fragments and it is only with Heraclitus of Ephesus that the term φύσις becomes explicitly 
connected with other philosophical concepts.  The expansion of the philosophical import of 
φύσις in the writings of Heraclitus is the subject of Chapter 3.  I argue that the importance of a 
dynamic concept of φύσις in Heraclitus’ work has not been sufficiently appreciated.  More 
specifically, I make the case that φύσις is a riddle for Heraclitus that demands a new method. 
This riddle is a paradoxical harmonia, or “fitting-together,” of opposites that serves as the pattern 
which underlies all things.  But the impact of φύσις extends beyond simply understanding what 
things are.  For Heraclitus, knowledge of φύσις unlocks our access to the λόγος, according to 
which all things are steered or guided.  Conflict is justice, Heraclitus tells us, and it is only 
through this process of conflict and reconciliation through harmonia that all things unfold. 
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Chapter 4 deals with the way early Greek natural philosophy is forever altered by the 
encounter with Parmenides.  Although many have read Parmenides as dismissing the idea of 
nature by condemning φύσις to “mere opinion,” I argue in favor of a predicational reading of 
Parmenides that understands the Eleatic to be concerned primarily with outlining the 
metaphysical and epistemological qualifications for the “nature” of anything real.  Rather than 
extricating the concept of nature from its more “dynamic” qualities, Parmenides in effect 
bifurcates nature into those qualities that constitute true “being” on the one hand, and the 
“becoming” or growth aspect, on the other.  In both cases, however, nature as an idea is 
functionally and repeatedly defined by Parmenides using the concept of limits (πείρατα).  The 
idea of limits for Parmenides is tied throughout the poem to the notion of paths as a way to 
understand the connection between reality and the human pursuit of knowledge.  More than a 
heuristic, however, paths are the natural means, established by the divine, through which all 
things are steered, and it is in this sense in which the purposiveness in nature manifests itself for 
Parmenides.    
In Parmenides’ wake, the early Greek pluralists struggle to articulate a concept of nature 
that simultaneously accounts for the supposed plurality of things in the human experience in the 
natural world and Parmenides’ metaphysical and epistemological criteria for the “nature” of any 
real thing.  The fifth chapter deals with three pluralist thinkers and the different concepts of 
nature that emerge in their theories.  Empedocles bifurcates the idea of nature into the physical 
structure of roots and the immaterial forces of Love and Strife that shape all things.  Anaxagoras 
understands all things to be composed of all things shaped, as it were, by a cosmic Mind.  
Finally, Philolaus understands the structural aspect of reality to be comprised of “limiters and 
unlimiteds” that are “fitted-together” by force of harmonia.  In each case, the idea of nature is 
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bifurcated along Parmenidean lines, but the attributes of both the “being” or physical structures 
of nature, and the “becoming” or motive forces responsible for shaping these structures are taken 
in different directions by the three thinkers.  Yet in every case the idea of nature has specifically 
purposive features.     
The final chapter of the dissertation deals with a pluralist thinker of an altogether 
different sort.  Democritus of Abdera is credited with expanding Leucippus’ theory of atomism 
into a credible account of the natural world.  Satisfying the Parmenidean metaphysical criteria 
for “the real,” but without restricting the cosmos to an absolute monism, Democritean atomism 
suggests a mechanical world that operates on strict necessity.  The φύσις of anything is reducible 
to its atomic composition and the idea of nature is purified of its divine and purposive qualities.  
The difficulty with this account of Democritus’ is that it persists in the Peripatetic tradition rather 
than his own words, and it is strongly contradicted by Democritus’ varied use of φύσις in his 
ethical fragments.  In this chapter, I examine the two distinct concepts of nature that emerge in 
connection with Democritus’ ideas.  I argue that he deliberately describes the “reality” of atoms 
and void in different terms in his fragments related to epistemology than the φύσις of things as 
found in his ethical fragments.  In so doing, Democritus reserves φύσις for a purposive idea 
closely connected to how humans ought to live. 
In the conclusion I turn to the conflict between nature and custom that reverberates so 
forcefully throughout intellectual circles in fifth-century Greece.  For the characteristic thinkers 
of the age, the sophists, nature has become a prescriptive force that poses clear norms for how 
many should live.  Yet even among the sophists, the idea of nature means any number of things.  
The foundation for such broad interpretive possibilities was laid by the failure of early Greek 
nature philosophy to generate a determinate idea of nature agreed upon across the spectrum of 
 10  
 
thinkers.  Extended to moral and political questions, and without an inherent telos, the 
amorphous idea of nature is used in service to a variety of human ends. This study concludes 
with an examination of the various ways the idea of nature is interpreted among the Greek 
sophists, and some suggestions for how we can read the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as an 
attempt to defend an idea of purposive nature and philosophy more broadly.  But the story of 
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Chapter 1: The Milesian Physiologoi and Unity in Nature 
 
The philosopher is the continuation of the drive through which  
we continually interact with nature by means of anthropomorphic illusions. 
    –Nietzsche 
 
Aristotle’s famous dictum that “all men by nature desire to know” opens his account of 
early Greek philosophy, explaining the motivation for the earliest attempt at philosophical 
theorizing (Metaphysics 980a22).6  A closer look at the views and lives of these earliest 
philosophers, however, reveals a broader set of motivations.  In part the desire to develop new 
ways of thinking about the nature of the world stemmed from the inadequacy of traditional 
explanations found in Homer and Hesiod.  An account of the cosmos based upon the whims of 
capricious gods was unsatisfactory or at best only a partial story for the origin and structure of 
the true reality of things. Curiously enough, however, in the fragments and testimonia of the very 
earliest Milesian φύσικοι there is no reference to mythic explanations at all.  One might attribute 
this absence to a lack of proper preservation of their written work or it may indicate a complete 
disregard for the traditional views.7  It is not a stretch to assume that these thinkers thought they 
could provide far better explanations of the origin and structure of the cosmos than those offered 
by their predecessors or that they understood their own ideas to be so radically different that they 
shared almost nothing with traditional views and thus saw no need to reference mythic 
explanations.  
                                               
6 All translations of Aristotle come from the Revised Oxford Translation, in Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), unless otherwise noted. 
7 For a brief discussion of the relationship between the Milesians and their more poetic predecessors, see Daniel W. 
Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major 
Presocratics, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at pp. 1-2, (hereafter TEGP). Graham calls 
the Presocratic approach to ignoring traditional lore and explanations “new, even shocking,” vol. 1, p. 2. In his 
earlier work Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), however, Graham goes to some lengths to note the continuity, maintaining that 
“Anaximander and his followers do in a sense continue the tradition of Hesiod in important ways,” p. 10.  To 
substantiate his point, he cites Hans Diller, “Hesiod und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie,” Antike und 
Abendland 2 (2010): 140-151, and Michael C. Stokes, “Hesiod and Milesian Cosmogonies,” Phronesis 7 (1962): 1-
37; 8 (1963): 1-34. 
 12  
 
The pursuit of better ways to explain the world around them could be attributed to some 
combination of a range of possible motivations.  First, the earliest φύσικοι may have pursued 
better explanations simply for the sake of accuracy; that is, they truly aimed at knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake. Perhaps they were dissatisfied with the capacity of established explanations to 
account for the existence of the cosmos or causes of particular events in it.  Or, perhaps, as 
Aristotle indicates, they were simply following their own nature in desiring to know more about 
“nature” in general.  Second, these thinkers also might have preferred the use of concepts in the 
formation of explanations because these could be applied to a broader set of phenomena and thus 
turn knowledge of nature into practical knowledge that aided navigation, husbandry, and other 
essential human endeavors.8  This possibility appears to be confirmed in the stories of the lives 
of the earliest philosophers who were interested in applying their knowledge across a range of 
activities from the construction of cities to the drawing of maps.  A third possibility may be that 
these thinkers aimed at the replacement of traditional beliefs that they viewed as harmful in 
certain ways to civic life.  Explanation through concepts may have bridged particular divides or 
mended sectarian differences within local culture by providing one view that all or most could 
agree upon.  
While their individual motivations may have varied, all of the earliest nature philosophers 
eschewed stories about gods or heroes in favor of conceptual explanations in order to give an 
account of the world and events in it.  In its most robust form this approach would have meant 
the creation of such concepts, or at the very least the construction of the capacity of a particular 
concept to explain natural phenomena.  The earliest Presocratics in particular are innovators on 
                                               
8 See Joseph Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959).   
Owens contradicts Aristotle’s description of  philosophy’s beginning in wonder when he claims instead that “the 
motives of the earliest Greek thinkers seem to have been sufficiently utilitarian in character,” p. 4. 
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an unprecedented scale; not only did they create and refine concepts and theories, but the very 
manner of their critical discussion was innovative.9  Spirited debate and contentious dispute 
replace dogmatic memorization and dramatic retelling of particular myths.  Instead of accepting 
the origins of the cosmos and the corresponding structure based on the apparent testimony of the 
Muses, these thinkers pushed one another to offer new ideas and better explanations for the 
things they experienced in the world around them.  The pursuit of wisdom about nature begins 
with passionate arguments where competing theories and concepts are advanced, attacked, and 
defended in peer groups of like-minded thinkers who wanted better knowledge as well.  The 
implications of this facet of the origins of philosophy have to some extent been lost amidst the 
forest of scholarship and perhaps more specifically the debate around whether or not their 
activities constitute philosophy.  The tendency to suppose, even in a “school” like the Milesians, 
that this spirit of innovation only extends to the specific principles of each thinker prevents a 
more complete appreciation of the earliest philosophical endeavors.  That is to say, perhaps the 
most fascinating earliest philosophical innovation comes about with respect to the very idea of 
the concept of nature itself. 
                                               
9 For perspectives on the foundations of critical philosophy in the Milesian school see Karl Popper, The Myth of the 
Framework (London: Routledge, 1994) pp. 40-43, and Dmitri Panchenko, “Thales and the Origin of Theoretical 
Reasoning,” Configurations, 1.3 (1993): 387-414.  Popper suggests that “the critical tradition was founded by the 
adoption of the method of criticizing a received story or explanation and then proceeding to a new, improved, 
imaginative story which in turn is submitted to criticism,” p. 42. Popper’s claim is that the Ionians are unique in that 
they celebrated criticism; it became the hallmark of the Ionian tradition when Thales “encouraged Anaximander, his 
follower, to see whether he could produce a better explanation of the apparent stability of the earth,” p. 43.  
Panchenko asks why this criticism was not carried out within the “mythological interpretation of nature” and argues 
that Thales establishes the possibility of debate regarding natural principles and, as a result, the possibility of gradual 
progress of knowledge, pp. 395-396.  For a different take on the essential ingredient of the early Greek physiologoi 
see Charles Kahn, “The Achievement of Early Greek Philosophy,” in Early Greek Philosophy: The Presocratics and 
the Emergence of Reason, ed. Joe McCoy (Washington D.C., Catholic University Press, 2013), pp. 1-17.  Kahn 
claims that “the fundamental innovation [of the earliest philosophers] is the concept of nature itself, the notion of 
physis,” p. 2.  His account of the origins of philosophy rightly emphasizes its creative quality and the concept of 
nature as the specific locus of that creativity, but Kahn presumes a shared view on the facets of this concept.  
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This chapter explores the innovation at the heart of the earliest Greek philosophical 
conceptions of nature in order to answer two principal questions. How does each thinker 
understand and use the concept of nature (φύσις) in his theory? And, to what extent is there a 
notion of purposiveness in each understanding?  In what follows I approach the respective 
theories of the Milesian φύσικοι; Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes in turn. Despite a 
variety of interpretations of their individual theories, the general assumption has been that they 
share a particular conception of nature, though competing theories exist as to precisely what this 
conception might be. I begin with a brief discussion of the two dominant interpretations of the 
Milesian conceptual framework for nature, one ancient, one modern, before suggesting the 
fundamental problem with both views. Turning to an examination of the specific theories of the 
Milesians, and beginning with Thales, I explore the implications of his view that water is the 
φύσις of everything, and argue that his conception of φύσις as origin also speaks to the aim of 
philosophical inquiry by replacing “a series of births with a circle of transformations.”10 His 
philosophical successor, Anaximander, builds on Thales’ description of φύσις as the origin or 
source of all things by offering the enigmatic ἄπειρον and yet emphasizing the notion of nature 
as process.  I argue that Anaximander’s conception of φύσις as process initiates the teleological 
worldview in Greek philosophy of nature in two fundamental ways. First, he provides a notion of 
nature as a process that guides or steers all things through arbitration between cosmic, 
conflicting opposites. Second, this natural process of reciprocity justice comes with a built-in and 
ever-elusive end: equilibrium.11 The last thinker covered in this chapter is Anaximenes, who is 
sometimes viewed as having taken a step backward from Anaximander’s more powerful 
                                               
10 Panchenko, “Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning,” p. 392. 
11 See Kurt Pritzl, “Anaximander’s apeiron and the Arrangement of Time,” in Early Greek Philosophy: The 
Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. Joe McCoy (Washington D.C., Catholic University Press, 2013), pp. 
18-36, at 35. 
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intellectual advances. I argue, however, that Anaximenes orchestrates a masterful synthesis of 
the view of φύσις as material origin with the view of it as perpetual process by positing a 
determinate material source, air, and a specific physical process, condensation/rarefaction. In 
doing so, he unites what he takes to be the best features of both earlier theories and establishes a 
more concrete notion of nature by providing a link between rational concept and empirical 
process. For Anaximenes, the process of condensation/rarefaction is not separate from the 
material constituent, but rather the inherent power of air itself. Finally, I conclude this chapter 
with a discussion concerning the notion of unity in the earliest φύσικοι that fundamentally 
characterizes the way they synthesize the concepts of nature and purpose.  
THE MILESIAN SCHOOL OF NATURE PHILOSOPHY 
The Milesian “school” begins around 585 B.C. during the prime of Thales and ends with 
Anaximenes whose floruit occurred roughly 50 years later. These men are the first-known 
thinkers to offer naturalistic accounts of the cosmos though precisely which figure first 
instantiates this sort of theorizing is contested.  While Aristotle and much of the subsequent 
tradition viewed Thales as the founder of early Greek nature philosophy, some modern scholars 
have argued that Anaximander is the true point of origin for philosophy in the West.12 Regardless 
of which thinker initiates nature or scientific philosophy, however, the common perception is 
that the earliest φύσικοι understood nature from the same basic framework. Yet despite this idea 
that they share a framework for understanding the cosmos, and by extension the very same 
concept of φύσις, the specific nature and the implications of this shared framework have been the 
                                               
12 For more extensive discussions regarding Thales as the founder of philosophy see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of 
Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-1981), vol. 1, pp. 45-72 (hereafter, HGP), 
and Patricia F. O’Grady, Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and Philosophy (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), pp. 1-8.  For proponents of Anaximander as the father of Western philosophy, see Charles Kahn’s 
Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.3, and Daniel 
Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, p. 4.  
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subject of varied interpretations. The classic understanding is inherited from Aristotle and 
presents the earliest Presocratic thinkers as material monists. The modern approach, where it has 
deviated from Aristotle’s influence, understands the earliest φύσικοι as “generating substance 
theorists.” In what follows, I construct a brief synopsis of each view, before illustrating the 
problem with both views that necessitates considering these thinkers in a new way. 
MATERIAL MONISM AND GENERATING SUBSTANCE THEORY 
Aristotle characterizes the first nature philosophers by their shared assumption that the 
principle of nature is “that of which all things that are consist, and from which they first come to 
be, and into which they are finally resolved” (ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται 
πρώτου καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, Metaphysics 983b8-9).  The standard view of this 
principle as material monism suggests that “the world arose out of a primal unity, and that this 
one substance was still the permanent base of all its being, though now appearing in different 
forms and manifestations.”13 Attributing this brand of monism to most of the first philosophers, 
Aristotle claims that such a concept of nature implies that “they do not think anything either 
comes to be or perishes, inasmuch as this nature is always preserved” (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε 
γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, Metaphysics 
983b12-14).14  Despite the fact that the earliest nature philosophers grasp the concept of nature as 
material, debate arises around the question of “the number and nature of this principle.”  The 
earliest nature philosophy then, according to Aristotle, is consumed by a debate over which and 
how many elements, or basic material constituents, are the primary source and substance of the 
universe and everything in it. Aristotle helpfully catalogues those who think there is only one 
                                               
13 Guthrie, HGP, vol. 1, p. 4. 
14 I have used Daniel Graham’s translation here as it is more faithful to Aristotle’s use of physis in this instance, 
TEGP, p. 29. 
 17  
 
material constituent persisting at the heart of things for us: Thales believes this to be water; 
Anaximenes and Diogenes contend it is air; and Heraclitus and Hippasus posit fire as the 
material nature of all things (Metaphysics 984a5-6).  But for Aristotle the materialism of the first 
nature philosophers is the infancy of metaphysical reasoning about nature because it is 
insufficient to explain the change we see in the world.15 Thus, nature philosophy necessarily 
progresses from this point through the attempt to explain what causes generation and destruction 
to follow from this single element, whatever it may be.  The general view of material monism 
embraces the idea of early Greek consensus around the concept of nature and holds that this 
single material is the source or principle of all things. Aristotle’s account maintains a similarity 
in how this unfolds across different thinkers. They offer only competing theories grounded in the 
same materialist view but are unable to explain real change because they hold that the nature of 
everything is always a single material constituent, even when things appear otherwise. Modern 
interpreters, however, have read far more sophisticated theories into the ideas of the earliest 
Presocratic thinkers, and the tendency has been to form a supposed consensus around the ἀρχή as 
a principle that continuously rules or governs entities within the cosmos. 
Daniel Graham presents a different account of the Milesian cosmologists’ basic 
assumptions as he argues against the standard Aristotelian interpretation that collects all of the 
early Ionians under the rubric of material monists.  Graham asserts instead that the earliest 
φύσικοι are “generating substance theorists.”16  Unlike the explanatory limitations that Aristotle 
levies against the materialists, the Generating Substance Theory (GST) explains how things 
                                               
15 In Physics 187a12ff, Aristotle homogenizes the monists even further by suggesting that they “make the 
underlying body one--either one of the three or something else which is denser than fire and rarer than air--then 
generate everything else from this, and obtain multiplicity by condensation and rarefaction.” He attributes here the 
same process (condensation and rarefaction) to all those he takes to be monists thereby suggesting that the only 
unique element of each theory is the individual material out of which the cosmos is constructed.  
16 See Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, p. 22. 
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evolved or developed from a single substance.  In effect, Graham construes the ability of the 
earliest nature thinkers to explain change in a radically different way from Aristotle. Graham’s 
theory goes even further when he contends that the GST is “governing the construction of 
theories in Ionian science or philosophy.”17  In other words, it is the paradigm for understanding 
not only the earliest Presocratic philosophers but the entire history of the Ionian tradition.  In the 
first part of his theory which covers the earliest thinkers, Graham does not contend that the 
Milesians offer an explanation of everything as a single material constituent.  Instead, as Patricia 
Curd observes, Graham suggests that they embrace the view that everything comes from a single 
“stuff” which “then generates other substances from itself and has no explanatory priority over 
the other substances at work in the cosmos.”18  The emphasis in the Generating Substance 
Theory is not on the single material as a source or origin (though the substance is that), but rather 
as a principle for the production of other substances.  Graham’s theory thus renders the Milesians 
as far more complex thinkers than Aristotle understands them to be but in changing their 
fundamental shared assumptions to those in his GST he still holds that they share the same 
conceptual view of the world and nature.  Graham’s theory also exceeds Aristotle’s in both its 
inclusiveness and its boldness; it gives an honored place for Anaximander in a way that 
Aristotle’s theory does not and connects the ideas of a greater number of thinkers within the 
broader tradition. 
 Each theory illustrates a different explanatory framework underscoring the study of 
nature by the earliest Greek φύσικοι.  Both interpretations, however, share a fundamental 
problem that inhibits our ability to appreciate each early Greek thinker in his own right and, by 
                                               
17 Ibid., p. 85. 
18 Patricia Curd, “New Work on the Presocratics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (2011): 1-37, at 5. Curd 
provides a helpful synopsis of Graham’s view. Graham sets forth his theory in most detail in Explaining the Cosmos, 
Chapter 4: “The Generating Substance Theory As An Explanatory Hypothesis.” 
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extension, the founding period of the philosophy of nature.  Both Aristotle’s material monism 
and Graham’s Generating Substance Theory link the earliest philosophers through the basic 
assumptions they supposedly share.  Each thinker is understood through a reference to a central 
framework; their respective ideas are first placed in the context of these shared assumptions.  But 
how much of this alleged unity is because of our fundamental desire to fit them into a unified 
paradigm?  In a period of innovation where traditional modes of explanation are wholly ignored 
or radically altered, why should these men necessarily think of the world through precisely the 
same lens?  The perceived similarity makes more sense if we consider the degree to which 
categorizing and schematizing explanatory frameworks restrict the appreciation of the earlier 
theorists.  In other words, Aristotle thinks of philosophy in terms of schools of thought, and he 
thinks of theories as precursors to his own theory of causality.  Graham’s ambitious theory is 
potentially even more limiting in this regard as it aims at categorizing even broader swaths of 
early Greek philosophy under the rubric of the “Generating Substance Theory.”  
The application of theoretical frameworks to the earliest nature philosophers also masks 
the depth of innovation in both concepts and theories.  Aristotle does afford us a glimpse of the 
practice of early Greek philosophy, or at the very least the practice as he understands it, when he 
characterizes the existing methodological framework in the earliest philosophers of nature as 
discussions about ἀρχή, the “source” or “beginning” of things.19  On one view the origin is 
precisely what these earliest physicists were debating, namely the proper sources or beginnings 
of the universe and everything in it.  This approach fits nicely with the view that the efforts of the 
φύσικοι are an extension of the efforts of their mythically oriented predecessors to understand 
                                               
19 Graham raises philological questions about Aristotle’s attribution of this practice to the Milesians, noting that “we 
have no fragments with this term [ἀρχή] being used substantively until Diogenes of Apollonia and Philolaus, and 
even there it is not clear how technical the term is,” TEGP, p. 39. 
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“the way the present world arose from a primordial Something.”20  But ἀρχή can also be 
understood as a principle that in some way governs or rules and both understandings of the term 
are intertwined in the earliest views of nature.  The source or origin plays a crucial role for the 
earliest philosophers because, at least in part, an explanation of where something comes from is a 
significant part of correctly identifying its nature.  At the same time, it is the ἀρχή as principle 
that governs the constitution of something, holding it together, and continuously making it what 
it is.   
Although Aristotle presumes some common conceptions among his predecessors, he 
illustrates the diversity in conceptual understandings of ἀρχή at the beginning of the 
philosophical lexicon in Metaphysics iv (1012b34ff).  Modern and ancient scholarship again 
diverge with respect to the proper understanding of ἀρχή in the theories of the Milesians.  The 
Aristotelian tradition understands Thales and Anaximander as grasping at the ἀρχή as principle, 
while modern scholarship “takes it to be much more likely” that both Milesian thinkers 
understand it as “the origin of things.”21  But why presume an inherent consensus rather than 
highly engaged critical debate about the very concepts used to explain nature?  Where else would 
the multiple meanings of ἀρχή have arisen prior to Aristotle’s time, if not from the very thinkers 
who were mobilizing the concept in crafting different theories?  Not only is it distinctly possible 
that the earliest nature philosophers understand ἀρχή differently by emphasizing different facets, 
                                               
20  See Jaap Mansfeld, “Myth, Science, Philosophy: A Question of Origins,” in Studies in the Historiography of 
Greek Philosophy (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), p. 45.  Mansfeld weighs in on the recurring debate in scholarship on 
early Greek philosophy regarding the degree to which the earliest philosophical efforts can be distinguished from  
mythology by suggesting a fair degree of continuity.  For classic accounts on this topic as it relates specifically to 
early Greek philosophy, see John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1930, 
hereafter EGP), and F.M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).  For a broader treatment of the topic which covers the idea more 
generally in early Greek culture, see From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, ed. 
Richard Buxton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).   
21 Malcolm Schofield “APXH,” Hyperboreus 3 (1997): 218-219. 
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but we can trace these differences to the way they result in markedly different theories of nature 
(φύσις).  At the origin of the discovery of φύσις lies a fundamental debate not only on what 
φύσις is (i.e. water, ἄπειρον, or air), but also what φύσις means.  Thales understands ἀρχή as 
source or origin as the central facet of φύσις; Anaximander the “process thinker” acknowledges a 
source but emphasizes the regulative process of nature, while Anaximenes synthesizes both 
views by prescribing a definite source material imbued with the power of a physical process 
which is responsible for the “nature” of anything and everything.  Despite such fundamental 
differences, however, in each thinker we discover traces of a teleological pattern of thought that 
undergirds his respective view.  Even as this pattern emerges along different lines for each 
thinker based on different views of nature, it nevertheless illustrates the common Milesian 
assumption of the unity of the cosmos.  Rather than the theories of Aristotle or Graham, this 
framework of purposiveness in nature and the corresponding assumption and exploration of unity 
explained rationally that harmonizes the Milesians into the first “school” of thought in the 
philosophy of nature. 
THALES OF MILETUS 
More than any other early Greek philosopher, Thales’ accomplishments speak for 
themselves.  He is one of only four Greeks included in all accounts of the Seven Sages and the 
only philosopher.  Celebrated in early Greek society for contributions in astronomy, nautical 
navigation, and the application of philosophical speculation to business pursuits, Thales is also 
considered a powerful political advisor who aids in the construction of cities and constitutions. 
Despite all of this, the ancient sage is, on some accounts, ridiculed for being an absent-minded 
philosopher more interested in the activity of the heavens than the practical concerns required for 
living on earth.  As a philosopher of nature Thales has also been understood in contradictory 
ways.  On the one hand, he has been portrayed as uninspiring, uninteresting, and of fairly little 
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importance on the view that his ideas and achievements have been greatly exaggerated 
throughout history.22  In contrast with this view, his recent defenders have argued that Thales is 
best regarded as a radical thinker who forever alters human history by founding theoretical 
thinking generally, philosophy and science more particularly.23  Since Thales’ seems to have 
written nothing down, we are left with little recourse but to derive his views from the testimonia 
about him rather than from his own words.24       
Aristotle tells us in Metaphysics i that Thales understands the ἀρχή to be water by 
explicitly connecting the concept of ἀρχή with φύσις.  Citing Thales as the “founder of this type 
of nature philosophy,” Aristotle suggests that the monists deny the possibility that “anything 
either comes to be or perishes,” contending rather that “this nature (φύσις) is always preserved… 
For a certain nature (φύσις) always exists, either one or more than one from which everything 
else comes to be while this is preserved” (ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης...ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί 
τινα φύσιν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους μιᾶς ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τἆλλα σωζομένης ἐκείνης, Metaphysics 983b13; 
17-18).25  Of these thinkers, Thales is said to hold the view that the φύσις of anything and 
everything, is water. What is not immediately clear, however, is whether this connection between 
ἀρχή and φύσις is forged by Thales himself or inferred by Aristotle as he outlines the view of his 
                                               
22 See D.R. Dicks, “Thales,”Classical Quarterly 9 (1959): 294-309.  Dicks takes great pains to reduce the proper 
view of Thales to include only that “he was a man of outstanding intelligence” who “speculated on the origin and 
composition of the universe,” and finally, that we should “regard it as highly probable that Thales interested himself 
in mathematics and astronomy and possessed for his time a more than average knowledge of both,” p. 306. 
23 Thales’ present-day defenders include Patricia O’Grady, Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science 
and Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2002) and Panchenko “Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning.” 
24 See O’Grady, Thales, for a recent argument that Thales did in fact produce written work.  For a stronger and 
better substantiated argument against this conclusion, see Dicks’ account in “Thales.”  Dicks points out that 
evidence for Thales’ contributions is limited to three sources prior to 320 B.C.: Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle. 
Subsequent sources often made comments based upon reports which were “two, three, four, five or more stages 
removed from the original,” p. 299.  Most scholars who weigh in on this debate conclude that it is best to assume 
that Thales did not produce written work, and O’Grady’s recent argument presents no real reason to abandon this 
view. 
25 Graham, TEGP, p. 29. In this passage, Graham’s translation is more faithful than Barnes’ with respect to the idea 
of translating φύσις as nature. 
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predecessor.  Aristotle helpfully supplies what he takes to be likely reasons Thales may have 
reached this conclusion: (1) “the nutriment of all things is moist”; (2) “heat itself is generated by 
the moist and kept alive by it”; (3) “the seeds of all things have a moist nature and that water is 
the origin of the nature of moist things” (λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντωνὁρᾶν 
τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸδ᾽ ἐξ οὗ 
γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων) διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ 
πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεωςεἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς, 
Metaphysics  983b 20-27).  These reasons are, at best, highly speculative, of course.  While 
Aristotle suggests that Thales derives his theories from observable phenomena in the natural 
world, some scholars object to the tendency to inflate the empirical character of the Milesian 
approach.  For instance, Seligman argues, “if they referred to observed ‘facts’, then it was in 
support of doctrines already held independently of them, and not as a basis for inference.”26  
Immediately following his presentation of the best empirical evidence for Thales’ view, 
Aristotle draws a parallel to an ancient view with the suggestion that Thales is not the first 
thinker to hold the view that water is the source of all things.  Aristotle implies an affinity 
between the views of physiologoi and mythologoi with an explicit reference to Homer.  Recalling 
the passage in the Iliad where Oceanus is named as the source “from whom all are sprung,” 
Aristotle marks this view as one of the oldest and most revered cosmogonical theories.  The 
affinity runs beyond water, however, and the more important parallel is the idea that for the 
                                               
26 Paul Seligman, The Apeiron of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas (London: 
Althone Press, 1962), p. 46. Seligman weighs in on another essential question in Presocratic scholarship: should we 
understand the early Greeks as empirical scientists, conceptual philosophers, or mystics? This question continues to 
be a source of contentious debate, except for Daniel Graham who considers this question a mere “quibble,” 
Explaining the Cosmos, p. 18. The classic exchange on this issue includes F.M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae 
and Gregory Vlastos’ response in “Review of F.M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae,” Gnomon 27 (1955): 65-76.   
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Greeks it is “the source of generation for which men feel awe.”27  Rather than a complete break 
from traditional modes of understanding, Thales continues the Homeric emphasis on primordial 
source as water, but instead of identifying the origin, and the encompassing generative powers, 
with a specific deity, he frames the source as a natural ἀρχή.  In doing so, he reimagines the 
Greek model of generation. Thales’ move, which equates the notions of  ἀρχή and φύσις with 
water implicitly if not explicitly, is thus both old and new; it relies on a traditional emphasis of 
nature, or “what is,” as closely aligned with its origin, and even the affinity with the elemental 
liquid as found in Homer.  But where Homer’s source is personified as Oceanus, Thales strikes a 
thoroughly naturalistic note by removing particular identity and broadening the origin to the 
widest possible scope.  The nature of anything is the same as the nature of everything for Thales 
principally because everything has a common, natural origin.  Not surprisingly, the evidence 
Aristotle offers for Thales’ conclusion hinges on the observation that the wet, or moist, plays a 
dominant role in biological things.  Perhaps projecting his own fascination with the biology of 
living creatures onto Thales, Aristotle’s examples center on the facet of biological life concerned 
with growth.  Nutriment and the production and maintenance of heat are vital functions for any 
living thing which aims to grow.  Aristotle’s final example is more fitting, however, as seeds 
provide a natural model for conceiving of the generation of all things, even the universe, from a 
common origin.  Likewise, water seems to be an observable source of growth for living things. 
Much of the world would have been quite obviously made up of water from the sea to rain which 
comes from clouds to plants having dew on them in the morning.  Aristotle’s line of reasoning is 
certainly plausible but sounds far more like Aristotle the biologist than Thales the astronomer. 
                                               
27 Richard Broxton Onians, The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, 
and Fate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 247. 
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Another way of reasoning to Thales’ conclusion is to suggest instead that meteorological 
phenomena induced him to his view.28  
Thales’ view that water is a precondition for growth and for life is certainly plausible, but 
does everything seem alive?  Why presume that water is the ἀρχή for things which display no 
obvious signs of life?  A famous passage in Aristotle’s On The Soul may give us a glimpse at 
Thales’ possible answer to this question, as Aristotle suggests that there are those who “think that 
the soul pervades the whole universe, whence perhaps came Thales’s view that everything is full 
of gods” (καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαι φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη 
θεῶν εἶναι, On The Soul 411 a7-8).  While Aristotle seems uncertain about the origin of Thales’ 
view, he seems fairly sure that Thales does indeed hold the view that “everything is full of gods.” 
Each thing is somehow pregnant with divinity, and we can speculate, in connection with his 
ideas on φύσις, that Thales moves to connect natural explanation with a mythical or 
theologically-based account for action or change in the world.  Rather than Oceanus as a single, 
original source from which all things have sprung, all things contain the mark of the divine ἀρχή 
through their possession of a watery nature.  Thales connects the observation of motion 
throughout the cosmos with the belief that soul is the source of motion, as Aristotle reports: “It 
appears from what is recounted of him that Thales too understood the soul to be a source of 
motion, since he said the lodestone has a soul because it moves iron” (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν 
ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν 
σίδηρον κινεῖ, On The Soul 405a19-21).  But there is a short distance from the connection of an 
inner principle, such as the soul or an inherent nature, with particular external motion.  As 
Ronald Polansky notes, “We may perhaps surmise that for Thales the ensouled magnet is also 
                                               
28 Burnet, EGP, pp. 48-49. 
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somehow cognizant of what it moves since it only moves certain things.”29  Such cognizance 
suggests the combination of the notion of source with the notion of ends in Thales’ view. 
Importing discernment to a broader class of things than just those that are obviously living, the 
selection of ends in nature is suggested in a primitive way.  The idea of water as the φύσις of 
everything, understood through a Greek tradition which embraces the divinity of origins, 
suggests a world imbued with a purposive discernment down to the most minute natural being.  
Thales’ infusion of all natural things with the purposive power of divinity through water 
as the φύσις of everything is an extension of the Homeric view of nature.  At first blush, the 
Homeric view seems to be more of a purposive forerunner to the teleological view that 
dominates the subsequent philosophical tradition in the respect of the process of the cosmic river 
generating.30  Thales redirects this notion of cosmic genesis into all things--not only do all things 
originally come from water as Oceanus, they are made of water, and thus have this same 
purposive, creative nature themselves.  In theorizing this way, Thales shifts such purposiveness 
from the macroscopic level of divine beings to a microscopic level of inherent nature.  Aristotle 
has already pointed us toward the idea that the material monism of the first philosophers of 
nature has a concept of τέλος built into it through the idea of destruction as fulfillment of the 
growth process.  On this view, a complete understanding of the source brings with it a grasp of 
the end of things.  Thus naming the source is akin to discovering the ends of nature such that all 
processes are a movement toward the end as a return to the source.  This identification holds true 
for Thales in an epistemological sense as well since in the discovery of an enduring ἀρχή as 
origin, ἀρχή is thus the τέλος of philosophical inquiry into nature, and Thales’ primary 
                                               
29 Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 79. See pp. 77-82, for 
a more complete account of Aristotle’s treatment of his predecessors’ views of the soul. 
30 See Onians, Origins, p. 247. 
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achievement as a philosopher of nature is that he has “replaced the series of births with a circle 
of transformations.”31  Supplanting the project of Homer and Hesiod, Thales posits the φύσις of 
things as a self-perpetuating source which accounts for itself always, and is not born or created, 
but transforms into different entities.  The pursuit of the origin of all things which leads to the 
discovery of nature is thus fundamentally purposive because it produces a knowledge of nature 
as continuously transforming itself.  The discovery of a natural explanation for the source of all 
things would necessarily induce one to ask: how then do things come to be from this source? 
Thales provides no clear answer to this question, but this is precisely where Anaximander 
focuses his own account of φύσις and ἀρχή, embracing origin but placing far more emphasis on 
the idea of nature as process.  
ANAXIMANDER 
While Thales precedes Anaximander in the history of western natural philosophy, the 
latter is generally considered to be the originator of both the Περὶ φύσεως tradition and scientific 
philosophy.32  The bulk of the modern literature on the Milesians focuses on Anaximander’s 
thought because the scope of Anaximander’s project was vast, as he purportedly attempted to 
move from a cosmogony to a descriptive account of the world at present, including a map.33  
Anaximander is also the first nature philosopher from whom we have concrete evidence of 
written work, based upon a single surviving fragment from his work in prose, later titled On 
Nature.  While the map along with much of Anaximander’s work is lost to us, what has become 
the inaugural fragment in early Greek philosophy survives.  Simplicius preserves the fragment in 
his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, although a fierce and interminable debate exists 
                                               
31 Panchenko, “Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning,” p. 393. 
32 Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, p. 3. 
33 Harold Cherniss, “The Characteristics and Effects of PreSocratic Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 12 
(1951): 319-345, at 323. 
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regarding the precise location of the beginning and end of Anaximander’s exact words.34  The 
surrounding context, however, proves helpful for the present study: 
τῶν δὲ καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων ᾿Αναξίμανδρος μὲν 
Πραξιαδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς 
ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος 
τοῦτο τοὔνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. λέγει δ᾿ αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε 
ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν 
ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς 
κόσμους· 
ἐξ ὦν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα 
γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν 
ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις 
οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.   
Of those who say the source is one and in motion and boundless, 
Anaximander, the son of Praxiades of Miletus, the successor and 
student of Thales, said the source and element of existing things 
was the boundless (ἄπειρον), being the first one to apply this term 
to the source (ἀρχή). And he says it is neither water nor any other 
of the so-called elements, but some other boundless nature (φύσιν 
ἄπειρον), from which come to be all the heavens and the world-
orders in them: 
From what things existing objects come to be, into them too does 
their destruction take place, according to what must be: for they 
give recompense and pay restitution to each other for their injustice 
according to the ordering of time, expressing it in these rather 
poetic terms (B1). 
The central concept in the passage is the enigmatic notion of the boundless, which has fascinated 
philosophers for thousands of years.  In that part of the fragment most often taken to be a direct 
quotation, however, Anaximander never mentions, much less elaborates on the nature of the 
ἄπειρον, in effect relegating significant portions of the debate surrounding the precise idea of 
“the boundless” to controversy over second-hand sources. In the larger passage included above, 
Simplicius frames this single Anaximandrean fragment in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
                                               
34 See Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of the Greek Cosmos at 168-178; G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and Malcolm 
Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 118, (hereafter KRS). 
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by explicitly connecting the ideas of boundless and nature by taking ἄπειρον to modify φύσις. 
So, rather than making “the boundless” a distinct source entity, or “thing,” rivaling Thales’ 
water, Anaximander’s notion of φύσις is itself described as indefinite or boundless.  Nature as 
boundless not only serves as a rejection of the material specificity of Thales’ theory but also 
signifies the possibility that φύσις, at its earliest conceptual stages, is conceived in significantly 
different ways.  Insofar as it is connected to ἄπειρον, the essential idea of nature for 
Anaximander is a lack of limit, material or otherwise.  
At first glance Anaximander’s suggestion that φύσιν ἄπειρον is the source or origin for 
the cosmos and all things in it may seem to follow Thales’ basic conception of nature rather 
closely.  On this view both Anaximander and Thales would have the same functional notion of 
φύσις, only different with respect to the particular constitution of the source.  It is true that 
Anaximander understands the φύσιν ἄπειρον as the source of all generation as Plutarch 
explicates by offering what he takes to be Anaximander’s account of the beginning in time of the 
universe: “[Anaximander] says that that part of the everlasting which is generative of hot and 
cold separated off at the coming to be of the world-order and from this a sort of sphere of flame 
grew around the air about the earth like bark around a tree” (φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου γόνιμον 
θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καί τινα ἐκ τούτου 
φλογὸς σφαῖραν περὶ φυῆναι τῶι περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῶι δένδρωι φλοιόν, A10).  The idea of 
“φύσις as origin” becomes remarkably more complex if it is both boundless and possesses 
specific powers of generation.  In the case of Thales, Aristotle infers a connection between his 
predecessor’s ideas and seeds, a connection often extended to Anaximander based on this 
passage from Plutarch.  Yet a seed implies a physical structure and thus, at the very least, 
physical limits.  Conceptually speaking, however, a seed is the source of something in such a 
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way as to contain the entire blueprint for what the thing will become.  The ἄπειρον insofar as it is 
both a source and boundless serves as a seed, without the limitations of a seed.  It is, in effect, “a 
kind of matrix from which seeds are born,” thus serving as a source for all things by prescribing 
how they will unfold.35 
One way to conceive of this notion of a boundless “matrix” is as an intricate process 
which both gives rise to and governs the cosmos.  Similar to his fellow Milesians, Anaximander 
envisions the ἀρχή as divine by transposing two key facets of divinity onto the boundless.  It is 
said to both “contain all things and steer all things” and be “deathless and imperishable.”36  Both 
ideas can be applied to this matrix through the notion of nature as a never-ending process which 
both contains and steers all things.  Aëtius supplies Anaximander’s reasoning behind his 
conception of the ἀρχή as boundless nature: “Thus he tells why it is boundless: in order that the 
coming to be which occurs may never cease” (λέγει γοῦν διότι ἄπειρον ἐστιν, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐλλείπηι 
ἡ γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη, A14).  We might suppose, as many others have, that the impetus behind 
Anaximander’s theory is a desire to correct an error he detected in Thales’ main idea.  After all, 
if everything is really water, how do we explain the existence of fire, let alone where it came 
from?  But Anaximander is far more interested in understanding the world in terms of “coming 
to be” rather than in “explaining the constitution of things.”  His entire project of a cosmogony 
aims not only to elucidate the source from which all things come, but to trace the process of 
development.  The story of nature for Anaximander, is the story of becoming, the story of 
                                               
35 Graham, TEGP, p. 68.  
36 Richard D. McKirahan expresses doubts that Aristotle has in mind Anaximander when he gives these attributes 
but provides no persuasive evidence to depart from the traditional attribution in Philosophy Before Socrates: An 
Introduction with Texts and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2010), p. 36, 
(hereafter PBS). 
 31  
 
process, the story of how we got here from there.  In such an account, the emphasis is less on 
origin and far more about what guides the development.  
For all the fascination and debate about the proper interpretation of the ἄπειρον, it is 
Anaximander’s invocation of a natural process of cosmic justice that ushers in the teleological 
view of the early Greek philosophers of nature.  While scholars debate how much of the only 
fragment we possess from Anaximander is paraphrased as opposed to direct quotation, the 
message is clear enough: justice is a cosmic principle that applies equally to the fundamental 
constituents of the cosmos as to mankind in political communities.  Anaximander assumes a 
basic plurality of opposites which naturally conflict with one another, such as hot and cold.37  By 
their very nature, these opposites commit injustice against one another by encroaching upon one 
another, “crimes” for which they then invariably “give recompense and pay restitution to each 
other.”  The universe unfolds for Anaximander from necessity or “according to what must be.”  
Both justice and injustice, then, are inevitable; woven into the very fabric of the cosmos as a 
universal, cyclical process.   
 If the ἄπειρον is itself this process of cosmic arbitration, then it serves as an original 
source of generation but one which plays a more specific, continual role in the unfolding of the 
universe.  All things are subject to this process and steered by it, which is consistent with the idea 
that the boundless nature “contains all things and steers all things,” as Anaximander says.  The 
notion of a “steered” (κυβερνᾶν) cosmos appears in Greek thought both earlier and later than 
Anaximander.  Under the Homeric conception, all things are steered by Zeus, a view Heraclitus 
employs when he suggests that the “Thunderbolt steers all things” (τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει 
                                               
37 See A10 and Physics 187a12-23 
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Κεραυνός, B64).38  Reality for the Greeks is then in a way fundamentally purposive in that it is 
steered and guided, but it is Anaximander who initiates the conception of a universe guided and 
steered not by supernatural beings but by a natural process with the force of law.  In providing a 
new way of thinking about the source of guidance, Anaximander seems to assert that entities 
must commit injustices against one another by their very nature, but that cosmic balance is 
inevitably restored through a process of reciprocity.  Adding the further stipulation that this 
cosmic process of justice occurs with a fixed regularity “according to the ordering of time,” 
Anaximander in effect supplies the way in which the course is constantly corrected.  The steering 
occurs both through the conflict of opposites and the inevitable retributive reaction.  Another 
reading of the ἄπειρον, provided by Kurt Pritzl, as fundamentally teleological is the suggestion 
that it is in fact time itself that is the “ἄπειρον as the divine, surrounding, mastering, force of the 
whole determining, according to law-like necessity, the fate or ends of all with-in the world.”39  
Operating as the force which governs the regulative process inherent in all natural things, on this 
view time is the indefinite, boundless natural process that “rules” both the unfolding of the 
cosmos and all things in it as a principle.  While a final evaluation of the precise nature of the 
ἄπειρον remains elusive, the inevitable conclusion is that Anaximander’s “conception of the 
universe, as a bounded whole steered and governed by an all-encompassing, teleologically 
ordered arche, is the conception of the universe that persists as philosophy develops and 
matures.”40  
But a teleological framework requires more than a notion of being steered in particular 
ways; it also requires being directed toward a particular end.  For Anaximander, the cosmic 
                                               
38 Heraclitus also uses the notion of a steered cosmos when he says, “The wise is one thing--knowing the plan which 
steers all things through all things” (B41).  
39 Pritzl, “Anaximander’s apeiron and the Arrangement of Time,” p. 35. 
40 Ibid. 
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back-and-forth process is in effect “a self-regulative equilibrium.”41  Natural justice is both a 
process of arbitration of conflicting opposites and an inherent end as the ever-present yet elusive 
goal of equilibrium.  The notion of equilibrium as a basic feature of the cosmos is not a new 
discovery with Anaximander.  Pervading Greek thought even for Homer and Hesiod, the notion 
of balance or equality in the cosmos was a commonplace.  Yet the idea that this is regulated by a  
law-like process which governs from necessity (not whim or fancy), is perhaps Anaximander’s 
greatest contribution to philosophy insofar as it marks nature with its own purposiveness rather 
than a supernaturally imposed sense of the end.  Anaximander mobilizes the concept of 
equilibrium as the fundamental principle of nature perhaps most famously in his discussion about 
an earth being equipoised.42  In resolving a question that fascinated his fellow Milesians, and 
perhaps Xenophanes, Anaximander maintains that what holds the earth in place is not a material 
support, such as the earth floating on water or air as the others claim, but the notion of 
equilibrium or symmetry.  The earth has no need to move in one direction rather than another, 
thus it remains equipoised.  While the ἄπειρον as a “matrix from which seeds are born” may 
have been responsible for the origin of the cosmos, it is as a process that aims perpetually at 
equilibrium that it ensures the continuation of the cosmos.  
  By connecting the idea of nature as a process with the notion of cosmic justice, 
Anaximander links nature with purposiveness.  The aim of justice is not to eradicate 
transgressions, as this would be impossible.  Rather, justice restores a balance that has been 
transgressed, thus always aiming at equilibrium as a kind of telos.  This idea of justice, 
regardless of its source, helps Anaximander articulate the idea that nature itself has equilibrium 
built into the process of generation as a natural telos.  As that which governs the regulative 
                                               
41 Vlastos, “Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies,” p. 172.  
42 See Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, pp. 76-81.  
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process inherent in all natural things, however, it is time that is the indefinite, boundless principle 
that “rules” both the unfolding of the cosmos and all things in it.  As the first physiologos to 
articulate the idea of nature as a fundamentally purposive process, Anaximander sets in motion 
the philosophy of nature among the early Greeks as an effort not just to say what things are made 
of or where they have come from, but how they come to be what they are.  
ANAXIMENES 
The general consensus among present-day scholars is that Anaximander’s intellectual 
accomplishments tower over those of the other Milesian physiologoi in no small part thanks to 
the possibilities contained in the concept of the ἄπειρον.  Yet his philosophical successor, 
Anaximenes, perhaps deserves a greater share of the praise for his own intellectual 
accomplishments.  In his prime around 546 B.C., and leaving only a single work (of which only 
one sentence survives), Anaximenes eschews the political metaphor contained in Anaximander’s 
theory, instead offering a psychological paradigm as the model for the cosmos: “As our soul, 
being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole universe” (οἶον ἡ ψυχή," 
φησίν, "ἡ ἡμετερα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει, 
B2).  In a way similar to Thales’ probable rationale, Anaximenes uses the concept of life to 
support his theory.  The universe and man operate by the same principle, according to 
Anaximenes, but this principle is not a regulatory law-like process of recompense that seeks 
equilibrium, but rather a material principle that surrounds and unifies.    
Theophrastus provides us with a more complete account of Anaximenes’ central beliefs, 
as reported by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: 
᾿Αναξιμένης...ἑταῖρος γεγονὼς ᾿Αναξιμάνδρου, μίαν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς 
τὴν ὑποκειμένον φύσιν καὶ ἄπειρον φησιν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκ 
ἀόριστον δὲ ὤσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ ὡρισμένην, ἀέρα λέγων αὐτήν· 
διαφέρειν δὲ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας. καὶ 
ἀραιούμενον μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἷτα 
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νέφος, ἕτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, εἶτα γῆν, εἶτα λίθους, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ 
τούτων. κίνησιν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἀίδιον ποιεῖ, δἰ ἣν σαὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν 
γίνεσθαι. 
Anaximenes…like Anaximander, declares that the underlying 
nature is one and unlimited but not indeterminate, as Anaximander 
held, but definite, saying that it is air. It differs in rarity and density 
according to the substance <it becomes>. Becoming finer it comes 
to be fire; being condensed it comes to be wind, then cloud, and 
when still further condensed it becomes water, then earth, then 
stones, and the rest come to be from these. He too makes motion 
eternal and says that change also comes to be through it (A5).43 
Anaximenes builds on the theories of his predecessors Thales and Anaximander by incorporating 
distinct elements from each thinker’s ideas.  From Thales he pulls the notion of a “determinate” 
material constituent which comprises the fundamental reality of any and every individual thing 
in the natural world.  Agreeing with Anaximander, however, that the φύσις of things is 
specifically generative, always involving “coming to be,” Anaximenes supplies a precise 
process, condensation and rarefaction, by which things come to be what they are.  By combining 
the fundamentally constitutive elements of his philosophical predecessor’s theories, Anaximenes 
generates a concept of “underlying nature” which more precisely explains the physical 
composition of things and processes of change in the natural world.44  The determinate material 
and the generative process are not separate for Anaximenes; instead, he understands air “to have 
in itself this power of movement, that is, the power of rarefying and condensing.”45  
                                               
43 Translation from McKirahan, PBS, p. 48. 
44  While the suggestion  that Anaximenes’ theory is a definitive step forward from Anaximander’s is certainly 
debatable, it is the idea that Anaximenes’ methodological innovation comes about through assembling a new theory 
from parts of those of his predecessor’s theories that is far more essential for properly understanding the 
development of the concept of nature in early Greek philosophy. Anaximenes’ ability to build on the ideas of his 
predecessors to establish a firmer concept of nature as having a definite material origin and an articulated process, 
specifically that  the material origin and the definite process are one and the same, establishes a fundamental facet 
of philosophical inquiry--better knowledge and stronger explanations can be constructed out of a history of ideas. 
45 Kathleen Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 66.  McKirahan also points this out when he says that 
“Anaximenes did not identify separation and condensation as separate causes from air,” PBS, p. 52. See Metaphysics  
984a5-6, 985a 29-31. 
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  The concept of nature understood this way (that is, as a concept of being) does not 
differentiate and classify but unifies in several key ways.  First, all things are functionally the 
same thing, air; they just happen to be in different current states.  Much like Thales’ water, 
Anaximenes’ air is, on some level, the only thing that “actually is.”  Second, by explicitly 
labeling an identifiable natural process as the singular law of the system, Anaximenes prescribes 
the specific process by which all things operate.  In this way, he might be accounted the first true 
empirical philosopher of nature.  Unlike Anaximander, for whom the process is a cosmic process 
that regulates the behavior of opposites contained within the universe, Anaximenes understands 
the power for condensing and rarefaction to be immanent in the nature of things themselves.  Air 
is both “condensing and rarifying” and “condensed and rarefied,” and as nature is both process 
and source material.  As both material and means, air produces everything in the cosmos, 
including, as it turns out, the gods themselves.  Air, as the underlying nature of everything, is 
more fundamental than the gods. 
While Anaximander understands nature as a process that aims at and produces 
equilibrium by regulating opposites, Anaximenes asserts a specific, observable, physical process 
of condensation and rarefaction.  One problem with Anaximander’s notion of justice derived 
from the perception of opposites like hot and cold giving way to one another, is that it fails to 
account for a whole host of seemingly unrelated phenomena in the natural world that do not 
neatly fit into the notion of “opposites.”  Anaximenes uses his idea of nature to unlock a far more 
intelligible world by increasing the “range of related phenomena” and giving an empirical 
process that can, at least in some instances, be directly observed.46  Anaximenes is much closer 
to our version of a scientist in that he expends “effort to arrange the observed data in an 
                                               
46 McKirahan, PBS, p. 50 
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intelligible scheme, based on the cause and effect relationship between them.”47  Where 
Anaximander grasps at the nature of things through the lens of polarity, Anaximenes views the 
natural world as a spectrum in which natural entities are related through what they possess in 
common rather than through their fundamental opposition to one another.  
Broadly speaking, the conception of φύσις as both material constituent and inherent 
process explains both the production and unification of the cosmos.  But does it explain the end? 
Air as nature is both the material and the force holding everything together as well as 
differentiating this unity into a plurality of distinct entities.  Returning to his psychological 
paradigm, it becomes clear that for Anaximenes the soul “holds us together” by serving as the 
principle of identity and unification in the same way air unifies the cosmos.  Anaximenes thus 
explains the unification of everything through the twofold structure of air as both material source 
and power of condensation/rarefaction.  His theory explains unity both of the individual thing, 
what is holding it together, and the cosmos--unified as one thing which operates in a singular 
way.   In this way, Anaximenes’ view anticipates the Aristotelian definition of nature as an inner 
principle of change quite clearly.  Contained in everything and possessing the capacity to shape 
itself, air is the inner principle underlying change in all entities.  If Anaximenes were to supply a 
telos then, it would be in the form of an end that guides the way this shaping occurs.  More 
explicitly than Thales, Anaximenes uses notions of life to understand and explain the operation 
of the cosmos.  The implication may be that the operation of air is guided by the end of the 
continuation of life and the inherent unity of all things into a whole, but this is, at best, a very 
tentative conjecture.48  
                                               
47 Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 65. 
48 Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, thinks that Anaximenes may suggest a “teleological account of the world” in B2 
(“As our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole universe”), but that Plato 
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END AND UNITY IN THE EARLIEST PHUSIKOI 
Fractured at its very origins then, the discovery of nature is not as monolithic and uniform 
as it has often been understood.  The first physiologoi, even if they do grasp the nature of things 
in terms of ἀρχή, understand and use the conceptual features of “nature” quite differently. 
Thales’ gravitates toward using traditional explanatory frameworks in new ways when he 
articulates a common source for all things that is not supernatural but material in nature.  While 
Anaximander continues Thales’ line of thinking after a fashion, he explicitly broadens the idea of 
nature to include that which governs not only origin but process of development. Transcending 
the limits of material composition, the idea of nature in effect becomes process through 
Anaximander’s theory of a cosmic process of arbitration that governs all things.   Anaximenes 
understands the material and process to be one and the same nature, air, which operates as the 
inner principle of all entities, shaping themselves through the dual process of condensation and 
rarefaction.  What then unites such disparate thinkers into a single “school” of philosophy?   
Beyond common location, the Milesians share a general orientation toward nature itself.  
Concerned with what can be said of the natural world, they exchange ideas and offer solutions to 
complex questions, thereby forming themselves into a school by common interest and endeavor. 
Despite fundamental disagreement on foundational concepts like ἀρχή and φύσις, that is, those 
notions by which they frame the natural world, the Milesian physiologoi also share a series of 
general assumptions.  They each hold that the idea of nature is both a worthy subject of inquiry 
and a way to better understand the cosmos.  These three men also share a common spirit of 
innovation and imagination both in the answers they provide to big questions and their 
willingness to experiment with existing conceptual frameworks.  The first steps on the path to the 
                                               
possibly neglects to appreciate the “suitable application...of the teleological and providential character the Milesian 
ascribes to air,” p. 48.     
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discovery of nature illustrate that the idea of nature is not simply something that man pursues and 
investigates, but a way in which he orients himself to answering particular questions.  The 
fundamental shift in orientation is the understanding that nature is both the question and the 
answer and the dogged pursuit of it in both capacities is an endeavor worth undertaking.  
In their earliest forms then, these theories of nature are all primarily intended to explain 
the underlying unity of things.  Such a unity is not unique to the Milesian physiologoi, but they 
aim to supply novel and fairly sophisticated explanations for it.  By virtue of its broad, if 
implicit, application to all things, the idea of nature is what unifies all things for the Milesians 
both when it is understood as “the first things” and the “essential character of a thing.”  Thales’ 
notion of unity stems from his belief that everything is ultimately composed of the same thing 
and this natural inter-connectedness between vastly different kinds of things demands an 
account.  Anaximander finds the unity of the universe through subjugation of all things to a 
cosmic process of recompense that aims at equilibrium.  While the opposites are fundamentally 
differentiated and competing, all things are regulated by the process of nature.  This is to say 
that, for Anaximander, understanding the world through the process of recompense, and thus 
cosmic equilibrium, not only better explains particular facets of the cosmos but illustrates that 
the process itself is the true underlying unity of all reality.  For Anaximenes, nature is both the 
material constituent and a determinate process. Anaximenes claims that what makes something 
what it is, and this goes for everything that is, is the degree to which it is condensed or rarefied 
air.  Unity in his view is immanent to the entities in the world, not an externally imposed cosmic 
process ruled by time, but an inner, regulative principle that shapes the entity through 
condensation and rarefaction.  In their exploration of various ways to understand and explain the 
underlying unity, the Milesian physiologoi lay the foundations for the more advanced discussions 
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and arguments around ideas of unity and plurality in the cosmos which play out in subsequent 
early Greek philosophy. 
The earliest physiologoi also share the common assumption of the divinity of nature. 
Some suggest that the “core” of the Milesian revolution in thought is a reformed theology.49  On 
this view, the Milesians are reimagining the nature of the gods through naturalizing them into a 
single entity at the heart of all that exists.  While this theory can be taken to extremes, leading 
scholars to tilt at far more sophisticated divine windmills than are actually present in the 
fragments and testimonia, the general view of a strong connection between theological and 
philosophical concepts at the very origins of philosophy is founded on reliable evidence that the 
Milesians conceive of nature as divine in certain respects.  In suggesting that “everything is full 
of gods,” Thales extends the divine attributes of immortality and unlimited power throughout the 
natural realm to both animate and inanimate things.  The implication, as Kirk and Raven point 
out, is that “the world as a whole manifests a power of change and motion” which must be 
“because of its permanence...extent and variation, be regarded as divine.”50  Anaximander 
expands this notion of divinity through the idea that the boundless controls and steers the world.  
In stark contrast with Homeric and Hesiodic divinity, which understands the regulation of events 
in the world through the “personal, arbitrary interventions” of the gods, Anaximander’s 
boundless controls the world through “enforced regularities” and “lawlike cycles,” thus 
transforming the notion of divinity into something akin to “natural order.”51  The relationship of 
divinity to Anaximenes’ air is more difficult to sort out.  According to Cicero and Aëtius, 
                                               
49 See Edward Hussey, The Presocratics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), p. 29.  Gregory Vlastos offers 
a more moderate position in observing that for the Milesians the “primary object is to understand nature, not to 
reform religion,” yet acknowledging that there are “important exceptions” to this rule; see his “Theology and 
Philosophy in Early Greek Thought,” Philosophical Quarterly (1952): 97-123, at 98. 
50 Kirk and Raven, p. 95. 
51 Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, p. 14. 
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Anaximenes believed that air itself was God, but Augustine contends instead that the Milesian 
embraced a polytheistic theory but “did not, however, believe air was created by them, but that 
they were formed out of air” (A10).  In both cases, Anaximenes’ notion of divinity continues the 
Milesian emphasis on infusing nature with the idea of unlimited power.  In its earliest 
philosophical conceptions, the idea of nature is thus necessarily interconnected with the 
constitutive elements of the concept of divinity.  
Finally, the Milesian theories of nature are marked, to greater and lesser extents, with 
notions of purposiveness that serve as foundational for succeeding philosophical traditions. 
Bound up in the explanations offered by the Milesians are not just attempts at articulating what 
there is or how things came to be this way, but implications for why they are this way.  A 
pantheistic Thales articulates a view of nature as a perpetual source which engages in a cycle of 
transformations.  The perpetuation of the cycle, that is, the power of the source, is best 
encapsulated in the idea of water.  Such a source is purposive not because it acts for particular 
ends, but by being the end itself, both of knowledge and existence.  The source as the nature of 
things is at once the origin, the process, and the telos.  Understood this way, Thales’ theory is 
elegant and yet deceptively simple, and offers Anaximander the opportunity to expand by 
providing a more explicit theory of the cycle of transformations.  It is not the source, but the 
cycle or process of encroachment and recompense aimed at the specific end of equilibrium that 
explains why the world is such as it is at any given point in time.  Anaximenes shifts this idea of 
process into a power of shaping that acts as an inner principle of nature, transforming the concept 
of φύσις into an explanatory principle that simultaneously has the capacity to shape itself and 
“hold itself together.”  While he may not supply a precise end for natural processes, it is not 
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inconceivable that Anaximenes believed that the purpose of the activity of nature was the 
continuation of the existence of the cosmos itself.    
Despite the attributes of unity, divinity, and purposiveness in the Milesian theories of 
nature, we should not fall into the trap of assuming that they share a single framework for 
thinking about nature.  Rather, as I have argued here, the Milesians lay the foundation for deeper 
explorations of nature, and its purposive features, in remarkably different ways.  By articulating 
different ways to understand ἀρχή, the Milesians offer a multi-faceted concept of nature that, in 
its original formulations, is primarily intended to explain the existence of unity in the cosmos.  
The fascination with unity that runs throughout all of ancient Greek philosophy finds its humble 
beginnings among these thinkers.  Through their efforts to carve out the features of this idea of 
nature, the Milesians lay important theoretical foundations for their most immediate 
philosophical successor, Xenophanes, who conceives of the relationship between φύσις and unity 
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Chapter 2: Xenophanes’ Theory of Everything 
To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a 
little with certainty, and leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things. 
   –Isaac Newton 
History has wavered considerably on the inclusion of Xenophanes in the philosophical 
canon. Oftentimes, he has been considered only a poet or theologian, unless one follows 
Aristotle who seems not to want to grant him even that much.  Calling him a “little boorish”     
(μικρὸν ἀγροικότεροι) and considering his ideas barely worth mentioning let alone meriting 
engagement, Aristotle dismisses Xenophanes as less rigorous than his other early Greek 
counterparts.52  Much of the history of philosophy would follow Aristotle’s lead in this view and 
though the Stagirite’s objection to Xenophanes’ ideas was neither the first nor the most extreme, 
it has certainly reverberated throughout history the longest and with the most force.53  And yet 
the more recent trend among scholars of early Greek philosophy has aimed at ever-increasing 
inclusiveness and the expansion of the canon of philosophers.  As a result, Xenophanes has 
found recent defenders who have sought not only to substantiate but elevate his place in the early 
Greek philosophical pantheon.  Even if one grants the existence of philosophical content in his 
fragments, however, Xenophanes seems far less concerned with natural philosophy than with 
epistemological and theological questions.  What relevance does he have then for the present 
study of the concept of purposive nature in early Greek philosophy?  His defenders, most notably 
James Lesher, have read Xenophanes as a systematic thinker who intends a broader integration 
                                               
52 See Metaphysics 986b18-27 where Aristotle justifies ignoring Xenophanes in metaphysical inquiry. 
53 Heraclitus is Xenophanes’ first recorded detractor when he says, “Much learning does not teach understanding. 
For it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus” (πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ 
διδάσκει. Ἡσίοδον  γὰρ ἂν ἐδιδακε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Χενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον, B40). Cherniss offers a 
similar present-day summation of Xenophanes’ philosophical talents when he suggests that Xenophanes is only 
included in the history of philosophy “by mistake,” The Characteristics and Effects of Presocratic Philosophy, p. 
18. Hermann Fränkel concedes that Xenophanes’ “doctrine of God and his critique of knowledge” may be 
philosophical but that “in all other respects, this remarkable man appears expressly unphilosophical,” “Xenophanes 
Empiricism and his Critique of Knowledge” in The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alexander 
Mourelatos (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 118.   
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of the various threads of his thought than has previously been accepted.54  While his defenders 
correctly aim to connect Xenophanes’ ideas, they take the wrong approach to Xenophanean unity 
when they argue for a “system.”  A system presumes parts fulfilling designated functions, and 
perhaps even one “part” driving another. In such commentaries on Xenophanes, his thoughts on 
the gods drive his ideas on natural things and knowledge.  That is, discussions of these latter 
concepts are only ever in service to his theological agenda. I will argue in this chapter, however, 
that his defenders have not gone far enough; using the concept of nature, we can give a better 
account of actual unity in his ideas and discover what Xenophanes ultimately sought to offer: a 
theory of everything.55   
A little over two generations after the Milesians, Xenophanes emerges as a new kind of 
nature philosopher among his contemporaries. By offering more specific insight into the 
challenges and questions surrounding man in both the natural and supernatural realms, 
Xenophanes explicitly extends the purview of the concept of nature beyond the origin and 
development of the cosmos.  Though he does not use the term φύσις in the fragments which have 
survived to us, we can derive key facets of his concept of φύσις from phu-cognates found in 
                                               
54 See James Lesher “A Systematic Xenophanes?” in Early Greek Philosophy: The Presocratics and the Emergence 
of Reason, (Washington D.C., Catholic University Press, 2013) , in which he suggests the possibility of 
systematizing Xenophanes’ work, albeit cautiously.  
55 Ascribing such theories of everything to Presocratic thinkers is a recent trend among commentators.  Patricia Curd 
suggests that Anaxagoras “proposed a theory of everything” although she does not define what she means by this 
phrase beyond suggesting that, “his aim seems to have been to explain as completely as possible the world in which 
human beings live…thus he seeks to investigate our universe from top to bottom,” “Anaxagoras and the Theory of 
Everything” in Oxford Handbook of PreSocratic Philosophy, Curd and Graham, eds. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) p. 230.  But this could plausibly be said about virtually all of the early Greek philosophers of nature 
following the Milesians. In fact,  Daniel Graham contends that Heraclitus is “the first philosopher in the full sense” 
since he attempts to provide “a coherent theory of everything,” TEGP p. 136. My argument is that Xenophanes is 
the first to attempt a philosophical theory of everything. In his introductory work for new students of the 
Presocratics, Giannis Stamatellos translates a key passage on Xenophanes from Aristotle to suggest that Xenophanes 
was the first “who looked up at the sky and had a theory of everything.” Stamatellos gives no account as to why he 
deviates from the established translation of this fragment to translate τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν as “theory of 
everything” nor does he endeavor to substantiate the suggestion. See Introduction to Presocratics: A Thematic 
Approach to Early Greek Philosophy, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 11.  Beyond this instance, I cannot 
find any other attempts to ascribe such a theory to Xenophanes, let alone argue for such a connection. 
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several of his fragments.  Connecting these facets with his application of the prescriptive 
qualifier “all things” (πάντα) to wide-ranging subjects and implicit philosophical questions 
illustrates the emergence of intertwined universal and individual features of his concept of nature 
which simultaneously classifies and unifies things in the world.  The most important and 
revolutionary application of the idea of nature which emerges from Xenophanes’ fragments is 
directed at the discovery of the true “nature” of the divine.  By tracing Xenophanes’ 
simultaneous deconstruction of traditional anthropomorphic views of the gods together with his 
positive construction of a single, unmoving God, we can see how Xenophanes employs his own 
concept of nature to reconceive divine nature both in itself and as it relates to the idea of a mortal 
nature.  
Understanding Xenophanes as a more inclusive kind of nature philosopher allows us to 
begin to piece together the seemingly disparate strands of his ideas on the gods, knowledge, 
human values, and the natural world.  These strands, I argue, can be connected into a single, 
unified theory of everything.  This chapter offers a new perspective on the emerging concept of 
nature (and its connection with purpose) in early Greek philosophy.  Xenophanes, I argue, uses 
the idea of nature to attack conventional beliefs and their sources in order to supplant tradition 
with a new way to understand the world.  Augmenting the idea of nature as “outward 
characteristics,” Xenophanes uses the notion of capacity, or what something can do, to expand 
the Hellenic conception of φύσις and apply it to a broader number of philosophical questions.  In 
his hands, this idea of nature helps to establish a “likely story” that enables better understanding 
of both natural phenomena and the nature of divine beings.  Such wisdom, on his view, has 
important political ramifications, as he contends that those who possess his sort of expertise are 
far more valuable to the city than Olympic victors.  By applying this sort of inquiry, mankind is 
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able to better reflect the true nature of the divine by guiding and governing according to 
intelligent principles, rather than the capricious whims of the Homeric gods. 
XENOPHANES’ CONCEPT OF PHYSIS 
Relative to the Milesians, an enormous amount of extant material survives from 
Xenophanes.  Yet despite this surfeit of fragments, the term φύσις is conspicuous in its absence. 
The lack of the term in the precious few fragments from the Milesians is not generally 
considered problematic given that Aristotle and the subsequent tradition categorizes them as 
nature thinkers.  He affords no such place to Xenophanes, and given the absence of the actual 
term, Xenophanes’ concern with the concept of nature seems plausibly doubtful at first glance. 
As a result, he has often been excluded from discussions of philosophy of nature among the 
Presocratics. James Lesher, who has written the definitive modern commentary on Xenophanes’ 
work, presents an alternative understanding, however, when he suggests that “although the noun 
φύσις  appears nowhere in the fragments of Xenophanes, the φύσις of things—both of 
individuals and of πάντα—is the subject of many of his accounts.”56  A passing suggestion in a 
footnote, Lesher’s claim nevertheless provides a plausible foundation for raising an important 
question: how much can the concept of nature be restricted to the appearance of the term φύσις?   
While the associated term need not necessarily be present in order for the thinker to use a 
particular philosophical concept, it does provide a useful signpost for the modern interpreter of 
early Greek texts.57 Xenophanes provides such signposts when he uses words derived from the 
verb φύω in several fragments.  Words derived from the Greek verb φύω inherently contain the 
notion of growth.  The single use of the noun φύσις in Homer concerns a flower reflecting an 
                                               
56 James Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992),  p. 140.  All 
translations of Xenophanes’ fragments come from this edition, unless otherwise noted. 
57 The concept of nature will become more intimately connected with einai in later early Greek thinkers, as I argue 
in my discussion of Parmenides’ views in Chapter 4. 
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affiliation with the notion of plant growth, but Xenophanes’ extends the use of the term φύονται 
to a wider class of things, when he says, “All things which come into being and grow are earth 
and water” (γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ πάντ᾿ ἔσθ᾿ ὅσα γίνοντ᾿ ἠδὲ φύονται, B29).58  This qualifier shapes the 
subject “all things” (πάντα), by redefining it into a smaller group of things which perform this 
function of growth.  In other words, Xenophanes means “all natural things are earth and water.”  
Natural things are defined on a fundamental level by their most basic functions, by what they do: 
they both come into being and grow.59  The emphasis in this fragment is not, as has often been 
assumed, on the specific materials mentioned, as though Xenophanes aims to enter the 
materialist debate by positing two ἀρχαί in place of one offered by the various Milesian 
physiologoi.60  It is on redefining what it means to be natural. In doing so, this sentiment 
augments the distinction Xenophanes wants to make between the natural world and the divine 
realm that takes shape even in the fragments concerned with explanations of physical 
phenomena.61  Natural things have an origin and a process of growth, whereas the divine does 
not, but instead is eternal and unchanging.  In fact, a significant element of Xenophanes’ 
purification of the concept of the divine centers on just this sort of distinction: showing that the 
gods are not born and do not die (see B14). 
                                               
58 Despite Xenophanes’ criticisms of Homer, this fragment shows an affinity with the Homeric view espoused in the 
Iliad : “may you all turn into water and earth” (ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε, VII.99). 
59 Based on the ancient texts which have survived to us, this is a new way of thinking about nature or natural things. 
The uses of φύσις and φυή in Pindar and Aeschylus almost exclusively “refer to the outward, visible characteristics 
of the object or person under consideration-- to its ‘appearance’,” John Walter Beardslee The Use of Physis in Fifth-
Century Greek Literature (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1918), p. 8.   
60 Xenophanes may suggest the idea of dual source in another fragment when he says “For we all come into being 
from earth and water” (πάντες γὰρ γαίνς τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα, B33), but there he modifies the subject to be 
more specific to humans and drops the notion of growth so it is not clear that he is speaking about all natural things. 
61 As Lesher suggests, “[earth and water] account for all things existing within the natural world, but the nature of 
the divine is another question,” Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 134.  It is not uncommon for commentators 
to attribute to Xenophanes an intent to divide the mortal and divine realms in those fragments which deal with the 
knowledge or the nature of the gods. What many fail to fully appreciate, as Lesher does here albeit in passing, is that 
the fragments dealing with natural phenomena accomplish this as well.  Such consistency points toward a cohesive 
theory rather than isolated observations on various phenomena or philosophical questions. 
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Natural things for Xenophanes are thus defined in a way which fits with the Milesian 
physiologoi--by their material constituents as a source, at least provisionally.  As a result 
Xenophanes has been interpreted as a material dualist who offers this competing theory in the 
midst of the monistic conceptions of the Milesians.62  Yet Xenophanes has also sometimes been 
considered a material monist, when he says: “for all things are from the earth and to the earth all 
things come in the end” (ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾶι, B27), but Aristotle 
repeatedly suggests that no physiologoi held the view that earth was the ἀρχή.63  Xenophanes 
likely has in mind what is clearly observable in plant and animal life: these natural things possess 
both solid, earthy components and fluid, watery components.  We know from some of his other 
fragments that Xenophanes was interested in various kinds of natural things which would have 
readily displayed both qualities—frogs and cherry trees, respectively (B39 and B40).  Extending 
our view to the testimonia, we find that Xenophanes is also the first to use the evidence of fossils 
to pose theories of broad scale evolution of periods of time on Earth (A33).  Given his wide-
ranging, and seemingly contradictory ideas concerning nature, what concept of φύσις can be 
reliably generated from his fragments?  
While Xenophanes uses phu-cognates to indicate the essence of natural things as those 
which grow, he also begins to use them to distinguish between things in the world, which comes 
                                               
62 Diogenes Laertius tells us that Xenophanes was quite familiar with the theories of Thales: “According to some 
accounts [Thales] seems to have been the first to study astronomy and to foretell solar eclipses and the solstices. So 
Eudemus says in his history of astronomy; for which reason both Xenophanes and Herodotus admire him,” Lives of 
Philosophers, 1.23. Lesher maintains in fairly standard form that Xenophanes is a “two-archai” dualist, Xenophanes 
of Colophon: Fragments, p. 133. While it is certainly possible that Xenophanes offered his ideas in response to the 
monistic theories of his philosophical predecessors, we should not so immediately assume that his primary way of 
doing so was simply to multiply material sources. While we cannot definitively answer the question, we can make 
the case Xenophanes considers this, at best, an auxiliary question in the pursuit of knowledge of the reality of things 
given the breadth of subjects covered in his other fragments. 
63 See Metaphysics 989a5, Physics 187a12, and On the Heavens 303b9. 
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to be a far more prevalent use of the term.64  The most telling example comes in the form of 
Xenophanes’ remarks on the nature of the rainbow.  Here he uses a phu-cognate to distinguish 
between conventional or popular explanation and natural or empirical explanation: “And she 
whom they call Iris, this too is by nature (πέφυκε) a cloud, purple, red, and greenish-yellow to 
behold” (ἥν τ' Ἶριν καλέουσι, νέφος και τοῦτο πέφυκε, πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ χλωρὸν 
ἰδέσθαι, B32).  In this fragment, the concept of nature is one which defines the principal 
properties of a thing or delimits its character in relation to other things in the world.  This is the 
first instance in the philosophical history of the West whereby nature is used as a way to identify 
something by explicitly differentiating it from what it is not.  The concept of nature (φύσις) as 
water or air for monists like Thales and Anaximenes does not aid in distinguishing and 
classifying, rather it unifies by understanding everything to functionally possess the same nature. 
Even if we look back to Homer and the φύσις of the Moly flower in the Odyssey, we find a term 
that is only vaguely connected to the notions of differentiation and classification which are so 
vital for the investigation of the world around us and the production of knowledge. 
Xenophanes shifts away from a traditional way of identifying something by juxtaposing 
what the phenomena has been called (Iris) from what it is by nature (a cloud) in effect 
“correcting” the deification of natural phenomena by means of the very idea of nature.65  Nature, 
                                               
64 Beardslee contends that φύσις had two primary meanings in the earliest uses: “origin” and “character or qualities” 
of a person or thing. He argues that the latter is the dominant usage throughout Greek literature and maintains that 
by Aristotle’s time, the term “retained little connection with the meaning of the verb φύω,” The Use of Physis in 
Fifth-Century Greek Literature, p. 2.   
65 Commentators do not agree on the best way to situate this fragment within the constellation of Xenophanes’ ideas.  
Some suggest that Xenophanes’ aim is not to provide an established explanation of natural phenomena but simply 
aimed at producing a kind of “popularizing” effect for the new Ionian science. For views which fall generally into 
this line of thinking see W.K.C. Guthrie, (HGP, 1, 393n), Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture 
Trans. G. Highet, (New York, Oxford: 1945), p. 170, and Karl Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophie (Bonn, Friedrich Cohen: 1916), pp. 146-150.  With respect to the idea that this fragment 
specifically concerns the nature of rainbows, Alexander Mourelatos argues that “there is no reason to see in this 
statement [B32] any sort of speculative hypothesis or theory on the nature of the rainbow,” “The Real, Appearances 
and Human Error in Early Greek Philosophy,” The Review of Metaphysics, 19:2 (1965), pp. 346-365, at 350.  
Instead, Mourelatos suggests that Xenophanes is a “hard-headed empiricist” who boldly proclaims to his listeners: 
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it turns out, offers a much better description of the rainbow as a multi-colored cloud, than the 
conventional tendency to explain or identify rainbows as manifestations of the divine Iris. 
Attaching the name of a goddess to this natural phenomenon supplies a much richer context for 
grasping the meaning of the phenomena in question by connecting the present experience with 
mythological lore and associated historical events, meteorological or otherwise.  Such a way of 
understanding the world, however, requires both an awareness of that context and history as well 
as the implications.  In other words, the individual is dependent upon authority or conventional 
sources for such knowledge, incapable of independently discovering anything substantive 
regarding the phenomena per se.  Use of the natural description, on the other hand, allows the 
individual to recognize and distinguish this particular thing from others: the rainbow alone is a 
multi-colored cloud.  This fragment is thus the first explicit attempt to draw a sharp distinction 
between the concepts of φύσις (nature) and νόμος (custom) in early Greek thought.66  It allows 
us to recognize and distinguish the rainbow from other natural phenomena we might observe, 
and ultimately to classify by means of knowledge of the nature of the thing itself.  Even from the 
first philosophical uses of the idea of nature as a means of classification, it is conceived against 
conventional views, helping to in effect delimit the boundaries of nature.  Nature is less clear to 
us than the artificial constructions of conventional identifiers, but the idea of nature nevertheless 
arises out of the insufficiency of convention to explain those first things.67  
                                               
“take a good look...what you see is no more than a cloud,” p. 350.   Lesher disagrees, suggesting that Xenophanes’ 
intent is “to call attention to the specific nature of rainbows and to suggest, in a polite way, how we ought to go 
about gaining a correct understanding of rainbows and other natural wonders,” Xenophanes of Colophon: 
Fragments, p. 142. The view that Xenophanes’ is here attacking divination as a source of knowledge is treated later 
in this chapter.   
66 Kirk and Raven suggest the connection with regard to some of Xenophanes’ more famous fragments about the 
gods, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 169. 
67 Leo Strauss claims that “‘nature’ is a term of distinction” and that “prior to the discovery of nature, the 
characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way,” Natural Right 
and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 82. On this view, philosophy and the discovery of 
nature only arise in response to the “doubt of authority” of custom, p. 84.  This begins implicitly with the 
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NATURE (PHYSIS) AND ‘ALL THINGS’ (PANTA) 
Xenophanes may well be the originator of grandiose claims in philosophical discourse if 
we consider his frequent use of the term for “all things” (πάντα).  Six of his fragments refer 
descriptively to “all things,” with the specific subjects of these fragments ranging from 
epistemological possibilities for mankind to essential theology to traditional topics of 
physiologoi like the ἀρχαί.  Such varied use across an array of subjects is precisely what makes 
πάντα such an important philosophical link.  The term connects Xenophanes’ disparate ideas by 
applying specific epistemological and natural concepts to “all things,” thus serving as the 
foundation of a broader theory of everything.  Xenophanes aims to answer one of the broadest 
possible questions: what can we say is true of all that exists?  Inquiring into this question affords 
the opportunity to understand the universal component of the concept of nature and the way this 
is intertwined with the idea of nature as a means of classification.  
Xenophanes’ poetic predecessors understood φύσις to refer to the outward characteristics 
of individual things.  At its most basic level, however, the idea of nature not only classifies, as 
the fragment concerning the rainbow demonstrates (B32), it also unifies existence since all 
things possess a nature.  The concept of nature is thus binding: once admitted, it is impossible to 
escape.  While something may defy or even enhance its nature, or in the modern sense “master 
nature,” this implies the simple, inescapable power of nature in suggesting that it is something 
that must, at certain times, be defied or mastered.  Nothing can be without a nature.  And, of 
course, among the Milesians, nothing is: water or air serve as the “underlying stuff [that] 
constitutes the real and basic nature of all that makes up the cosmos.”68  For the Milesian 
                                               
cosmogonical ideas of the Milesians, but it is Xenophanes who first explicitly challenges customary authority by 
using the idea of nature. 
68 Patricia Curd, A Presocratics Reader (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1996), p. 9. 
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physiologoi the idea of a common nature of “all things” is entirely descriptive, as is the idea of 
individual nature of things in Xenophanes’ poetic contemporaries Pindar and Aeschylus.  So, the 
idea of nature may provide a better way to approach big questions, such as what is everything 
made of or how did the cosmos come to be, but it fails to contribute more specifically to the 
production of knowledge. 
Xenophanes’ theory provides a way to conceive of both a common nature and an 
individual nature.  Nature is shared in that everything has a nature but also uniquely possessed by 
individual things as a principle of differentiation, i.e. the nature of a tree and a flower are 
different.  The concept of nature simultaneously allows for an individuated multiplicity of things 
that could have their own nature while at the same time a commonality through the shared 
possession of a nature in general. The fragments containing πάντα illustrate the origin of this 
dual conception of nature in Xenophanes’ work.  
In certain cases he uses the term to clearly refer to all human beings, as when he says 
“Since from the beginning all have learned according to Homer” (ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ᾿ Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ 
μεμαθήκασι πάντες, B10).  His speculation as to the nature of human beings is not limited to 
epistemological experience, however, as he also claims that “We all come into being from earth 
and water” (πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα, B33).  In other cases Xenophanes 
expands the use to the broadest possible classification, when he says: “for all things (πάντα) are 
from the earth and to the earth all things (πάντα) come in the end” (ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς 
γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ, B27).  The expansion of the idea of nature here not only draws parallels 
between humans and non-living entities with respect to ἀρχαί, but also with respect to trajectory 
or end.  Despite significant differences in the individual natures of things, and the paths they may 
take according to these natures, all come to the same place in the end (τελευτᾷ). 
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Xenophanes applies the concept of nature to various classes of things within the natural 
world through accounts of commonalities for “all things,” allowing for both individuation and 
unification.  It also extends, arguably for the first time, beyond the “outward character” or 
appearance of things as it is used by his predecessors, to a more robust concept that includes 
powers, abilities, or even possibilities.  By far his most interesting and innovative use of the 
concept of nature to generate knowledge, however, is the attempt to purify the idea of divinity of 
its polluted sources, namely the experience of men.      
DIVINE NATURE VS. MORTAL NATURE  
Xenophanes’ most fascinating and lasting contribution to philosophy is generally taken to 
be the simultaneous attempt to deconstruct the mythical view of the divine while offering the 
first recorded philosophical conception of a single deity governing the universe.  His attacks on 
the traditional Greek religious orthodoxy take the form of sharp criticisms of the 
anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods found in Homer and Hesiod.  Occasionally his 
constructive ideas on the divine have been chalked up to a simple antithesis of the view he is 
rejecting, making them seem much less impressive.69  More recently, Herbert Granger has 
argued that Xenophanes’ conception of divinity is in fact a logical extension of the Homeric 
conception.70  In several key fragments, the origin of religious beliefs can be directly linked to 
                                               
69 Kirk and Raven argue that Xenophanes derives particular divine attributes “by taking the very antithesis of the 
characteristics of a Homeric god” or, more generally, that he “arrived at the concept of one god by reaction from 
Homeric anthropomorphic polytheism,” Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 170-171.  
70 See Herbert Granger, “Xenophanes’ Positive Theology and his Criticism of Greek Popular Religion” Ancient 
Philosophy 33 (2013): 235 - 271. Granger argues, contra Lesher and Jaeger, that the “properties of divinity in 
Xenophanes’ theology...may plausibly be appreciated as having their antecedents, although with some deviations, in 
traditional theology,” p. 236. On this view, Xenophanes is not a radical reformer, but only “rectifies inconsistencies 
that mar the traditional conception of divinity,” p. 235. Granger’s claims are well-argued but they assume that 
Xenophanes uses the concept of nature to outline specific divine properties without actually recognizing that this is 
an entirely new way of approaching divinity. Some of the qualities of the divine that Xenophanes hits on may be 
extensions of Homeric conceptions but the way in which he produces, or arrives at, these aspects of the divine is 
radically different from his predecessors. What he has gained from the Milesians is a new approach to customary 
conceptions of “all things,” including the divine; the implication of this new approach for knowledge generated 
through the concept of nature justifies the classification of “radical reformer.” 
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the early Greek method of sharing knowledge about the gods through the poetry of bards like 
Homer and Hesiod.  These poems were not only a body of religious beliefs, but were also the 
predominant method of moral and historical instruction.  Attacking particular beliefs about the 
gods would have also constituted an attack on the methodology of the early Greek poets as 
capable of imparting real knowledge. Xenophanes forcefully attacks the conventional views and 
simultaneously models the proper way to think about divinity.  Extending the concept of nature 
even to the gods, Xenophanes widens the break with customary sources of knowledge while 
simultaneously establishing the foundation of his theory of everything. 
Alluding somewhat cryptically (due, presumably, to the ravages of history on those 
documents which have survived) to Homer’s influence, Xenophanes points out Homer’s 
powerful influence with respect to cultural education when he says, “Since from the beginning 
all have learned according to Homer… ” (B10).  Given his critical approach to Homer, at least in 
the fragments we possess, this fragment quite plausibly initiates a series of attacks on Homer as a 
flawed source of knowledge about at least the gods, if not the larger sphere of cultural 
education.71  Read in this way, B10 implies a critique of the way in which the Greeks learned; 
that is to say, this fragment can be read as a direct criticism of Homeric methods in addition to 
the content.72  Homer’s authority on the nature of the gods and his level of cultural influence is 
highly problematic for Xenophanes because it is more revelation than explanation. The problem 
is not so much that the Greeks repeated the stories, but that this was the way they obtained 
                                               
71 Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments,  suggests we should interpret this fragment as a complaint on the 
“extent of Homer’s influence” and “status as authority on the behavior, epithets, and other attributes of the gods,” p. 
82. Glenn Most argues that Plato’s attack in the dialogue Ion on the supposed polymathy of poets is a continuation 
of that view established by Xenophanes and Heraclitus which sought to challenge the traditional notion that Homer 
and Hesiod were “divine sages who knew everything and could serve as the source of all human knowledge,” “The 
Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 336-337, at 336.  
72 Kirk and Raven suggest Xenophanes’ thoughtfulness leads him “to react against the archetype of poets and the 
mainstay of contemporary education, Homer,” Presocratic Philosophers, p. 167.  
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knowledge of the gods and thus both basic and complex structures of reality.  As a poet himself, 
Xenophanes clearly understands that beliefs are inextricably linked with how an individual or a 
culture arrives at those beliefs and he is not shy about offering the value of his own expertise.  In 
one of the more complete fragments, Xenophanes draws the distinction between appearance and 
reality with respect to the honors afforded to highly skilled athletes:  
ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὲν ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν νίκην τις ἄροιτο 
ἢ πενταθλεύων, ἔνθα Διὸς τέμενος  
πὰρ Πίσαο ῥοῇς ἐν Ολυμπίῃ, εἴτε παλαίων 
ἢ καὶ τυκτοσύνην ἀλγινόεσσαν ἔχων, 
ἔιτε τὸ δεινὸν ἄεθλον ὃ παγκράτιον καλέουσιν, 
ἀστοῖσίν κ᾿ εἴη κυδρότερος προσορᾶν, 
καί κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἀγῶσιν ἄροιτο, 
και' κεν σῖτ᾿ εἴη δημοσίων κτεάνων 
ἐκ πόλιος καὶ δῶρον ὅ οἱ κειμήλιον εἴη· 
 
But if by swiftness of foot one were to gain a victory  
or in the pentathlon, there by Pisa’s stream in Olympus in 
the sacred grove of Zeus, or by wrestling, 
or again the painful art of boxing, 
or the fearsome sport they call pankration, 
he would appear more glorious to his townsmen 
and win the front-row seat of honor at games. 
And there would be good from the city’s public stores 
and a keepsake gift for him. (B2, 1-9) 
 
Pointing to the breadth of cultural celebration over physical prowess in events that test speed, 
skill, and courage through belabored repetition, Xenophanes connects such prowess with glory 
and honor.  Despite the rewards of honor and gifts such athletic victors receive from the 
populace, these endeavors only create the appearance of earned glory.  Drawing a direct 
comparison, Xenophanes goes on to measure the true worth of these various kinds of athletic 
skill against his own expertise: 
εἴτε καὶ ἵπποισιν, ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι, 
οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ· ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων 
ἀνδρῶν ἠδ᾿ ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη· 
ἀλλ᾿ εἰκῆ μάλα ταῦτα νομίζεται· οὐδε δίκαιον  
προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης.  
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And even if he were to win with horses he would get all these, 
not being as worthy of them as I. 
For our expertise is better than the strength of men and horses. 
But this practice makes no sense nor is it right 
to prefer strength to this good expertise. (B2, 10-14) 
 
Not so subtly pointing out that his fellow citizens rather ironically celebrate those who win such 
contests through the prowess of other animals, Xenophanes directly ridicules the custom             
(νομίζεται) of elevating such flimsy practices at the expense of more worthwhile endeavors.  His 
attack cuts both ways as he simultaneously undermines both an “unreflective way of behavior” 
and a “way of thinking.”73  Xenophanes supplies his rationale for the superiority of his expertise 
to athletic feats of strength when he finishes by saying: 
οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθός λαοῖσι μετείη, 
οὔτ᾿ εἰ πενταθλεῖν, οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην, 
οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τό πέρ ἐστι πρότιμον 
ῥώμης ὅσσ᾿ ἀνδρῶν ἔργ᾿ ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει, 
τούνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἴη· 
σμικρὸν δ᾿ ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ᾿ ἐπι τῷ, 
εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῷ Πίσαο παρ᾿ ὄχθας· 
οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλιος.  
 
For neither if there were a good boxer among the people 
nor if there were a pentathlete or wrestler 
nor again if there were someone swift afoot- 
which is most honoured of all men’s deeds of strength- 
would for this reason a city be better governed. 
Small joy would a city have from this- 
if someone were to be victorious in competing for a prize on Pisa’s 
banks-- 
for these do not enrich a city’s treasure room. (B2, 15-22) 
 
                                               
73 Lesher contends that it is more plausible that the target of Xenophanes’ criticisms is the former rather than the 
latter, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 56.  But in the immediately following passage in the fragment, 
Xenophanes distinguishes his expertise from the skill of athletes in terms of value to the city, suggesting that it is in 
fact a “way of thinking” which is flawed. Namely, athletic endeavors turn out to be less worthy not because they are 
disproportionately valued only in Greek culture, but because they produce less value for the city itself.  They are 
intrinsically worth less. There is no reason not to suppose that Xenophanes’ aim is to attack both the “unreflective” 
way in which his countrymen determine what to honor and the specific cultural practice, or “way of thinking” which 
elevates athletic prowess above acquiring knowledge with more value to the governance of the city.   
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Challenging the way his society generally values knowledge, Xenophanes’ criticism of 
Homeric values extends beyond particular conceptions of the divine.  Notions of virility so 
lauded in the Homeric epic are undermined here in favor of something more intellectual.  
Honors, Xenophanes implies, should be tied to actual benefits one produces for his fellow 
citizens, not the isolated achievements of individuals that produce little more than arbitrary 
glory. Xenophanes does not say what sort of wisdom (σοφίη) he and those like him possess but 
he is steadfast in the belief that this knowledge benefits the city.74  In direct contrast, the city 
receives neither “joy” nor increased wealth from victory in athletic competition. Indeed, 
Xenophanes argues that good governance of a city does not stem from any sort of “deeds of 
strength” or athletic prowess.  Without specifying how, he suggests that it is the knowledge 
possessed by those like himself that would allow for the city to be “better governed.”  
Xenophanes has in mind a kind of ideal city as “well-ordered” specifically, perhaps, by 
reorganizing and updating the customs of the city (μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις).75  But if tradition is 
not to be the guide to developing better beliefs to govern the city, where can such a guide be 
found?   
Xenophanes’ assault on custom extends beyond mild political critique, however, 
principally because in aiming to replace an existing order with a new one, he must first destroy 
the old one.  Given that it is “all” (πάντες) who have learned according to Homer, and “from the 
beginning” (ἐξ ἀρχῆς), this effort is no light undertaking.  Such firmly entrenched bias 
necessitates especially poignant criticism aimed at the heart of conventional belief structure. 
Only too happy to comply, Xenophanes famously highlights the Hellenic tendency to 
                                               
74 Frankel contends that σοφίη does not mean “the observant and interpretive wisdom of the philosopher” at this 
point in Greek history but only instead “that cleverness of the unprejudiced, practical man that assists the state,” 
“Xenophanes Empiricism and his Critique of Knowledge,” p. 118, n1. 
75 Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 56. 
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anthropomorphize the divine and directly challenges the tradition as he says “Homer and Hesiod 
have attributed to the gods all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among 
men: theft, adultery, and mutual deceit” (πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ᾿ Ἡσίοδός τε, ὅσσα 
παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν. κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν, B11). 
Rather than grasp the nature of the divine through the essential characteristics of a god, men have 
fashioned divine beings into caricatures of the very worst human flaws and crimes. Xenophanes 
strengthens his critique and aligns it more closely with the ideas in those fragments commonly 
associated with nature, when he says: “But mortals suppose that gods are born, wear their own 
clothes, and have a voice and a body” (ἀλλ᾿ οἱ Βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεοὺς τὴν σφετέρην 
ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε, B14).  The gods, he implicitly suggests, are nothing like things 
which are born and embodied.  In his “physio-logical” fragments, we recall, he establishes that 
what is born and grows is made of earth and water.  He draws on that same concept in his 
“theological” fragments to illustrate the flaw in traditional thinking that attributes such capacities 
to the divine.  Xenophanes’ criticisms are clearly aimed at the Homeric conception of gods 
which depicts some of them as born, but these barbs might also be directed at the Milesian 
science which sometimes divinized nature as material source constituents.76   In doing so he not 
only undermines the particular views they hold, but the way in which they arrived at these views. 
The false attributions of these qualities to divine beings come about because men do not 
understand, or even attempt to understand, what it means to be divine.  The general implication 
from these fragments taken together is that the nature of the divine does not resemble mortal 
                                               
76 Burnet claims that the Milesian theories of nature were “thoroughly secular” and any use of the term “god” or the 
divine “had no religious significance,” EGP, p. 80. Jaeger defends the opposite view, arguing for thoroughly 
intentional religious implications in the Milesian theories. See Chapter II of his The Theology of Early Greek 
Philosophers, pp. 18-37. 
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nature in its origin, composition (voice and body), or conduct.77  The Homeric tradition fails to 
discover or provide knowledge of the highest and most important things, principally because it 
considers the “nature” of things using outward appearance or characteristics.  
Xenophanes expands his criticism of the harmful effects of custom with his particularly 
wry sense of humor in two other fragments: 
εἰ <δέ> τοι <ἵπποι> ἔχον χέρας ἣ βόες ἠὲ λέοντες  
ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, 
ἵπποι μέν θ᾿ ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας  
καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ᾿ ἐποίουν  
τοιαῦθ᾿ οἷόνπερ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι. 
 
But if horses or oxen or lions had hands 
Or could draw with their hands and accomplish such works as men 
Horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses and 
the oxen as similar to the oxen, 
And they would make the bodies 
Of the sort which each of them had. (B15) 
 
Αἰθίοπές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρουσ> σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε 
Θρῇκές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πελέσθαι>· 
 
Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; 
Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired. (B16) 
 
Pointing to very different elements of the anthropomorphism that infects the views of the divine 
held by his contemporaries, Xenophanes indicates how deeply-entrenched such an attitude is for 
his contemporaries.  In the latter fragment, he suggests that this tendency is standard for mankind 
but relative to culture; in other words, all men form their beliefs of the divine in the same way, 
but the specific attributes they project onto the divine are relative to their experience of 
themselves. Xenophanes’ invocation of other cultures seems, at first glance, to countermand his 
suggestion regarding the pervasiveness of Homer’s influence.  After all, we may suppose he only 
meant that “all Greeks” have learned according to Homer.  A more plausible explanation, 
                                               
77 See Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers, pp. 49-50. 
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however, given his apparent penchant for broad proclamations, is that he is generalizing on a 
broader level, suggesting that all men learn from poets like Homer, that is, according to those 
who use inherited myths to understand what they cannot explain.  Such an explanation fits with 
the notion that the primary target is the edifice of tradition and custom as a source of knowledge, 
not Homer in particular. A more curious implication is found in B15 as Xenophanes suggests 
that the tendency to anthropomorphize is only limited to mankind insofar as humans have hands 
which are necessary for the creation of images.  Men form images through drawing or sculpture 
as a way to understand the divine by creating a physical representation.  As a result we use what 
we know of embodied things to project images of ourselves onto divinity. Thus it is inherent in 
human nature to project images of ourselves onto divinity (B15) and manually craft these images 
(B16).  In short, we understand things which we can make, construct, or fashion ourselves.  If 
animals would do such things if they possessed hands, however, then the implication is that men 
are not much different from beasts.  The difference is not in how men formulate their beliefs (this 
turns out to be largely the same process), but only in how they reinforce those beliefs through the 
production of images.   
Taken together, these fragments point toward another important conclusion: maker’s 
knowledge cannot be applied to the realm of the divine.  Instead, his theological fragments raise 
the implicit question: what would it mean to be a god?  It is, at the very least, the orientation to 
these kinds of questions, and the expertise derived from pursuing such lines of inquiry that 
Xenophanes has in mind in B2 when he claims he benefits the city more than its athletes.  
Xenophanes’ god does not demand sacrifice, so perhaps the treasure he has in mind is simply 
what the city would save from abandoning such silly practices.  It is not his ability to ride a horse 
well, but his judgment and insight that set him apart and truly benefits the city.  
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Xenophanes separates himself from those he criticizes by escaping the limits of an 
empirically derived notion of the divine through a deceptively simple question: “What must God 
be like”?  Avoiding the limits of custom as a way to understand the divine, namely, what 
originates from man and is described like man, he uses the idea of nature as essential 
characteristics to sketch his own outline of the divine.  Only certain qualities befit the divine.  
The essential “theological” fragments can be strung together in the following way to form a 
cogent picture of the whole of Xenophanes’ thought on the nature of the divine: 
“One god is greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in 
body or in thought” (B23) and as such “whole he sees, whole he 
thinks, and whole he hears” (B24), “but completely without toil he 
shakes all things by the thought of his mind” (B25), and “always 
he abides in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it seemly for 
him to travel to different places at different times” (B26).78   
Considerable debate among commentators arises from the fact that Xenophanes seems to include 
some notion of lesser gods in his concept of the divine when he says “One god is greatest among 
gods and men.”79  More poignantly, Xenophanes widens the breach between mortals and the 
                                               
78 The Greek for each of these fragments: Εἷς θεὸς ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, 
οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίϊος οὔτε νόημα. (B23); οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ οὖλος δέ τ᾿ ἀκούει (B24); ἀλλ᾿ ἀπάνευθε 
πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει (B25); αἰεὶ δ᾿ ἐν ταὐτῷ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδεν, οὐδε μετέρχεσθαί μιν 
ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ (B26).  While there is no evidence that Xenophanes laced the ideas in these fragments 
together in this particular order, any attempt to interpret the ideas of the earliest Presocratic philosophers necessarily 
imposes a framework and a largely arbitrary order upon them. This particular order has the advantage that it 
arranges Xenophanes’ ideas on the divine from the broadest, most general description to more specific facets of 
divine nature. 
79  Those who take Xenophanes to offer a monotheistic theory have accounted for this strange reference to other 
gods in a variety of ways.  Hermann Fränkel, Early Greek Philosophy and Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
pp. 330-331 n10 suggests the phrase refers to the “gods of popular superstition,” but the more common reading is 
that the expression “among gods and men” is merely a linguistic turn of phrase that should not be taken literally. 
See, for example, Guthrie, HGP, p. 375 n2 and Hussey, The Presocratics, who claims that this is only “a way of 
speaking: it does not imply the existence of other gods,” p. 13. Some commentators rely on B23 to attribute 
polytheistic views to Xenophanes, among them, Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, pp. 98-99 and 
Werner Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 43-44.  More 
recently, Granger continues this line of thinking as he argues that there is “no justification” for understanding 
Xenophanes as a monotheist given that monotheism would be “outstandingly revolutionary” and that “if 
Xenophanes were such a radical innovator he should not be expected to muddle his challenging declaration” with 
banal phrases like ‘among gods and men’, “Xenophanes Positive Theology and his Criticism of Greek Popular 
Religion,” p. 237.  
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divine, claiming the divine is “not at all like mortals in body or thought.” This broad statement 
points us toward the defining attributes specified in subsequent fragments. The divine capacity 
for perception is unlimited; the divine does not have “parts” responsible for different activities 
but performs all operations with the entirety of its being.  Thus, “whole he sees, whole he thinks, 
whole he hears.”  Unlike Zeus and the other gods, who have to go to all the trouble of traveling, 
throwing lightning bolts, and siring offspring with mortals to intervene in the affairs of humans, 
the one god for Xenophanes is entirely free from such menial labor, directing “all things” 
(πάντα) without needing to move or physically intervene (B25 and B26).  Approaching the 
divine through its necessary, conceptual features, he concludes that the divine in effect must be 
complete, unmoving, and eternal.  Further, it is omnipotent in that it has the ability to “shake all 
things by the thought of his mind” (B25).  Beyond radically altering the conventional conception 
of the divine, Xenophanes here reimagines the very idea of how one approaches the nature of 
things.  No longer is the “nature” of something, the most important thing in this case, conceived 
of only in terms of its physical descriptors or outward appearance, as it is in Homer, Pindar, and 
Aeschylus, or material constitution as in some of the Milesian thinkers, but rather through 
abstract conceptual features which, in effect, define what the thing can do.80  
Although these fragments are explicitly about the nature of the divine, all of these ideas 
implicitly refer to the nature of men in the way they emphasize the distinction between mortals 
and gods.  Xenophanes tells us that mortals only “suppose that gods are born” (ἀλλ᾿ οἱ βροτοὶ 
δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς), and from this lack of knowledge, project other facets of mortal 
nature onto the gods by inferring that they “have the clothing, voice, and body of mortals” (τὴν 
σφετέρην δ᾿ ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε, B14).  Mortals are constrained by their nature to 
                                               
80 Beardslee, The Use of Physis in Fifth-Century Greek Literature, pp. 6-9. 
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rely on both their body and suppositions, but such is not the case for the one god who is “not at 
all like mortals in body or in thought” (B23).  Xenophanes’ choice of οἱ βροτοὶ in many 
fragments, particularly given that he freely uses ἀνὴρ where it suits him (B34), is evidence of 
linguistic effort that reflects an intentional philosophical distinction.81  The divine who thinks 
with his entire being (B25) and is powerful enough to “shake all things by the thought of his 
mind” (B26), has no need of supposition or opinion. In each of these fragments we find nature 
which delimits boundaries, in this case the boundary between mortal and divine, but we also find 
impressions of epistemological concerns.82  One of the conventional ways to distinguish between 
men and gods, or mortal and divine natures, are the respective capacities for knowledge.  By 
using the concept of nature to generate his view of the divine, rather than the genetic 
explanations favored in conventional poetic discourse, Xenophanes not only draws a sharp line 
between mortals and gods, he raises essential questions concerning the possibility and power of 
knowledge in the Greek world.  
KNOWLEDGE, PURPOSE, AND A THEORY OF EVERYTHING 
Although most famous for his theological views, Xenophanes provides the first 
philosophical engagement with questions surrounding the possibility of human knowledge.83  
Yet while most have limited the scope of Xenophanes’ epistemological musing to the debate 
over the possibility of knowledge, we can read key fragments as defining the nature of humanity 
                                               
81 Lesher, “Xenophanes’ Skepticism” Phronesis 23 (l978), 1-21, at p. 3. 
82 Emese Mogyoródi concludes that Xenophanes “must have reasoned somehow that human representations of the 
divine were incompatible with its true nature because they impose on it some sort of limitation (relativity, 
particularity) inescapable for our mortal being but contradicting the nature of the divine,” “Xenophanes as a 
Philosopher: Theology and Theodicy” in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie présocratique? (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002), pp. 253-286, at p. 263. 
83 McKirahan calls Xenophanes the “father of epistemology,” noting that he has also been labeled as the “father of 
skepticism,” PBS, p. 67.  In his commentary on the “master fragment” B34, Lesher provides a thorough discussion 
of the possible views with respect to Xenophanes on knowledge, cataloging and discussing those who understand 
the  Presocratic thinker  as (1) Sceptic, (2) Empiricist (3) Rationalist, (4) Fallibilist, (5) Critical Philosophy, and (6) 
Natural Epistemologist. See Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, pp. 161-169.   
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through its unique epistemological attributes.  One such attribute is the pursuit of knowledge as a 
defining activity of human life.  Xenophanes strengthens one of the key differences between 
mortal and divine natures when he says, “Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all 
things to mortals but as they search in time they discover better” (οὔτοι ἀπ' ἄρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ 
θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον, B18).  Gods, so the Greeks 
held, possess all knowledge by their very nature as divine beings.  On this traditional view, 
mankind is at the mercy of the gods to reveal vital secrets of the universe, as the stories Hesiod 
tells of Prometheus demonstrate (Theogony 510-616; Works and Days 42-105).  Xenophanes 
echoes the immediate possession of knowledge by divine beings, on the one hand, but in the very 
same breath subverts the traditional relationship of mortal dependency on the divine with respect 
to knowledge.  The gods may possess knowledge but they do not “intimate all things to mortals”; 
there is, it turns out, no transmission of knowledge between the divine and mortals.  As Hermann 
Fränkel suggests about Xenophanes, “he made the chasm between the here and the beyond 
unbridgeable.”84  
In aiming at a correction of the traditional model of divinity, Xenophanes’ critique 
famously extends to the acquisition of knowledge by divination (μαντιχή).  Cicero notes that 
Xenophanes’ repudiation of divination was exceedingly rare among philosophers in the ancient 
world (A52).  But the critique is thorough and, as Lesher takes pains to illustrate, intimately 
connected to other areas of Xenophanes’ thought.85  Xenophanes attacks the traditional accounts 
of the signs themselves, as in the rainbow and St. Elmo’s Fire (B32 and A39).  He purifies the 
                                               
84 Fränkel, “Xenophanes Empiricism and his Critique of Knowledge,” p. 130. 
85 See Lesher, “Xenophanes’ Skepticism,” pp. 291-297. Lesher calls the assault on divination “a basis for a coherent 
account of [Xenophanes’] general philosophical outlook,” p. 291.  My analysis is heavily indebted to Lesher’s 
arguments which themselves build on Dodds’ work, who is the first to make these observations. See E.R. Dodds, 
The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 196 n7. 
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nature of the divine as something utterly unlike mortals, implying in other fragments (B14-16, 
B23-26) the lack of divine communication with mortals he suggests outright in B18.  Likewise, 
in the testimonia concerned with meteorological phenomena, the emphasis on natural 
explanations can be read as a way to purify celestial bodies from the pernicious influence of 
seers who interpret celestial bodies, eclipses, or comets as signs from the gods (A32, A41, A43, 
A44).  The attack on the idea of divination and seers undermines their claim to knowledge, and 
subsequent political power derived from such exclusive insight, but it seemingly leaves mankind 
without a way to interpret the cosmos and his existence. 
Mortals fare better on Xenophanes’ view, however. Despite a lack of knowledge of all 
things “from the beginning” (ἀπ' ἄρχῆς), mortals nevertheless possess the ability to make 
discoveries for themselves.  Able to pursue understanding independent of the gods, divine 
revelation ceases to be the means by which humans acquire wisdom, but what replaces it?86 
Xenophanes provides the answer by demonstrating how one acquires knowledge using the 
concept of nature (φύσις), or “what is fitting,” to produce knowledge of the gods, mankind, and 
environmental phenomena.  The nature of something can be grasped at times by observation (as 
in the nature of a rainbow) and at other times by means of proper thought (as in the nature of the 
divine).  In the end for Xenophanes it is through the study and reflection on the idea of nature 
(φύσις) that mankind is able to generate epistemological discoveries.  The diverse topics and 
                                               
86 Lesher notes that Fragment 18 has often been read as “perhaps the very first expression...of a ‘faith in human 
progress’,” Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 150. He goes on, however, to suggest that other fragments 
complicate this picture of Xenophanes’ supposed “faith in social and intellectual progress,” citing B1-3, as well as 
those fragments critical of “the reliance of the populus on misguided poets and self-styled religious experts” (B7, 10, 
11, 12 and A7), p. 151. One plausible alternative to the standard view is that Xenophanes aims to “restrict [fragment 
B18’s] intended scope to matters of scientific thinking or inquiry,” p. 152. Lesher refines this further to the claim 
that Xenophanes believes his own method of discovery is superior to others, specifically rejecting the idea of “divine 
communication...especially through the medium of signals or cryptic signs,” p. 153.  Xenophanes’ method, 
according to Lesher, understands the “significance of the marvels of nature” as “physical realities to be described 
and understood in terms of observable properties and familiar natural forces,” p. 154. Nature, in other words, can be 
understood by men on its own terms and without divine assistance. 
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specific ideas demonstrate that it is in the very nature of individual human beings to learn, grow, 
and thus better themselves over time; in short, this capacity to learn is a significant part of the 
defining aspect of human nature.  In a similar fashion, Xenophanes’ fragment suggests that 
mankind began in an infantile state and improves over the course of the history of the human 
race with advancements in knowledge.87  Not only do we make progress in our collective 
knowledge over time, we also become better at learning the more we engage in inquiry. 
Reading his views through the concept of nature provides a way to connect Xenophanes’ 
epistemological conclusions with those concerning natural things and the gods.  It also properly 
stresses the limitations of mortal nature with respect to the acquisition of knowledge. Speaking 
more directly of knowledge in the famous “master fragment,” Xenophanes says:  
καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται 
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· 
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπι πᾶσι τέτυκται. 
 
And of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen 
Nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say 
about all things. 
For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak just of what 
has been brought to pass, 
Still he himself would not know. But opinion is allotted to all. 
(B34) 
 
On the surface, this fragment continues the contrast in the poetry of tradition between mortal and 
divine beings with respect to knowledge. Xenophanes’ first line is both restrictive and 
unrestricted: men have no access but the province of truth (τὸ σαφὲς) covers all possible realms 
                                               
87 Lesher raises doubts as to whether Xenophanes describes the collective here, suggesting that ζητοῦντες refers not 
to the progress of “mankind as a whole,” but only “individual seekers,” Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 
150.   Note, however, a certain affinity with one of Heraclitus’ fragments: “Man is stamped as infantile by divinity, 
just as the child is by man” (B79). See Hermann Fränkel “A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus” in The Pre-Socratics: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alexander Mourelatos (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 214-
228, for a detailed discussion of this fragment as illustrating a key insight and implications for other fragments 
pertaining to Heraclitus’ epistemological views.  Xenophanes may have “seeking” as a fundamental part of human 
nature, thus the fragment applies broadly to men in general. 
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of knowledge. Switching to the future possibilities, however, Xenophanes refines the scope of 
knowledge to concern “the gods and what I say about all things” in a way that is meant to 
distinguish such subjects from τὸ σαφές or else is entirely redundant.  The implication seems to 
be that the ideas he puts forth about the divine are, at best, true opinions which are very close to 
knowledge.88  The real problem, however, is verifying the opinion--humans cannot confirm the 
truth of what they say, even when they happen to “guess” correctly in their opinions.  Much like 
Sophocles later suggests when he criticizes the idea of knowledge by signs: there exists no 
“distinguishing truth” or “sure test” (χρίσις ἀληθής) that guarantees a prophet has attained 
knowledge (Oedipus Tyrannus, 499-512).  In linking knowledge of the gods with his ideas on 
“all things” (πάντα), however, Xenophanes offers the best mankind can hope for: a theory of 
everything. 
Xenophanes’ theory of everything is not one which lays claim to absolute certainty, 
perhaps beginning with these lines by undermining the possibility of such as might be found in 
Hesiod’s Theogony.89  A philosophical “theory of everything” necessarily goes beyond natural 
phenomena found in physics, and for the early Greeks, who held the general assumption that 
both man and cosmos were governed by the same processes, such a theory would necessarily 
connect ideas on the physical constitution of things, the nature of mortals and the divine, and the 
possibility of knowledge.  Xenophanes’ concept of nature unifies these different facets of the 
world and human experience into a single theory.  But it is still just a theory, one that can never 
                                               
88 But Xenophanes has been pointing us to two paths to “knowledge” in all of his fragments, contrary to those who 
view him as a dyed-in-the-wool empiricist. One path to understanding is through “what is fitting,” as the fragments 
on the divine show us. The other route is through a kind of empiricism that uses perceptual knowledge to classify the 
world. Xenophanes was often thought in antiquity to be the father of Eleaticism, and it may be the case that the two 
routes to some version of knowledge found here prefigure the “paths” in Parmenides’? Perhaps Parmenides’ poem is 
a response or correction of his teacher’s error.  
89 Sarah Broadie suggests that the “earliest ‘theories of everything’ were mythological panoramas,” offering 
Hesiod’s Theogony as the exemplar, see “Rational Theology” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek 
Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 205-224, at 205.   
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lay claim to being “certain truth.”  Perhaps in a way that prefigures the philosophical-
cosmogonical account in Plato’s Timaeus, Xenophanes offers his theory of everything as, at best, 
merely a “likely story” (τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον).90  This fits with another fragment where Xenophanes 
cryptically suggests that his contemporaries “let these be accepted, certainly, as like the realities” 
(ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι, B35).  Though the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence prohibits us from being certain as to the referent of “these,” the affinity with notions of 
“accepted” opinion and “seeming” are clear.91  Aided by the application of the concept of nature, 
such a theory may be what Xenophanes has in mind by suggesting that men “discover better” 
(ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον).  Yet how, specifically, might the strands of Xenophanes’ thought be 
connected into this theory of everything?  And, if his ideas cannot be verified, what makes this 
theory better than the alternatives? 
In one of his fragments generally taken to be about the physical world, Xenophanes tells 
us that, “The upper limit of the earth is seen here at our feet, pushing up against the air, but that 
below goes on without limit” (γαίνς μὲν τόδε πεῖρας ἄνω παρὰ ποσσὶν ὁπᾶται ἠέρι προσπλάζον, 
τὸ κάτω δ' ἐς ἄπειρον ἱκνεῖται, B28, my emphasis).  Frequently interpreted as his answer to the 
question of what may be supporting the earth, the phrase “here at our feet” marks man as the 
boundary between earth and air.  Aristotle famously tells us of Xenophanes that “he 
contemplates the whole heaven and said the One is God” (εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν 
                                               
90 For references to the cosmology in the Timaeus as eikōs muthos see 29d, 59c, 68d; for references as eikōs logos 
see 30b, 48d, 53d, 55d, 56a, 57d, 90e. The frequency with which Plato reminds his reader of the “likelihood” of this 
story must be intentional.  Aristotle himself suggests pedagogical purpose behind the cosmological muthos, see On 
the Heavens 279b32–280a1.  For more recent interpretations, see Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s 
Timaeus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 243-277, and Myles Burnyeat “Eikōs muthos” in 
Plato’s Myths, Catalin Partenie ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 167-186. For a  more 
detailed recent account of the idea of likeness in Xenophanes fragments, see Chapter 1 “Xenophanes fallibilism” of 
Jenny Bryan’s Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
91 For a brief discussions of δεδοξάσθω and ἐοικότα see Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, p. 170.   
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εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν, Metaphysics 986b24-25).  Not surprisingly, this has led to pantheistic 
interpretations of Xenophanes’ ideas on the divine.92  This seems strange, however, since it is 
through the specific contemplation of the heavens that leads Xenophanes to his conclusion.  We 
might expect that if God is everything, or in everything, then one need not look to a single place 
like the heavens to find divinity.  Of course, this also seems at odds with the suggestion in B26 
that the divine is in a fixed place.  Reminding us of our limitations as natural beings that are 
never able to entirely escape our roots, Xenophanes suggests “For from earth are all things and 
into earth do all things die” (ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾶι, B27).93  This 
contrasts clearly with the divine: “One God,” he tells us, “not at all like mortals in body nor in 
thought.”  
Rather than construe the heavens as the playground of the gods and the place beneath the 
earth as the repository for souls and the torturous afterlife, Xenophanes locates man between a 
unified divine being who knows and directs the universe through thought alone.  Beyond 
describing what capacity specifically defines natural things when he says, “all things which come 
into being and grow are earth and water,” Xenophanes is distinguishing between the mortal and 
divine by locating natural things in a middle realm.  Only things that are a kind of mixture of at 
least two elements have the possibility for change and becoming.  But Xenophanes need not 
mean only physical growth. Growth in this case may mean that we can seek knowledge and 
develop expertise, and in doing so grow or become more than we have been.  Air and water are 
clear, while earth is opaque, and mortals are in between, since “we all come into being from 
                                               
92 McKirahan sums up Xenophanes’ position on the relationship “between god and the world” by saying that “the 
world for all its diversity and change possesses an underlying unity. All its movements are controlled by the unitary 
divinity that pervades it,” PBS, p. 63.  
93 In Therapy for Greek Diseases Theodoret supplies us with this line from Xenophanes but suggests that 
Xenophanes’ “forgot” his theory of the totality as an everlasting, motionless, ungenerated whole as a way to explain 
the contradiction with the notion of growth and development advanced in B27 (A36).  
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earth and water” (B33).  Thus, we can connect his ideas on the physical world with his ideas on 
knowledge.  For Xenophanes, the divine has absolute knowledge of things because of its location 
and because of its nature.  His description of the god includes place, “always he abides in the 
same place, not moving at all;” knowledge, “whole he sees, whole he thinks, and whole he 
hears;” and capacity “completely without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind”. 
The earth “here at our feet” positions man between the absolute enlightenment and power of the 
heavens and the infinite depths of ignorance and limitation represented by the earth which 
stretches forever downward.  This middle area is also the realm of opinion, and as such an 
epistemological middle as well, as Xenophanes reminds us repeatedly that “opinion is allotted to 
all,” and that mortals “suppose” particular facets of the gods.  
For all the attacks on the Homeric conception of the gods and the cosmos, Xenophanes 
shares the widely-held belief in antiquity that the cosmos is guided or directed in some fashion. 
The source of such governance is what differentiates Xenophanes’ ideas from his predecessors, 
as McKirahan suggests when he says, “More explicitly than in the Milesians, intelligence, not 
the whims of the Olympians, governs the world.”94  From a customary perspective, what 
separates the Olympians from mortals is that the gods have certain knowledge of the purpose of 
all things.  When Apollo asks Chiron for knowledge of Cyrene in one of Pindar’s Pythian odes, 
the centaur answers with a complimentary reminder of the omniscience of the gods: 
κούρας δ᾽ ὁπόθεν γενεὰν  
ἐξερωτᾷς, ὦ ἄνα; κύριον ὃς πάντων τέλος  
οἶσθα καὶ πάσας κελεύθους:  
ὅσσα τε χθὼν ἠρινὰ φύλλ᾽ ἀναπέμπει, χὠπόσαι  
ἐν θαλάσσᾳ καὶ ποταμοῖς ψάμαθοι  
κύμασιν ῥιπαῖς τ᾽ ἀνέμων κλονέονται, χὤ τι μέλλει, χὠπόθεν  
ἔσσεται, εὖ καθορᾷς.  
 
                                               
94 McKirahan, PBS, p. 63. 
 71  
 
Dost thou ask, O king, of the maiden’s birth? Thou who  
 knowest the end supreme of all things, and all the ways   
 that lead thereto, the number of the leaves that the earth   
 putteth forth in the spring, the number of the sands that,   
 in the sea and the rivers, are driven before the waves and   
 the rushing winds and that which is to be, and whence it is   
 to come,--all this thou clearly seest.95 
The gods know the “appointed end” of all things in the realm of nature, making Apollo’s inquiry 
rather silly. On the other hand, human beings, according to Xenophanes, are only able to “speak 
just of what has been brought to pass” (τετελεσμένον), that is, literally what has been “brought to 
a telos,” by means of opinion (δόκος).  Mortals, by their very nature, are limited to supposition in 
ways that often lead them astray, which Xenophanes artfully points out when he says, “But 
mortals suppose that gods are born, wear their own clothes, and have a voice and a body. So, 
even though men may “discover better in time,” they will never reach the level of knowledge 
held by the gods who can know the telos of things.   
We might raise two questions here.  Does Xenophanes think such certain knowledge that 
necessarily includes knowledge of the ends of things exists at all?  And what evidence do we 
have that telos is an aspect of the divine nature from Xenophanes’ perspective?  It is clear that 
Xenophanes thinks God directs things by means of intelligence rather than by caprice, being 
above such petty concerns (B11, B14, B23).  This guidance takes the form of activity without 
effort, as Xenophanes tells us, “but completely without toil he shakes all things by the thought of 
his mind” (B25).  Yet only in light of the “whole” can the telos of particular things be grasped; 
any limited view can never be certain that completion has been achieved.  Xenophanes’ god is 
not fractured like the divinity of tradition, but principally also able to perceive the entirety of 
things and how they fit together because he is a unity: “whole he sees, whole he thinks, whole he 
                                               
95 Translation from Loeb Classical Library Edition, translated by William H. Race, Harvard University Press, 1997.  
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hears…” (B24).  Unlike the Homeric gods, Xenophanes’ god cannot be deceived; no part of 
reality is obscured from him at any time.  So telos exists as an aspect of the divine, but even 
Xenophanes “theory of everything,” has limitations.  Despite perhaps accurately distinguishing 
between the gods and mortals, and the provinces of knowledge, opinion, and ignorance, 
Xenophanes is still unable to demonstrate an unassailable theory of everything or “certain truth” 
since no human can speak plausibly about the end or fulfillment of things.  Perhaps some 
theories or opinions hit much closer to true knowledge or the reality of “all things” than others 
by virtue of their ability to explain diverse phenomena.  The implication is that a cosmic telos 
exists but is beyond the scope of man’s knowledge.  
His theory, however, has some distinct advantages over the traditional accounts of the 
nature of things.  What sort of “discoveries” does Xenophanes have in mind?  It is not likely that 
he just means scientific discoveries, but also political or ethical progress that necessarily 
improves the quality of civic life.  If intelligence guides the cosmos, the guidance of a city can be 
understood as a microcosm of the guidance of the cosmos.  Instead of drawing the parallel of the 
operation of the cosmos from a political analogy, as Anaximander perhaps does, Xenophanes 
draws the idea of a directed-cosmos down onto human life, laying the foundation for Heraclitus’ 
greater emphasis on philosophical investigation into the connection between the operation of the 
cosmos and how men choose to live.  We can guide our lives and our cities by wisdom, as the 
divine guides the cosmos.  In this way, the world is not only directed or ruled by intelligence but 
that intelligence itself is the end at which all things aim.  Choosing to live and govern our 
communal lives by means of σοφίη is, for Xenophanes, a divine act.  Such wisdom comes about 
by seeing things for what they are through the application of the philosophical concept of nature 
and is the basis of his identity and the foundation of any claim of respect from his peers.  
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Positioning this wisdom against athletic prowess as the most prized thing in Greek culture, he 
argues, in a way that must have been as profoundly unpopular in his day as it would be in ours, 
that his wisdom is infinitely more valuable than these trivial endeavors.  Xenophanes thinks his 
wisdom is so valuable because it re-imagines how the Greeks understand the world and 
themselves, not just explaining how things came to be as they are in the present.  The Greek 
tradition has stories about the gods to explain everything from the origin of all things to 
particular historical events.  If Xenophanes is to supplant this tradition with something that both 
better explains natural phenomena and provides greater civic value, it must answer perennial 
questions in a way that is both engaging, as a poet ought to concern himself with this, and 
consistent in its application.  It has to be a complete theory, a “theory of everything,” that uses 
emerging philosophical concepts as the means of accomplishing such a feat.  Instead of “the 
begetting of gods by gods,” Xenophanes uses the concept of nature as the “single basic 







                                               
96 Edward Hussey, suggesting a parallel between Hesiod’s Theogony and Presocratic thought, maintains that Hesiod 
“attempts to create a complete, unified, and reasonable picture of the workings and history of the universe” by 
“employ[ing] a single basic mechanism,” The Presocratics, pp. 12-13.  Hussey thus agrees with Broadie’s view in 
“Rational Theology,” that Hesiod’s work is an early “theory of everything.”   
 74  
 
Chapter 3: Heraclitus and the Riddle of Nature 
It is in solving a riddle that we may leave it behind, and if the unsolved riddle remains with us, oppressing us with its 
unresolved and conflicting elements, is not nature, the self-revealing self-concealer, the unresolved and unresolvable 
riddle? 
     –Bob Rethy 
 
As the most enigmatic of all early Greek philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus presents a 
much more intricate interpretive challenge than either the Milesians or Xenophanes.  Unlike the 
Milesians, a remarkable amount of source material from Heraclitus survives the passage of time, 
including the specific use of the noun φύσις, which never appears in the surviving work of 
Xenophanes.  As a thinker who often prizes subtle insight at the expense of clarity, even 
delighting in contradiction and paradox, however, Heraclitus’ philosophical approach presents a 
staggering number of perplexities that have bedeviled scholars since antiquity.  Embracing 
elements of the basic assumption of unity found in the theories of nature offered by the Milesians 
and Xenophanes, Heraclitus nevertheless charts his own philosophical course by expanding unity 
to simultaneously account for differentiation and unification both in the cosmos and within the 
individual entity.  While some of his ideas are undeniably revolutionary, his method meets sharp 
criticism in antiquity.  Aristotle remarks that Heraclitus’ approach to truth lacks real clarity, even 
violating the principle of non-contradiction, while Lucretius’ evaluation of the Ephesian sage is 
far less kind, suggesting that only “dimwits” would be taken in by Heraclitus’ method since they 
alone “admire and love all things...hidden under twisted words.”97 Not surprisingly, little 
agreement arises as to the “true” Heraclitus, even among his earliest commentators, Plato and 
Aristotle, who seem to have had access to Heraclitus’ book.98  Though Heraclitus’ interests 
                                               
97 See Metaphysics 1012a24-b2 and Rhetoric 1407b11-18; Lucretius De Rerum Natura I.635-44.  
98 Though the existence of Heraclitus’ book has occasionally been disputed, most notably by Diels, most scholars 
accept that Heraclitus did in fact produce a written work. See KRS for a brief discussion of the topic, pp. 183-185.  
For an account that argues in favor of a traditional, continuous text see Jonathan Barnes “Aphorism and Argument,” 
in Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, ed. Kevin Robb (La Salle: Hegeler Institute, 1983), pp. 91-
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extend beyond the purview of natural philosophy, Plato takes his Presocratic predecessor to be 
the “philosopher of flux” when it comes to cosmological questions, while Aristotle categorizes 
the mysterious Ephesian sage as a material monist who considered fire to be the source (ἀρχή).99 
Without the luxury of the lost book, subsequent readers have to navigate the further difficulty of 
piecing together the surviving fragments in some kind of cogent order.100  Establishing any 
principle of organization, however, also inevitably imposes a particular interpretation that can be 
difficult to justify among the many possibilities.  Some have arranged the fragments without 
regard to thematic content, thus implicitly attributing a collection of stand-alone “wise-sayings” 
to Heraclitus.101  Others contend that Heraclitus’ work is better understood as an intentionally 
integrated whole, perhaps on the model of a choral ode with its “fluid, but carefully articulated 
                                               
100. For an account that criticizes Barnes’ approach and instead argues for an aphoristic, discontinuous text, see 
Herbert Granger “Argumentation and Heraclitus’ Book,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004): 1-17.   
99 See Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4, 
(hereafter ATH), and McKirahan, PBS, p. 125.  For Plato’s views see Theaetetus 152d2-e8 and 160d6-8 and 
Cratylus 402a8-10; for Aristotle’s views see Metaphysics 984a7-8 and Physics 205a3-4. While the standard story 
(found in Kahn and, more recently, in McKirahan) takes Aristotle to emphasize Heraclitus’ interest in fire as a kind 
of monism, Aristotle also rehearses Plato’s representation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of flux in Metaphysics 
1010a7-15. The difference can be accounted for by Aristotle’s greater interest in natural philosophy, thus he accepts 
Heraclitus as the philosopher of flux who extends this view to questions of materiality through fire.  For an account 
that explores and subsequently undermines the “Platonic-Aristotelian interpretation of Heraclitus’ views on change,” 
see G.S. Kirk, “Natural Change in Heraclitus,” Mind, 60 (1951): 35-42, at 35. 
100 For a concise history of the scholarly dispute regarding fragment order and its connection to interpretive 
framework in Heraclitus, see Charles Kahn “A New Look at Heraclitus,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 
(1964): 189-203, at pp. 189-191.  Kahn notes that even Diels’ classic arrangement of the fragments “alphabetically, 
according to the author who happens to cite them” is problematic since it “impos[es] his own view of Heraclitus’ 
work as lacking literary structure,” p. 189.  Kahn cites Burnet, Gomperz, and Frankel as the few classical 
commentators who object to “the principle of Diels’ arrangement,” preferring instead the original grouping by 
Bywater according to subject matter, p. 190 n. 7.  Kahn’s own approach in ATH follows Bywater by giving the 
fragments a thematic arrangement, though according to his own interpretation.   
101 For a more recent collection and translation of the Heraclitean fragments that follows Diels’ method of 
arrangement, see T.M. Robinson, Heraclitus Fragments: A text and translation with commentary (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1987).  Generally speaking, Robinson’s translations more readily preserve original 
textual ambiguities and accompanying translational difficulties than, for example, the translations found in Kahn’s 
ATH or Graham’s TEGP, but frequently at the expense of readability.  The bulk of the translations in this chapter are 
taken from Kahn, however, in certain cases translations from Graham and Robinson are more fitting and I have used 
and noted these as appropriate. Identifiers for fragments and testimonia from Diels/Kranz have been retained for the 
sake of clarity.  
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movement from image to aphorism, from myth to riddle to contemporary illusion.”102  
Whichever may be true, nearly all scholars agree that Heraclitus is a deliberate, careful writer 
whose rhetorical method serves his philosophical purpose.  This purpose, and the “central issue” 
for Heraclitus are at the center of the interpretive challenges that continue to attract scholars to 
the perpetual puzzle of the Ephesian’s philosophical views.   
Yet for all the attention directed to Heraclitus’ fragments, the role that φύσις plays in 
linking key ideas has been underappreciated or simply disregarded.  Hans-Georg Gadamer 
notably dismisses the significance of φύσις for Heraclitus, claiming agreement with what he 
takes to be Kirk and Raven’s position when he says that, “the concept of physis in Heraclitus did 
not yet have any philosophical import.”103  Gadamer considers only the idea of collective 
‘Nature’ to merit description as a concept, readily dismissing the idea of physis as a “thing’s true 
constitution” as being philosophically insignificant.  Although he cites them for support, Kirk 
and Raven suggest an important parallel between physis and logos in their concluding remarks 
on Heraclitus by saying, “Understanding of the Logos, of the true constitution of things, is 
necessary if our souls are not to be excessively moistened and rendered ineffective by private 
                                               
102 Kahn, “A New Look at Heraclitus,” p. 190.  Kahn’s claim is that Heraclitus’ poetic contemporaries, Pindar and 
Aeschylus are the models against which to understand the Ephesian sage, rather than the aphoristic Nietzsche. 
103 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 1998), pp. 34-35.   Although 
Gadamer is not specific with respect to what he has in mind from Kirk and Raven, it seems likely that he is referring 
to their assessment of B123 “where φύσις probably means not ‘Nature’ but ‘a thing’s true constitution’,” KR, p. 194.  
Gadamer goes further than this brief speculation offered by Kirk and Raven by arguing that “we must assume that an 
actual concept [of physis] began to form only when the counter concept to it had also taken shape,” p. 34.  His point 
is that it is not until the rise of custom (nomos) as an explanatory principle among the sophists that nature must 
emerge as a robust philosophical concept.   But as I argued in the previous chapter, and as Strauss points out quite 
effectively, the concept of custom arises prior to the concept of nature as the default mode of explanation “what 
something is” even in Homeric times.  The Presocratic emphasis on nature must then be seen as a reaction against 
the influence of custom as an explanatory mode in Homer and Hesiod. While few go so far as Gadamer in rejecting 
the significance of φύσις in Heraclitus’ work, the notion has merited far less attention than other concepts, especially 
logos.  Heidegger is a notable exception, having dedicated a significant portion of his Introduction to Metaphysics to 
the Greek idea of φύσις. In some ways, Gadamer’s dismissal of the significance of φύσις may be a reaction against 
Heidegger’s thorough-going emphasis on the concept in early Greek philosophy in general.  For Heidegger’s ideas 
on φύσις in Heraclitus specifically, see Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 133-143.  For a more recent treatment of the topic, see Enrique Hülsz 
Piccone, “Heraclitus on Φύσις,” Epoché, 17.2 (2013): 179–194. 
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folly.”104 They do not, in short, provide the support for his position that Gadamer attributes to 
them.  In this chapter, I defend the idea that Gadamer so easily rejects and that others, 
conversely, accept almost in passing as self-evident.  Simply put, I argue that φύσις itself is the 
essential riddle with which Heraclitus wrestles and that this riddle as the “true constitution of 
things” is even more intricate than commentators have realized.  On this reading, φύσις is a far 
more central philosophical concept for Heraclitus than has generally been accepted.  I argue that 
Heraclitus finds prevailing notions of nature to be woefully insufficient and in need of radical 
redefinition. In his attempt to achieve his new account, he expands the range of phenomena that 
the concept of nature can explain to include those experiences and events firmly grounded in the 
human realm.  Expanding the concept of nature itself through the connection to λόγος, Heraclitus 
lays the groundwork for the broader idea of Nature.  In the process of redefining, or better yet 
rediscovering, the idea of nature, however, Heraclitus develops an entirely new approach.  If 
nature is indeed a riddle, then one must be trained in the art of riddles, the art of paradox, to 
begin to untangle and “see through” the riddle.  Heraclitus’ vaunted and frequent use of paradox 
is, therefore, the only way one could conceivably approach the enigmatic, obscure nature of 
reality.  The reading offered here uses Heraclitus’ notion of φύσις as a way to connect his most 
important ideas concerning both the natural world and human experience, presenting his 
fragments as guides for how to decode the secrets of nature. 
This chapter focuses on Heraclitus’ transformation of the pedestrian notion of nature as 
the “character” or “qualities” of the thing into a more intricate conception of identity that has 
epistemological and ethical consequences for the way humans live.  Rather than disconnected or 
disassociated but loosely related thoughts, Heraclitus’ insights are thus entirely dependent on this 
                                               
104 KR, p. 215, emphasis added. 
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new understanding of nature.  Far from being philosophically insignificant then, the entire 
project of human wisdom is grounded on the proper understanding of the idea of nature. Nature 
as a philosophical concept must be dynamic enough to account for both plurality and unity, 
change and enduring identity.  Echoing throughout Heraclitus’ fragments, the riddle of nature 
reverberates in profoundly different themes, and demands a certain orientation from he who 
would properly investigate the most perplexing puzzle.  It is not an orientation, Heraclitus tells 
us, that can be readily adopted by the many.  Exploring Heraclitus’ innovative notion of φύσις 
first by arranging and analyzing the fragments that explicitly contain the term φύσις, I develop an 
understanding of the context and importance of Heraclitus’ concept of nature as it connects to his 
idea of λόγος and his own philosophical method.  More readily than any of his predecessors, 
Heraclitus connects his fundamental philosophical concepts to the way men actually live.  After 
establishing this foundation, I turn then to those fragments that concern his theory of the unity in 
opposites.  Here I show that Heraclitus applies and expands notions of unity found in his 
predecessor’s ideas to shape the idea of the nature (φύσις) of individual things as the unity of 
fundamental opposites.  These ideas are connected to some of Heraclitus’ most powerful 
statements about the nature of the cosmos that has always existed, governed by parallel notions 
of strife, justice, and the divine.  In the final section of the chapter, I explore the purposive 
implications of Heraclitus’ conception of conflict and justice and the idea of nature as a 
harmonia with a ‘built-in’ teleology that steers the cosmos.  
RIDDLES AND PARADOX IN THE SEARCH FOR PHYSIS 
Of the nearly one hundred and thirty Heraclitean fragments that survive to the present 
day, only five contain the noun φύσις.  In addition to confirming Heraclitus’ awareness of the 
cosmological and conceptual innovations of the earliest Milesians, the repeated use of the term 
also suggests a rise in its prevalence since the time of Homer and Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Pindar 
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where it occurs but seven times in total.105  In only one instance does φύσις explicitly assume the 
role of subject of the fragment; in the other fragments, it is overshadowed by concepts like λόγος 
that are generally taken to be much more important for Heraclitus.  Cautioning his reader against 
relying overmuch on what is readily apparent, however, Heraclitus tells us that, “The hidden 
attunement is better than the obvious one” (ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων, B54).106  
Presenting nature as a riddle, the “self-concealed, concealer,” Heraclitus famously and 
cryptically observes that “nature is ever hidden” (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, B123).107   For 
Heraclitus, φύσις is this “unapparent structure” or “hidden attunement,” both within his 
fragments and in the cosmos itself.  Unlocking the secret of the “hidden attunement” in the 
Heraclitean fragments requires careful, methodical interpretation and an ability to persevere 
beyond the surface to new depths of knowledge.  This is, of course, precisely what Heraclitus 
intends, as his art imitates nature that is inherently obscured.  Although some scholars debate 
whether common conceptual threads do in fact tie his fragments together, it can hardly be denied 
that Heraclitus’ eminently quotable yet profoundly perplexing style is intended as a deliberate 
                                               
105 John Walter Beardslee, The Use of φύσις in Fifth-Century Greek Literature (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1918), p. 1.  Beardslee suggests, however, that while φύσις only appears twice in Pindar’s work, “φυή is frequently 
found, and there is apparently no difference in meaning between the two words,” p. 6. To the best we are able to 
reconstruct the history of the term, it seems that it is during Heraclitus’ time that the usage of φύσις begins to rise 
dramatically in frequency such that by the time we get to Sophocles, the word is a commonplace, appearing more 
than 30 times in his plays. See Arthur O. Lovejoy “The Meaning of Φύσις in the Greek Physiologers,” The 
Philosophical Review 18.4 (1909): 369-383, at 376. 
106 Kahn, ATH, p. 65.  See also Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments, p. 39, and G.S. Kirk Heraclitus: The Cosmic 
Fragments, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1962), p. 222, (hereafter HCF). Both translate ἁρμονίη as “connection,” Graham 
opts for “structure” (TEGP, p. 161).  I explore the notion of ἁρμονίη and its implications for the larger picture of 
Heraclitus’ thought in greater depth in the final section of this chapter.    
107For a convincing argument against the standard translation of the verb φιλεῖ as “loves,” see Daniel Graham, 
“Does Nature Love to Hide? Heraclitus B123 DK,” Classical Philology 98 (2003): 175-79. Using a series of 
passages from Herodotus to clarify the “nuances” of the Ionic dialect surrounding this term, Graham argues that 
philein + infinitive is an idiomatic expression that refers to what is customary or usual and has nothing to do with 
“love” as an emotion. See also Pierre Hadot, Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 7. 
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provocation to the reader.  But provoke the suitable reader to what, exactly?  The most 
immediate answer: to learn to listen well.   
Striking a scornful tone, Heraclitus admonishes the many when he says, “Having heard 
without comprehension they are like the deaf; this saying bears witness to them: present they are 
absent” (ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσι μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι, 
B34).108  Foolishly accepting a shallow version of reality, mere sounds without meaning, the 
many are unable to connect what they experience with what matters most.  Everything is, in 
effect, the same for them: sound without comprehension.  Worse yet are those among the many 
who listen too much, that is, without the proper discernment: “A stupid person tends to become 
all worked up over every statement (he hears)” (βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγωι ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ, 
B87).109  These individuals are equally hopeless, though in a different way.  Blown with the 
prevailing winds, they lack the wherewithal to commit to a particular account.  What then is one 
to be listening for, precisely?  Heraclitus’ play on ἁρμονίη as an “attunement” is intentional, 
though he does not mean it solely in the musical sense attributed to him by Plato.110  As an 
attunement, ἁρμονίη requires that things be “fitted together” properly.  While this applies equally 
well to the sensitive ear of the listener and the sensitive mind of the student of nature, it need not 
be an attunement in the way one expects.  In fact, if it is “hidden” or “latent,” and thus the more 
important connection, then it very likely is not the kind of fitting together that is readily apparent 
or expected.  
                                               
108 Graham translation, TEGP, p. 145. 
109 Robinson translation, Heraclitus: Fragments, p. 53. 
110 See Symposium 187a; Kirk judges Plato guilty of misinterpreting Heraclitus because the “technical musical 
meaning” of ἁρμονία does not exist during Heraclitus’ time, HCF, p. 204.  Kahn views the musical application as 
just one of three meanings for Heraclitus, see ATH, p. 203. 
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Many Heraclitean fragments are themselves carefully constructed in ways that model a 
very precise attunement.  In B54, which Charles Kahn calls “one of the shortest and most 
beautifully designed fragments,” Heraclitus uses the principle of fitting together opposites to 
literally forge the verbal and conceptual connection: ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων.111 
Listening is the analogy Heraclitus uses for comprehension, connecting his ideas on the 
investigation of nature with everyday life, but it is rather the ability to pay close attention to the 
way things fit together that Heraclitus finds to be the truly vital element in understanding.  This is 
one of the reasons he uses an array of literary techniques: to cultivate proper discernment 
through listening well for what fits together.  The careful attunement in his fragments serves two 
purposes.  First, the subtle attunement aims to condition the listener to see precisely these sorts of 
connections in nature itself.  In effect, Heraclitus teaches a new way to find meaning using the 
idea of nature, by attuning ourselves to the unapparent connections in things.112  It is not enough 
simply to announce that there are powerful, hidden realities, as the Milesians do, Heraclitus must 
guide the listener into moving beyond what is obvious in the same way that someone first grasps 
sounds and moves to meaning.  Such obscurity demands an intelligent reader searching for 
hidden truths and connections between seemingly disconnected ideas.  Though some 
commentators have lamented the numerous, vastly divergent interpretations that arise from such 
a method, this open-endedness is entirely by design, in a way that fits with the object of inquiry.  
In other words, the method of discourse necessarily reflects the hidden, enigmatic quality of 
                                               
111 Kahn, ATH, p. 202. 
112 Glenn Most points to the poetic quality, and intentional shrouding of truth, found in many of Heraclitus’ 
aphorisms in suggesting that the form of his philosophy itself demands close attention and interpretation from the 
listener, see “The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, 
ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 332-362, at pp. 357-359. 
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nature itself.113  When it comes to reading Heraclitus, then, one should be wary of explicit 
subjects and overt connections, instead listening carefully in order to seek after the less obvious, 
even obscure connections.  The only way one may approach nature is by learning the language 
of nature, or as Heraclitus says,“Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not 
understand the language” (κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς 
ἐχόντων, B107).114  Language begins with the use of the senses but every translation from sights 
and sounds gathered requires interpretation in order to make those signals meaningful.  The 
language of nature is no different for Heraclitus, and it requires one to reorient his ability to 
listen in order to understand and ultimately “speak” the language: “Not knowing how to listen, 
neither can they speak” (ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ᾿ εἰπεῖν, B19).  True comprehension is not 
just a discerning ear for how things “fit together,” but the ability to articulate the hidden 
connections in nature. 
Heraclitus offers clues on how to understand the language of “ever-hidden” nature in a 
fragment that receives comparably little attention.  In an adaptation of a common tale from the 
Lives of Homer, Heraclitus presents a tantalizing riddle intended to both teach and ridicule: “Men 
are deceived in the recognition of what is obvious, like Homer who was wisest of all Greeks.  
For he was deceived by boys killing lice, who said: what we see and catch we leave behind; what 
                                               
113 Guthrie bemoans the breadth of possible interpretations of Heraclitus as “discouraging,” but admits that “one can 
only give one’s own,” HGP, vol. 1, p. 427. Barnes is somewhat more poetic in expressing the point when he says, 
“The truth is that Heraclitus attracts exegetes as an empty jampot wasps; and each new wasp discerns traces of his 
own favourite flavor,” The Presocratic Philosophers, volume 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 57, 
(hereafter PP).   
114 Daniel Graham, “Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge” in The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, 
ed. Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 169-188, at 177.  The 
connection between knowledge of the cosmos and the idea of learning a language is a generally accepted insight in 
Heraclitean studies. See also Kahn, ATH, p. 107, Kahn, “New Look at Heraclitus,” p. 192, and Lesher, “Heraclitus’ 
Epistemological Vocabulary,” Hermes 111.2 (1983): 155-170. at 167. My claim goes one step further: Heraclitus 
aims to teach his discerning reader to speak the language of nature through carefully constructed aphorisms.  This 
language of nature mimics the operation of physis, the hidden fitting-together of opposites that creates meaning.  
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we neither see nor catch we carry away” (ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν 
φανεπῶν παραπλησίως Ὁμήρῳ, ὃς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων· ἐκεῖνόν τε γὰρ 
παῖδες φθεῖας κατακτείνοντες ἐξηπάτησαν εἰπόντες· ὅσα εἴδομεν καὶ κατελάβομεν, ταῦτα 
ἀπολείπομεν, ὅσα δὲ οὔτε εἴδομεν οὔτ᾿ ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα φέρομεν, B56).115  Though this 
fragment has been generally interpreted and often dismissed as merely an attack on Homer, 
Heraclitus presents both a paradox and riddle that go to the heart of his thoughts on 
knowledge.116  Opening with the paradox of the “deceptiveness of knowledge,” Heraclitus 
sounds the familiar theme of the unapparent nature of true wisdom, and follows this with a riddle 
that is both old and new.  The riddle is an old tale, presumably one that has been told many 
times, but Heraclitus puts a new spin on it: presenting with paradox, illustrating with the riddle. 
The riddle itself shows that “the things closest to us are what we do not know,” and that “nature 
as physis, the true being of things as self-unfolding, loves to hide.”117   
If Heraclitus intends the prosaic notion of nature as the “character” of a thing, reflected in 
his predecessors’ customary view as the “outward, physical characteristics” then this sentiment 
of nature as unobvious makes little sense.  We might, more poignantly, interpret this fragment as 
a direct repudiation of his poetic predecessors who understand the φύσις of anything to be 
                                               
115 The point of B56 is easy to miss, as when Kahn wonders, “Why does Heraclitus find the story significant?” ATH, 
p. 111. For a thorough interpretation of the significance of this fragment as it reveals key Heraclitean ideas, see 
Robert Rethy, “Heraclitus, Fragment 56: The Deceptiveness of the Apparent,” Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 1-7. 
The interpretation presented here is heavily indebted to Rethy’s reading.  For a more recent account that defends the 
crucial importance of B56 for a proper understanding of Heraclitus’ thought, see Roman Dilcher, “How Not to 
Conceive Heraclitean Harmony,” in Doctrine and Doxography: Studies in Heraclitus and Pythagoras, ed. David 
Sider and Dirk Obbink (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), pp. 263-280.   
116 For a thorough account of Heraclitus’ “harshly critical” view of Homer grounded in a thorough repudiation of the 
Homeric view of the soul, see Martha Nussbaum, “ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, I,” Phronesis (1972): 1-16.  Nussbaum 
references B56 as an explicit criticism of Homer, p. 1n1.  The majority of scholars interpret this fragment along 
these lines. See, for example, Kahn, ATH, p. 112 and Miroslav Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with Short 
Commentary (Merida, Venezuela: Los Andes University Press, 1967), p. 82. 
117 Rethy, “Heraclitus, Fragment 56: The Deceptiveness of the Apparent,” p. 3. 
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obvious.  Nature hides in the way a riddle does, that is, the meaning is what is hidden. and we 
must wrestle with it to untangle the knot.   
In a truly fascinating observation, Serge Mouraviev has keenly pointed out that fragment 
B123 contains a reverse anagram  
ΦΥΣΙΣ ΚΡΥΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ ΦΙΛΕΙ118  
 
such that the enigmatic φύσις is literally “escaping precisely in its striking self-exhibition.”119  
As a “classic riddle,” the very idea of φύσις is one in which “the immediate expectation or 
surface meaning of terms and situations must be seen through for the riddle to be solved.”120  
Heraclitus then fulfills the role of oracle, as he suggests in another fragment: “The lord whose 
oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but gives a sign” (ὁ ἅναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ 
ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει, B93).  One must learn how to interpret the 
various signs and clues offered by both Heraclitus and the divine.  
While wide-ranging interpretations have been offered for Heraclitus’ frequent use of an 
eclectic mix of proverbs, prophecy, paradox and riddles, in reality his ideas would be 
ineffectively transmitted in any other way.121  Heraclitus’ provocation through paradox goes 
                                               
118 Serge Mouraviev’s striking claim can be found in Heraclitea, III.3.A (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2002).  
See Hülsz Piccone, “Heraclitus on Φύσις,” for a brief analysis of the claim as it fits into Heraclitus’ broader 
approach to φύσις, p. 185.  
119 Rethy, “Heraclitus, Fragment 56: The Deceptiveness of the Apparent,” p. 3.  
120 Ibid., p. 1.  Rethy briefly notes some of the adaptations Heraclitus makes to the classic tale, namely the 
replacement of fishing boys with children and catching with “seeing and grasping.”  For an account which situates 
Heraclitus’ take on the riddle more thoroughly in antiquity, see Kirk, HCF, pp. 158-160.  
121 Nietzsche suggests that Heraclitus’ style of “oracular proverbs and the language of the Sibyls” reveals a profound 
loneliness in the Ephesian sage, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana, Illinois: University 
of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 55. Guthrie contends that it is Heraclitus’ love of puzzles and “delight in paradox” that 
inspires his rhetorical choices or, alternatively, that the language of the time was too limited, necessitating the use of 
paradox, HGP, vol. 1, pp. 410-413.  Graham suggests that Heraclitus “depart[s] from the usual style of exposition” 
because the many “are incapable of understanding his message, even when it is explained to them,” “Heraclitus: 
Flux, Order, and Knowledge,” p. 170.  Each of these may hold some bit of truth but they fail to explain such precise 
and careful linguistic construction of many of the fragments.  Further, to miss the symmetry between Heraclitus’ 
philosophical ideas and his rhetorical method, or to dismiss it as some unintentional byproduct of personality, as 
even Theophrastus does, is to miss out on precisely what makes his fragments so fascinating. 
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beyond challenging his listener to just think more deeply, instead aiming to “startle and outrage” 
us in order to “direct our thought in particular determinate directions.”122  Heraclitus’ river 
fragments are the most famous example: “One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one 
grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and 
dissolves, and approaches and departs” (B91).  Likewise, “as they step into the same rivers, other 
and still other waters flow upon them” (B12).  These fragments present a blatant challenge to 
common sense, in order to “activate reflection” in a way that draws us both to the conflicting 
elements in reality as well as to the conflict within our own cognitive processes.123  
Understanding nature as a riddle we cannot leave behind necessitates the development of a 
certain perspective in ourselves, an orientation toward a perpetually deep and ever-deepening 
mystery.  If Heraclitus truly understands, “the finding of the ‘latent structure’, of the ‘nature’ of 
things” to be “solving of the riddle,” then only he who can grapple with the paradox and 
effectively navigate the riddle is worthy of the wisdom of nature.124  
Lest we make the mistake of thinking that the notion of nature as unapparent (ἀφανής) or 
hidden is entirely new, we should not fail to point out certain similarities with the single use of 
φύσις in Homer’s Odyssey.125  There Odysseus is dependent upon Hermes for knowledge of the 
φύσις of the Molu flower that the god “pulled from the earth (ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας).  Hermes shows 
Odysseus “its nature” (φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε), and notes the difficulty mortals have in digging it 
up.  In this case, the root must be unearthed because it is the hidden aspect that must be revealed 
                                               
122 Mackenzie, “Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox,” p. 14. 
123 Ibid., p. 3. 
124 Hussey, “Heraclitus,” p. 91. 
125 See Hülsz, “Heraclitus on Φύσις,” for an account of Heraclitus’  continuation of Homer’s notion of φύσις. Hülsz 
notes that the similarities with Heraclitus’ are “remarkable,” the differences “subtle” and cites the B22 as a 
Heraclitean parallel: “Those who search for gold, then, dig up much earth and find little” (χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι 
γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον), p. 182. 
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in order for the nature to be fully explained.  The emphasis on the difficulty of the task, and the 
subsequent comparison with the unlimited power of the gods, illustrates that the knowledge of 
φύσις is the “prized goal of hard digging.”126  And yet although there are certainly Homeric 
overtones in Heraclitus’ thought with respect to the “hidden” quality of φύσις, as well as the 
difficulty of the investigative labor required to unearth what hides, the differences are equally 
striking.  If, for Heraclitus, the divine does not “reveal,” but rather only “gives a sign,” then there 
is no divine revelation and the task is not digging but interpretive.  In addition to the fact that the 
wise must know how and where to look, when it comes to mortals they must also be committed 
to the labor of dogged investigation to search out “what is hidden.127  “He who does not expect 
will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless and unexplored” (ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον 
οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον, B18).  This hiddenness plays itself out in his 
interactions with other supposed purveyors of truth: “Of all those whose accounts I have heard, 
none has gone so far as this: to recognize what is wise, set apart from all” (ὁκόσων λόγους 
ἤκουσα οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅ τι σοφόν ἐστι, πάντων κεχωρισμένον, 
B108).  Since he points to a common mistake, it is worth thinking about precisely which 
accounts Heraclitus has in mind here.  The venerable figures he references throughout his 
fragments, both explicitly and implicitly, offer radically different accounts, though he finds them 
similarly deficient.  From Heraclitus’ view, the Milesians may fail to appreciate how the “wise” 
is “set apart from all” since they look only for what is common.  Yet Xenophanes does seem to 
distinguish between a divine that knows, and the material world inhabited by mortals grounded 
                                               
126 Hülsz, “Heraclitus on Φύσις,” p. 181. 
127 Kahn offers little in the way of commentary beyond grouping B123 with other fragments that illustrate this 
theme of searching, ATH, p. 105. Pierre Hadot, on the other hand, spends a great deal of interpretive effort 
untangling all the possible meanings for this short fragment, deciphering at least five worthy of investigation, Veil of 
Isis, pp. 9-10.  
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only in opinion.  Xenophanes’ mistake may then have been a failure to appreciate what true 
wisdom really entails, rather than how it is distinct or “set apart” (B40).  In any event, it is with 
no small amount of confidence that Heraclitus sets the stage for what his account will 
accomplish where others have failed. 
Connecting that which is “wise, set apart from all” to what men fail to adequately “hear” 
through his notion of λόγος, Heraclitus famously begins his book, saying 
τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδε ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ 
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γιγνομένων γὰρ 
πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι 
ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοῖ α ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι, κατὰ φύσιν 
διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους 
ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα 
εὕδοντες ε0πιλανθάνάνονται. 
Although this account holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend 
both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all 
things come to pass in accordance with this account, men are like 
the untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, 
distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. 
But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are 
forgetful of what they do asleep. (B1) 
Linking the task and value of the pursuer of wisdom explicitly with the notion of φύσις, 
Heraclitus adopts Xenophanes’ use of φύσις as a mechanism of distinction and classification.   
By enhancing the crucial role φύσις plays in unlocking the λόγος, however, Heraclitus shifts 
philosophical inquiry to include “how humans react to the world.”128  If these are the opening 
lines of the book, then they are crucial for pointing the reader to the importance of the concept of 
φύσις.  From an epistemological standpoint, the ability to recognize an underlying reality by 
“distinguishing each according to its nature” (κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον) and ultimately 
                                               
128 Graham, “Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge,” p. 170. 
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giving an account (“telling how it is,” φράζων129 ὅκως ἔχει) is what produces knowledge of this 
“higher law” of the cosmos to which only few have access.130  It is, in short, what separates the 
wise from the untried.  Yet for the enigmatic sage, the pursuit of the hidden truth of things is not 
about mere accumulation of knowledge but is itself a way of life. In fact, although Heraclitus’ 
general issue with the many is that they perpetuate a general “failure to grasp the underlying 
connection between things,” this can take several forms.131  The many often fail to get beyond 
their own private thoughts: “Most men do not think things in the way they encounter them, nor 
do they recognize what they experience, but believe their own opinions” (οὐ γαρ φρονέουσι 
τοιαῦτα πολλοὶ ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρέουσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι, B17).  
Others, often considered wise, confuse learning as amassing facts or information with 
comprehension: “Much learning does not teach understanding.  For it would have taught Hesiod 
and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus” (πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· ῾Ησίοδον 
γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτις τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον, B40).  The awareness of 
the λόγος through the pursuit and articulation of the φύσις of things differentiates what 
                                               
129 Enrique Hülsz aptly suggests that φράζων may be better translated here as “showing it forth,” emphasizing the 
visual connotation. See “Heraclitus on Logos: Language, Rationality, and the Real,” in Doctrine and Doxography: 
Studies in Heraclitus and Pythagoras, ed. David Sider and Dirk Obbink (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), pp. 281-299, at 
283.  Though Hülsz does not cite other Heraclitean fragments to support his translation, contending only that it fits 
the context and “is consistent with usage at Heraclitus’ time,” the Ephesian sage’s emphasis on sense experience, 
particularly sight, does suggest an affinity with “showing.”  See, for example, B55 “Whatever comes from sight, 
hearing, learning from experience: this I prefer” and B101a “Eyes are surer witnesses than ears.”  Compare with 
Homer’s use in the Iliad: ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε. The φύσις of individual things requires a 
demonstration both in Homer and Heraclitus.  A notion of mere “telling” may or may not live up to such a 
requirement demanded by the obscure nature of φύσις because it is so difficult to distinguish.  
130 This reading may be controversial given that there is little consensus around the precise sense of λόγος in the 
Heraclitean fragments. Two basic camps emerge, only to see deeper fissions within them. On the one hand, we have 
the “minimalists” who understand λόγος to refer to only to Heraclitus’ words, see M.L. West Early Greek 
Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 124. Jonathan Barnes adopts a similar view, 
claiming that “it is wasted labor to seek Heraclitus’ secret in the sense of logos,” PP, p. 59. The other camp is much 
larger and takes Heraclitean λόγος to refer to something more universal and metaphysical. This camp is deeply 
divided, however, on the precise meaning of this universal λόγος such that any sort of agreement is generally only 
derived from suggesting what λόγος is not: restricted to Heraclitus’ words. 
131 Patricia Curd, “Knowledge and Unity in Heraclitus,” The Monist 74.4 (1991): 531-549, at 532.   
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Heraclitus comprehends from what others believe about the world.  More importantly, perhaps, 
this awareness also differentiates how the sage lives from the way other men blindly go about 
their lives.  Such obliviousness may be traced to the inability to understand and properly apply 
the idea of nature. In short, on account of their failure to understand nature, most people are, in 
effect, nothing more than zombies.132  
But we may ask: In what sense does knowledge of the nature of things give us access to a 
λόγος?133  Playing on the multi-faceted meaning of λόγος, Heraclitus offers, on the one hand, a 
traditional construction that typically begins such early Greek works that speak of λόγος as the 
author’s own account.134  On the other hand, Heraclitus clearly intends something far more 
universal than simply his own discourse, especially given that he chastises men for a failure to 
comprehend the λόγος even “before hearing it.”  The λόγος is the account that stands outside of 
time (“holds forever”), and that effectively governs the universe as “all things come to pass in 
accordance with this account.”  But the fixed, unchanging nature of the account is directly 
contrasted with the transience of all things (πάντων) that are subject to the effects of time and 
becoming (γιγνομένων).  Access to the fixed “account” of the λόγος, that underlying structure or 
reality of all things, is only gained by inquiring into the nature (φύσις) of individual, changing 
                                               
132 Thus the warning in B71-73: “Men forget where the way leads...And they are at odds with that which they most 
constantly associate. And what they meet with every day seems strange to them...We should not act and speak like 
men asleep.” 
133 It should be noted that some commentators have denied precisely the link I am here arguing for between φύσις 
and λόγος for Heraclitus. See, for example, Kirk, HCF, p. 43 and Curd, “Knowledge and Unity in Heraclitus,” p. 
542.   
134 Kahn suggests Heraclitus’ use of λόγος at the outset of his work is part of an existing literary tradition of prose 
but an “atypical representative of the new genre,” ATH, p. 97.  Kahn points out that early prose authors like 
Hecataeus and Ion of Chios, among others, “regularly introduced [treatises] by a reference to the logos or discourse 
as such,” p. 97.  Kahn’s treatment of the topic in ATH is nevertheless only a cursory one; for a more detailed 
etymological history of λόγος, see Kahn, “A New Look at Heraclitus,” pp. 191-193. For a broader treatment of the 
various uses of λόγος in the fifth century, see Guthrie, HGP, vol. I, pp. 420-424.  Nussbaum critiques the supposed 
“impressive diversity of usage” that Guthrie develops by arguing that “Λόγος in early writers is not used 
frequently,” but that when it is it “always means a story” and usually a “falsehood,” “ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, I,” p. 3.  
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things.  Such knowledge is not gained by divine revelation or even by way of experience.135  
Studying entities that change over time, seemingly becoming something both the same and yet 
different, gives insight into what unites or undergirds change and motion.  The pitfall of such 
observational habits, and the resulting view of reality, is a kind of relativism that Heraclitus 
objects to when he says, “Though the λόγος is common, the many live, however, as though they 
had a private understanding” (τοῦ λόγου δ᾿ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες 
φρόνησιν, B2).136  The danger is not being able to transcend observed multiplicity and change in 
the search for something more fundamental and universal. As a mode of inquiry, the study of 
φύσις provides access to what is common or “shared by all” by allowing the wise to move from 
what they experience to what connects those experiences. In short, as Curd notes, “an 
understanding of the cosmos is grounded in the knowledge of the nature of each thing.”137  By 
establishing a conceptual pattern that unifies the experience of change while at the same time 
being able to account for differences, φύσις provides the path to a more comprehensive 
understanding of things in the world.  
In yet another fragment dealing with φύσις, Heraclitus gives an example that strengthens 
the essential connection between the idea of nature and how one ought to live when he tells us 
that “Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom: to act and speak what is true, 
perceiving things according to their nature” (σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη καὶ σοφίη, ἀληθέα λέγειν 
καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας, B112).  Constituting Heraclitus’ contribution to σωφρονεῖν, the 
                                               
135 For detailed discussions of Heraclitus’ epistemology, see Edward Hussey “Epistemology and Meaning in 
Heraclitus,” in Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, ed. Malcolm 
Schofield and Martha Craven Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 33-59, and Lesher, 
“Heraclitus’ Epistemological Vocabulary.”  
136 Robinson translation, Heraclitus: Fragments, p. 11. 
137 Patricia Curd, “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. Mary 
Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (Malden: M.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 34-55, at 36. Curd’s view here 
seems an adjustment of her earlier account in “Knowledge and Unity in Heraclitus,” which indicated that the logos 
may be grasped independent of any knowledge of particular things. 
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“paramount virtue of his age,” this fragment draws together the important concepts of the pursuit 
and articulation of knowledge with virtue into a vision of the best life.138  The fragment works 
backward from the ultimate goal of σωφρονεῖν to the way in which this excellence is produced: 
true act and speech.  Such truth is elusive both in thought and action, Heraclitus implies, without 
the ability to properly perceive the nature of individual things.  Not only can we not know, we 
cannot effectively choose without the ability to grasp the φύσις of things.  All that man might 
achieve for himself, the greatest excellence, thus depends upon the ability to properly see the 
nature of things.  What seems to be the least important concept in the fragment, φύσις, is hidden 
in plain sight and turns out to be the most essential.  Heraclitus not only moves philosophical 
investigation from cosmology to human affairs, he moves the concept of φύσις from one that 
concerns scientific or atmospheric phenomena to one that is integral to all human endeavors.  
Thus, in addition to knowledge of how things come to be, Heraclitus also understands that 
“moral virtue is deeply rooted in φύσις.”139  As Heraclitus suggests in a separate fragment: “It 
belongs to all men to know themselves and to think well” (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν 
ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν, B116).  Perhaps then Heraclitus gives the first step on the path to moral 
virtue when he says, “I went in search of myself” (ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν, B101). 
But in order to think well, one must in effect discover how to think.  Heraclitus, like 
Xenophanes, challenges the traditional mode of learning that has done more harm than good. 
Whereas Xenophanes aims most of his ire at Homer as the one from whom “all have learned,” 
                                               
138 Kahn weighs in on the authenticity debate surrounding this fragment, saying, “If [B112] is not his, Heraclitus has 
nothing really original to say on sophrosyne, the paramount virtue of his age. But if it belongs to Heraclitus, [B112]  
is his most interesting utterance as a moral philosopher,” ATH, p. 120. Though some have certainly raised plausible 
doubts as to authenticity, Kahn appropriately claims that “the burden of proof falls on those who would deny 
authenticity.”  Nevertheless, the real and underappreciated significance of this fragment is the connection it forges 
between Heraclitus’ moral philosophy and the endeavor of the natural philosopher to properly grasp things 
according to their φύσις.  Heraclitus is often singled-out as the earliest Presocratic philosopher concerned with 
ethical questions, but rarely do commentators connect these with his developing theory of φύσις. 
139 Hülsz, “Heraclitus on Φύσις,” p. 184. 
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Heraclitus targets Hesiod, saying,“The teacher of most is Hesiod. It is him they know as knowing 
most, who did not recognize day and night: they are one” (διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· 
τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν, 
B57).  Homer is the teacher of kings, Hesiod the teacher of farmers, and between them they 
constitute the principal sources of Greek knowledge.  Hesiod’s reach, according to Heraclitus, is 
far greater because it extends to hoi polloi, that is, to “most” (πλείστων). Simultaneously 
complimentary and insulting, Heraclitus suggests that Hesiod’s influence is powerful and 
pervasive but ultimately misleading and detrimental to the masses.  The irony is that this 
powerful source of knowledge in the Greek world makes a fundamental mistake.  Hesiod’s real 
error, Heraclitus points out, is that he “counted some days as good, others as bad, because he did 
not recognize that the nature (φύσις) of every day is one and the same” (῾Ησιόδῳ τὰς μὲν ἁγαθὰς 
ποιουμὲνῳ, τὰς δὲ φαύλας, ὡσ ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας μίαν οὖσαν, B106).  In Hesiod’s 
Theogony, Day and Night are personified as characters, distinctly separate from one another with 
Night giving birth to Day (Theogony 748-757).  But, as Nietzsche points out, night and day are 
“unthinkable separated” precisely because they are “opposites sides of one and the same 
relationship.”140  Heraclitus challenges Hesiod’s authority by undermining the traditional notion 
of φύσις as something that serves solely as a means of differentiation.  The nature of something, 
anything, must be a unity.  Hesiod’s failure has consequences: since he registers “some days as 
good and some as bad,” he ascribes value where there is none.  His failure to understand φύσιs 
and the true unity of things means that he has ultimately failed to grasp the meaning of 
existence.141     
                                               
140 Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, p. 57. 
141 See Kirk on the connection between λόγος and meaning for Heraclitus, HCF, p. 37.  Kahn provides a brief 
discussion concerning meaning and Heraclitus’ use of the ideas of his predecessors in the development of his own 
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PHYSIS AND THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES 
Unmistakably woven throughout many of Heraclitus’ fragments, φύσις is thus intimately 
connected with questions of what humans can know and how they should live. His understanding 
of φύσις as an unapparent ἁρμονίη is reflected in the precise composition of his aphoristic 
fragments that entice the reader beyond the obvious.  For Heraclitus, one must be rigorously 
prepared to go beyond simple experience in order to grasp the secret structure of things by means 
of the riddle.  But all this for the sake of what truths, what insight?  What then is φύσιs for 
Heraclitus?  As he indicates in B1, φύσιs is a means of distinguishing individual things in a way 
that ultimately allows access to the λόγος.  Although λόγος plays the role of cosmic unifier,  
Heraclitus connects φύσις with unity even more explicitly in B106, where he indicts Hesiod for 
his failure to understand true unity, namely that “the nature (φύσις) of every day is one and the 
same.”  The failure to understand the hidden connection in things extends even to the “teacher of 
most.”  Hesiod’s real error is making an improper distinction, believing Night is the parent of 
Day, principally because he sees opposition where unity in fact exists.  There is some truth in 
Hesiod’s view, however, as opposition plays an integral part in the fundamental structure of 
reality.  For Heraclitus, the movement beyond earlier versions of φύσις, whether poetic or 
philosophic conceptions, comes through recognizing that φύσις is a unification of opposites 
within the things themselves.  Heraclitus thus establishes a new way to think of φύσις as a unity, 
specifically a unity in opposites.  Though some have suggested such a link in passing, or alluded 
to a comparison rather vaguely, the connection has not been fully appreciated and properly 
defended as a revolutionary articulation of φύσιs in the early Greek period.142    
                                               
theories, maintaining that “men like Xenophanes and Pythagoras failed to see the true meaning of their own 
knowledge,” “A New Look at Heraclitus,” p. 191. 
142 See Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Hellenic 
Studies, 1971), pp. 89-90, for a brief discussion of the novelty of such an idea in antiquity.  Pierre Hadot suggests 
the possibility of connecting φύσις in Heraclitus with the idea of contraries through an analysis of B123 (φύσις 
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Although the existence of a theory of the “unity of opposites” has generally been 
accepted, the proper understanding and precise implications of this key idea in Heraclitus have 
been a source of considerable debate.143  Aristotle takes Heraclitus to mean that opposites are 
identical, not merely unified in some way, and concludes that Heraclitus perhaps was not serious 
about such an obvious absurdity.144  Aristotle’s motivation for such a simplistic reading of his 
predecessor is unclear.  What is clear from a reading of the Heraclitean fragments that deal with 
this idea is that identity is only one possible way to think of the sort of “sameness” or unity that 
Heraclitus has in mind.145  The notion of unity was itself nothing new, as earlier Presocratic 
thinkers clearly wrestled with how to understand that which holds things together.  They had 
been chiefly concerned with explaining a unified cosmos, however, through a variety of 
principles.  Although Heraclitus may have been influenced by his cosmological predecessors, the 
Ephesian is not merely or even primarily a cosmologist.  Instead, he is far more concerned with 
unity as it relates to the “requirements for an object of knowledge.”146  Understanding and 
explaining what something is, or in his words “distinguishing each according to its nature and 
                                               
κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ).  He arrives at a rather unorthodox conclusion that “reality is such that within each thing there are 
two aspects that destroy each other mutually,” Veil of Isis, p. 10.   As previously quoted, Hussey may suggest a 
parallel between ἁρμονίη, φύσις, and the unity of opposites when he says “the finding of the ‘latent structure’ of the 
‘nature’ of things, is solving the riddle,” but he offers no substantive explanation or argument regarding this claim, 
“Heraclitus,” p. 91. 
143 For classic accounts of the “Unity of Opposites” in Heraclitus, see Kirk, HCF, pp. 166-201 and Kahn, ATH, pp. 
185-204. Other accounts include C.J. Emlyn-Jones “Heraclitus and the Identity of Opposites,” Phronesis 21 (1976): 
89-114; M.M. Mackenzie “Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6 (1988): 1-37; 
and Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, pp 89-100.  For a more recent account that provides a broad 
but accessible framework, see Edward Hussey, “Heraclitus,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek 
Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-112.  Hussey argues that 
Heraclitus’ tripartite strategy is to 1) compile examples that “draw attention to the unity-in-opposites pattern,” then 
2) generalize to state the pattern, and finally 3) “apply the pattern in the construction of theories,” pp. 93-98.  
Hussey’s formula is a more specific version of Mackenzie’s pattern that involves “the opposition of unity and the 
unity of opposites” as “counterparts,” “Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox,” p. 9.  For a synopsis of the problems in 
attributing a “unity of opposites” theory to Heraclitus, see Dilcher “How Not to Conceive Heraclitean Harmony,” 
pp. 263-265. 
144 See Metaphysics 1005b17-26 and Emlyn-Jones, “Heraclitus and the Identity of Opposites,” p. 90.  
145 Graham’s account of this idea in Explaining the Cosmos is helpful in understanding the range of possibilities of 
“sameness,” among which identity is merely one option, see pp. 122-129. 
146 Curd, “Knowledge and Unity in Heraclitus,” p. 532.   
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telling how it is” (κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει, B1), requires an account 
of what makes some entity a unified thing.  Heraclitus fashions a new notion of unity by 
synthesizing the ideas of his predecessors into a description of both the unity and difference that 
describes the fundamental reality of existence.  By importing the philosophical notion of unity at 
the level of the individual entities, Heraclitus gives a way to understand both identity and 
change, unity and differentiation.  Further, φύσις as such gives humans a path to grasping the 
λόγος according to which “all things come to pass.”  In this way, Heraclitus establishes a far 
more specific way to understand the parallel operations between the individual and the cosmos 
that is a commonplace in ancient Greek thought.  By moving beyond simplistic principles of 
unification such as “everything is water” or “everything is rarefied or condensed air,” Heraclitus 
allows for different kinds of unity and differentiation at various levels of reality.  
Although some have occasionally challenged the presence of a “unity of opposites” 
theory in the extant fragments, the fact that Heraclitus has “monistic ambitions” is hard to refute.  
He suggests repeatedly and in a variety of ways that “all things are one.”  Reinforcing a parallel 
with listening and logos, he says, “It is wise, listening not to me but to the account, to agree that 
all things are one” (οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογειν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι, 
B50).   The unity is difficult to “grasp” given the apparent prevalence of contrary movements or 
opposing traits: “Graspings: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, 
from all things one and from one things all” (συλλάψιες· ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον 
διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδοϝ διᾷδον, ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, B10).  Such unity may in fact 
be hidden behind what we too casually take to be opposite states: “The same…: living and dead, 
and the waking and the sleeping, and young and old.  For these transposed are those, and those 
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transposed again are these” (ταὐτό τ᾿ ἔνι147 ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον 
καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κὰκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα, 
B88).  Among the Heraclitean fragments, even the ones just highlighted, one finds not a single 
version of unity but rather different kinds of unity of opposites.  Correspondingly, his 
commentators manage all manner of schema for connecting the various fragments that deal with 
opposites.148  For our purposes, it is enough to illustrate a few examples.  When Heraclitus 
contends that “Beginning is together with end [on a circle] (ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ 
κύκλου [περιφερείας], B103), the paradox here is that the opposites are “logically 
indistinguishable.”149  In other cases, the opposites may be unified in the form of a continuum, as 
in those fragments that assert that Night and Day are really one.  Elsewhere, Heraclitus 
highlights the way two opposites are said simultaneously of the same thing: “A road up and 
down is one and the same” (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή, B60).150  The perception of unity may 
be a matter of perspective.  Here it depends on the perspective taken on the entity in question, 
suggesting an affinity with those fragments that suggest a relevance problem: “The sea is the 
purest and foulest water: for fish drinkable and life-sustaining; for men undrinkable and deadly” 
(θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαρώτατον· ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ 
ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον, B61).  Unity, it turns out for Heraclitus, is said in many ways, and the 
specific role opposites play in generating or revealing that unity differ.  Yet in each case the 
specific unity of particular opposites is what reveals the nature of the thing.  A circle is the kind 
                                               
147 I have followed Kahn here in leaving τ᾿ ἔνι in the text though he notes that it “must be wrong and should 
probably be bracketed,” ATH, p. 70. 
148 Kahn divides the fragments dealing with unity in opposites between anthropocentric and cosmic subjects, ATH, 
p. 185ff. Stokes starts with the “easiest kind of unity first” and progresses through what he takes to be increasingly 
complex varieties, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 90-100. Mackenzie develops a scheme that 
embraces, in true Heraclitean fashion, reciprocal concepts of the unity of opposites and the opposition of unity, 
“Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox,” pp. 7-12.  
149 Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, p. 90. 
150 Graham translation, TEGP, p. 157. 
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of thing in which the beginning and end are one and the same.  A road is the kind of thing that 
simultaneously travels in opposite directions.  Sea water is, at the same time, poisonous and 
nourishing.   
Heraclitus reveals more about the nature of this unity in opposites as a specific pattern 
when he describes it as an attunement (ἁρμονίη).  Kahn’s analysis shows that the notion of 
ἁρμονίη manifests itself in three particular ways in the Heraclitean fragments: 1) “a physical 
fitting together of parts,” 2) “a principle of reconciliation between opponents,” and 3) “a pattern 
of musical attunement.”151  Explicitly identifying the idea of attunement as a facet of reality that 
escapes most people, Heraclitus says: “They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance 
with itself; it is an attunement turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre” (οὐ 
ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονιη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης, 
B51).  In these situations, the attunement is internal: “a thing agrees at variance with itself.”  And 
it is this unification of conflicting forces or features that makes a thing what it is.  In other words, 
the φύσις of the thing as a unity is generated by the opposition.  Without the tension, the 
conflicting pull in opposite directions, neither the bow nor the lyre would exist as such.152  In 
stark contrast to the traditional Greek notion of φύσις as the “essential character” of a thing with 
an eye toward the obvious, outwardly visible quality, Heraclitean φύσις presents particular 
opposites as the essential features of a thing.153  In his usual paradoxical way, Heraclitus 
repeatedly points to individual objects “characterized by contradictory properties”: the road, the 
circle, and “the path of the carding wheels is straight and crooked” (γνάφων ὁδὸς εὐθεῖα καὶ 
                                               
151 Kahn, ATH, p. 197. 
152 Graham carries the opposition even further by suggesting an intentionally juxtaposed symbolism of the bow as an 
object of war and the lyre as an object of peace, unified as simultaneous representations of Apollo, “Heraclitus: 
Flux, Order, and Knowledge,” p. 178. 
153 Dilcher alleges that the instances of opposites in the fragments are so “diverse” as to make any notion of unity so 
elastic that it is nearly meaningless, “How Not to Conceive Heraclitean Harmony,” p. 264.  
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σκολιή, B59).154  In many cases, the opposites are not cosmic or elemental opposites, but within 
the individual entity.  As such, opposition in general allows us to “structure and find our way 
about so much of our experience.”155  That is to say, the opposites give us a starting place to 
begin to properly “distinguish each according to its nature” (B1), but true recognition of the 
φύσις of any individual thing, that is being able to “tell how it is,” requires grasping how this 
opposition generates a unity. 
The unapparent ἁρμονίη is not only a “principle of reconciliation between opponents” but 
a process that connects several of Heraclitus’ key ideas into a cogent whole: “The counter-thrust 
brings together, and from tones at variance comes perfect attunement, and all things come to pass 
through conflict” (καὶ ῾Ηράκλειτος <φησιν> τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων 
καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ᾿ ἔριν γίνεσθαι, B8).  It is in this process of ἁρμονίη that the 
Heraclitean notion of unity “performs its essential function” that “unites, controls, and gives 
meaning to the opposites.”156  This “hidden unity of warring opposites” may only be perceived, 
however, through “coming-to-be and passing away, in change and transmutation.”157  Heraclitus 
refers to this both when he says “The same…: living and dead, and the waking and the sleeping, 
and young and old.  For these transposed are those, and those transposed again are these” and 
“For souls it is death to become water, for water it is death to become earth; out of earth water 
arises, out of water soul” (ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι· ἐκ 
γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή, B36).  Likewise, pointing to the inevitability of 
transition between opposites, he says, “Cold warms up, warm cools off, moist parches, dry 
dampens (τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται, B126).  In 
                                               
154 See Mackenzie, “Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox,” pp. 14-17. 
155 Hussey, “Heraclitus,” p. 94. 
156 Ibid., p. 98.   
157 Seligmann, The Apeiron of Anaximander, p. 52 
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perhaps his most famous fragment, Heraclitus claims that, “We step and do not step into the 
same rivers; we are and are not” (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἶμέν 
τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν, B49a).  Rather than an enigmatic reference to the inevitability of change, the 
flux of all things, Heraclitus’ river fragments present the paradox of φύσις.  In this case, “it is the 
very essence of...any river, to be composed of moving waters that are renewed constantly.”158  
The nature of anything is thus fixed and changing at the same time, making the elusive interplay 
of change and permanence another way in which nature hides.  Expanding this idea to all things 
when he says, “While changing it rests” (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται, B84a), φύσις as a ἁρμονίη is 
both the constant process by which the opposites “fit together” and the structure of the unified 
entity.  
For Heraclitus, then, it is variety in kinds of unity, specifically in the more precise nature 
of attunements, that constitutes the φύσις of things as a kind of common pattern and yet uniquely 
discernible in individual things.  The particular opposites in a thing and their specific attunement 
is what Heraclitus is able to distinguish that others are not. Able to recognize the kind of unity 
that exists for a particular individual thing, Heraclitus thus grasps the unapparent ἁρμονίη by 
means of the measured process of change.  Insofar as Heraclitus is concerned with what 
constitutes an “object of knowledge,” it is the φύσις of the thing that demands his attention and 
necessitates going beyond the “outward appearance” of a thing.  In doing so, Heraclitus sees 
possibility and complexity that opens up the world of experience.  A road may seem one 
directional to most due to individual vantage point; likewise, one may fail to see that the end of a 
circle, or a journey, also must be a new beginning.  Rather than distinct opposites, one ought to 
understand that night and day are “really two facets of a single process; this, indeed, is their 
                                               
158 Graham, “Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge,” p. 174. 
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φύσις.”159  The uncovering of greater possibilities for conceptions of the cosmos and human life 
unlocks the λόγος as the “unifying principle that guides and steers all things, a single account of 
how things are, and the object of genuine knowledge.”160 
JUSTICE, HARMONIA, AND PURPOSIVENESS 
The general view of the early Greeks that the cosmos is guided in some way finds its 
strongest proponent yet in Heraclitus. The surviving fragments of his predecessors offer only 
several vague gestures at such a notion.  Anaximander believed that the boundless must “contain 
all things and steer all things” and Xenophanes contends that the One God effortlessly “shakes 
all things by the thought of his mind.”  Heraclitus returns to the idea of a guided cosmos multiple 
times in different contexts, going well beyond mere suggestion to articulate, albeit cryptically, 
precisely how he understands this to take place.  Sounding a purposive note at the outset of his 
book, he suggests that “all things come to pass in accordance with this λόγος” (B1).  To the 
frustration of those who place so much emphasis on the centrality of the term, the other 
fragments that specifically mention λόγος fail to clarify how this might be the case.161  Heraclitus 
does, however, repeatedly provide his reader with the pattern of that force responsible for 
generation, movement, becoming in the world.  Within the structure of the fragments themselves, 
this pattern emerges as the conflict implicit in the paradoxes and riddles and their resolution, 
depending on the aptitude of the listener, in some fundamental insight that they lacked prior to 
this experience.  Heraclitus’ fragments, an experience in themselves, are composed as a 
reflection of the overall pattern or structure that guides the cosmos itself, a hidden truth summed 
up when he says “all things come to pass in accordance with conflict” (B8).  While the conflict 
                                               
159 Kirk, HCF, p. 230. 
160 Curd, “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” p. 36. 
161 See B2, B39, B50, B87, B108.   
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between particular opposites produces the φύσις of individual things as a unity, these individual 
entities, including human beings, are only mirrors which reflect this greater cosmic process.  
Extending his insight to the cosmic level, he says: “One must realize that war is shared and 
Conflict is Justice, and that all things come to pass (and are ordained) in accordance with 
conflict” (εἰδέ<ναι> χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνὸν καὶ δίκην ἔριν καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ᾿ ἔριν 
καὶ χρεώμενα, B80).  Casting aside any doubt concerning the fundamental existence of 
opposition in the basic nature of things, Heraclitus adopts Anaximander’s “serial injustice” as the 
basic condition of existence.162  Yet whereas Anaximander has Time as the cosmological, 
teleological force which shapes all things by imposing order on naturally conflicting opposites, 
Heraclitus maintains that conflict, and not its mediation, is the force of justice that shapes and 
order to the cosmos.  Although the text is uncertain at this point, the notion of χρεώμενα at the 
end of the fragment supports teleological implications through the suggestion that all things are 
ordained, that is, they are “established as right and necessary” by conflict.163  As “the pattern of 
order and reciprocity,” justice is the “principle of regularity,” and for Heraclitus it is conflict that 
plays this role within all things.164  The same conflict that shapes individual things as unities also 
guides the unfolding of all events in the cosmos. 
In a stark reversal of the Homeric view of conflict, however, Heraclitus says, “Homer 
was wrong when he said, ‘Would that Conflict might vanish from among gods and men!’.  For 
there would be no attunement without high and low notes nor any animals without male and 
female, both of which are opposites” (καὶ ῾Ηράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι ῾ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν 
καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο ᾿· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα 
                                               
162 The phrase is used by Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, p. 36. 
163 See Kahn, ATH, p. 207 and p. 326 n. 275 for a brief discussion of the textual ambiguities in B80. 
164 Kahn, ATH, p. 206. 
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ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων, A22).  The explicit connection between conflict and 
ἁρμονίη is impossible to miss. In order to allow for the possibility of ἁρμονίη as a goal, there 
must be opposition and conflict. This fragment also sheds light on the twin error of Homer and 
Hesiod.  Hesiod fails to recognize the unity (B57), Homer fails to appreciate the necessity of 
conflict; both fail to grasp the “true structure of things” through different mistakes.165    
Extending his criticism to the Milesians, Heraclitus advocates for a very different kind of 
source for all things: “War is father of all and king of all. He renders some gods, others men; he 
makes some slaves, others free” (Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς 
μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρουσ, B53).  This 
criticism casts as wide net, ensnaring the theogonies in Homeric and Hesiodic epics as well as 
naturalistic explanations that suggest first principles in the form of archai. As “father” war 
serves as a source, and as a “king” it plays the role of a principle that rules over all things, 
shaping things by hierarchy.  Likewise, this criticism seems aimed at Xenophanes as well, who 
attributed the distinction between mortal and divine natures to the possession of key attributes. 
Heraclitus maintains instead that war (πόλεμος) is what differentiates not only in the broadest 
possible sense between human and divine, but in what sort of lives individual men will lead.  
Though this illustrates the way the cosmos is directed, how does Heraclitus understand it to be 
purposive? 
From an etymological perspective, a ἁρμονίη “implies a purposive mutual adjustment of 
components to produce a unity” as the result of this process of “fitting together.”166  More 
specifically, this unity operates as a telos that “becomes more than mere schematism: we find 
                                               
165 Ibid., p. 204. 
166 Hussey, “Heraclitus,” p. 110 n. 15. 
 103  
 
that the unity unites, controls, and gives meaning to the opposites.”167  For Heraclitus, the 
attunement of opposite features is what makes every individual thing what it is, but the making 
as a process is fundamentally purposive.  The process of attunement, a process grounded in 
conflict, is itself what steers everything in the cosmos.  And yet for Heraclitus, the connection of 
the ἁρμονίη as “built-in teleology” to the divine is unmistakable.168  As Kahn notes, “the 
universal ἁρμονίη or fitting together and the divine unity that structures the world are only 
different modes of designating the same principle.”169  Invoking the imagery of traditional 
divinity in connection with his new wisdom, Heraclitus claims, “The thunderbolt steers all 
things” (τάδε πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός, B64) and “The wise is one alone, unwilling and willing 
to be spoken of by the name of Zeus” (ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς 
ὄνομα, B32).  The belief that the universe is steered in some capacity is part of the cultural view 
of the early Greeks, but Heraclitus’ view is unique in suggesting that the purposive operation of 
the divine is somehow available to mortals: “The wise is one, knowing the plan by which it 
steers all things through all” (ἓν τὸ σοφόν· ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην ὅκη κυβερνῆσαι πάντα διὰ 
πάντων, B41).  Wisdom, in Heraclitus’ view, gives an account of why things happen. As the 
unity-in-opposites, φύσις for Heraclitus is not an inert structure but an active unification that 
both guides and illuminates.  As a hidden unity φύσις is the manifestation of the cosmic process 
of ἁρμονίη at the level of the individual, the recognition of which allows for the possibility of 
true wisdom: “of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has gone so far as this: to 
recognize what is wise, set apart from all” (ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο 
                                               
167 Ibid., p.  98. 
168 Ibid., p. 97. 
169 Kahn, ATH, p. 203. Kahn conceives of the Heraclitean ἁρμονίη as a response to Pythagorean “conception of the 
world in terms of the musical numbers.” 
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ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅ τι σοφόν ἐστι, πάντων κεχωρισμένον, D108).  But what, precisely, is 
recognized? 
Customarily, Heraclitus offers no clear answer to this question, but the gnomai that 
“steers all things” as a kind of divine purposiveness provides a clue.  Elaborating on the gnomai, 
he draws a distinction between moral and divine activity along purposive lines when he says 
“Human nature has no set purpose, but the divine has” (ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, 
θεῖον δὲ ἔχει, B78).  A better understanding of the fragment is generated, as Kahn suggests, if we 
think of ἔχει as “holds onto,” so human nature fails to consistently hold onto the “set purpose” 
(gnomai) in the way that the divine is naturally able to maintain.170  Humans get lost in the world 
of opposites while the divine retains its purposiveness because it is the unity in opposites which 
serves as the living, latent structure in a way that is simultaneously “intelligent, purposive, and 
controlling.”171  Heraclitus draws together the divine and the theory of the unity of opposites 
when he says: “The god: day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger.  
It alters, as when mingled with perfumes, it gets named according to the pleasure of each one” (ὁ 
θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός. ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ 
ὁκόταν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν ὀνομάζεται καθ᾿ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου, B67).  Kirk notably summarizes by 
saying: “all the pairs of opposites can themselves be equated with god” insofar as the divine 
“stands for the connexion between things.”172  Mortals fail to grasp what is “set apart from all” 
because they are focused on “the more apparent variation which is nominal and superficial 
though not completely unreal.”173  Viewed from the perspective of the divine, there is no 
evaluative difference between opposites: “For god all things are fair and good and just, but men 
                                               
170 Ibid., p. 173.  
171 Hussey, “Heraclitus,” p. 101. 
172 Kirk, HCF, p. 166. 
173 Ibid. 
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have taken some things as unjust, others as just” (ὡς τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ 
δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια, B102).  Knowledge of the repeating 
pattern of φύσις gives us access to this divine λόγος which is simultaneously “set apart from,” 
and yet identical with, all things.  That is, φύσις unlocks not only what the cosmos is, but the 
process by which it becomes so.  It is, however, not enough to grasp this divine connection, this 
logos, one must augment this knowledge with the courage of conviction: “Speaking with 
understanding they must hold fast to what is shared by all, as a city holds to its law, and even 
more firmly.  For all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices 
for all and is more than enough” (ξὺν νόῳ λὲγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ 
νόμῳ πόλις καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ 
θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται, B114).  Such 
knowledge may be transformed into practical wisdom for Heraclitus, but only if humans possess 
the endurance to see the riddle through and the conviction to hold onto the hard won knowledge.  
Thus it is that divine purpose may be infused into human endeavors.  
CONCLUSION 
Heraclitus thus develops a dynamic concept of φύσις that reflects the enigmatic, hidden 
quality of nature as a perpetual riddle.  Grounded in the inherent dynamism in the cosmos, his 
idea of nature expands on Xenophanes’ concept as a tool of differentiation and classification 
since it presents a unified experience of change in the natural world while at the same time being 
able to account for differences.  As a ἁρμονίη of opposites, the φύσις of things is only available 
to those who are attuned to the language of nature.  Heraclitus’ own paradoxes, riddles, and 
proverbial utterances challenge his reader to develop the capacity to listen well and interpret the 
signs of nature.  In short, he enables us to teach ourselves the language of nature in order to 
derive the meaning of this riddle. In doing so successfully, these rare individuals develop the 
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ability to understand the λόγος according to which all things happen.  That is, they gain insight 
not simply into the pattern and connection in all things, but rather into the divine in its dual 
aspect as recurring conflict and enduring unity which shapes all things.  But it is only through 
grasping the inherent purposiveness in the unity of opposites, in a ἁρμονίη born of conflict, that 
one achieves true wisdom.  Wisdom, for Heraclitus, is only for those brave enough to face down 
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Chapter 4: The Limits of Nature: Parmenides and the Path to Enlightenment 
The path of my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run. Over unsounded gorges, 
through the rifled hearts of mountains, under torrents' beds, unerringly I rush. Naught's an obstacle, naught's an 
angle to the iron way! 
–Ahab in Moby Dick 
 
Aristotle does not mince words when he declares that adopting Eleatic monism seems 
“next door to madness.”  Regardless of apparent logical consistency, once one properly considers 
the facts, Aristotle tells us, “no lunatic seems to be so far out of his senses as to suppose that fire 
and ice are one.”174  The insanity of such strict monism notwithstanding, many commentators, 
both ancient and modern, hold that Parmenides advocates precisely this kind of extreme unity 
that denies the very possibility of change.  It may seem strange then that Parmenides casts the 
longest shadow throughout antiquity as that of the first true philosopher.175  Likewise, the 
modern narrative for understanding the early Greeks portrays Parmenides as the central figure 
among the Presocratics; all of the earliest philosophers are then categorized in a general way as 
either Pre-Parmenidean or Post-Parmenidean.176  In all likelihood, the relatively large portion of 
his poem that survives, nearly one hundred and fifty lines in all, invites bolder and more 
definitive claims from modern scholars than they often dare to make about earlier figures from 
                                               
174 On Generation and Corruption, 325a19-22. 
175 As I contend later in this chapter, Aristotle conflates the respective views of Parmenides and Melissus when it is 
convenient for him to do so given his own philosophical agenda.  Nevertheless, he does recognize appreciable 
differences in their thought such that it is probably only Melissus’ version of monism that Aristotle has in mind as 
being “next door to madness.” 
176 See Daniel W. Graham, Explaining the Cosmos, pp. 19-27.  Parmenides’ pivotal role is among the few things 
commentators agree on when it comes to the Eleatic philosopher. Guthrie contends that “Presocratic philosophy is 
divided into two halves by the name Parmenides,” HGP, vol 2., p. 1, while Jonathan Barnes says more broadly that 
“Parmenides of Elea marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy,” PP, p. 155.  James Lesher is more precise, 
arguing that three identifiable factors distinguish Parmenides’ poem from earlier philosophical accounts: 1) the 
“high level of abstraction” Parmenides uses in his discussion of τό ἔον; 2) the manner in which Parmenides orders, 
distinguishes, and evaluates “possible ways of thinking” about “what-is”; 3) the “degree of rigour” with which 
Parmenides argues for the attributes of “what is.”  See “Early Interest in Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 225-249, at 236.  
Such a pronounced division holds for the present study of the development of the concept of nature in early Greek 
philosophy. Following Parmenides, subsequent philosophers must grapple with new requirements for what 
constitutes a “nature” in light of the arguments put forth in Parmenides’ poem. 
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this period.  Within his poetic discourse, however, it is Parmenides’ combination of the dactylic 
hexameter of epics past with a new form of logical dialectic that firmly plants his poem at the 
crossroads of archaic style and novel questions.  Enthralling listeners with revolutionary ideas 
and arguments, the Eleatic philosopher-poet harnesses the power of the epic hero to advance 
provocative philosophical concepts, including a new idea of nature.177  Parmenides challenges 
some of the basic assumptions of early philosophical orthodoxy, if indeed there is such a thing, 
by raising critical questions that cut to the heart of the prevailing Ionian understanding of nature.  
Inevitably, his arguments demand a response in a way that produces an immediate and 
significant impact on his philosophical successors.   
Within the emerging philosophical milieu of the 5th century B.C., Parmenides stands out 
as an entirely new kind of thinker, so unlike other physiologoi as to demand an entirely different 
classification.  Rather than attempt to make sense of plurality and change, as his philosophical 
predecessors did, Parmenides denies them outright.  Since only one thing exists, the world of 
multiplicity, conflict, and appearance is merely illusory.  Thus, traditional Ionian inquiry into the 
φύσις of things is pejoratively relegated in his poem to the status of mere opinion “on which 
there is no true reliance” (B1, 30).  Or so the story goes.  An alternative narrative has emerged in 
more recent accounts of his poem, challenging some of the conventional, long-standing 
                                               
177 Scholars have long wrestled with how to make sense of Parmenides’ use of traditional poetic form for his new 
truths.  Reasons abound for Parmenides’ choice of poetry to convey his ideas, but a typical answer is that the 
customary meter of epic poetry had the advantage of being easier to memorize as well as connoting “wisdom and 
authority” and serving as a “vehicle of divine revelation,,” PBS, p. 152. Other commentators, like Glenn Most, 
contend that the choice serves a far more philosophically significant purpose by answering the question: “how can 
the philosopher know the truth of what he claims to know?,” “The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy,” p. 353.  
Similar disputes also emerge with respect to which epic poet most influences Parmenides.  Werner Jaeger argues 
that Hesiod’s Theogony is the model for Parmenides’ poem, The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers, p. 93.  For a 
detailed account of the Homeric influence on Parmenides, see E.D. Floyd, “Why Parmenides Wrote in Verse,” 
Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992): 251-265.  For a more complete summary of the various ways scholars have made 
sense of Parmenides’ use of verse, especially as it relates to the Proem, see Herbert Granger, “The Proem of 
Parmenides’ Poem,” Ancient Philosophy 28 (2008): 1-20, at 1-5. 
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interpretations of Parmenides’ project and arguments.  These nouveau, “predicational” readings 
argue, in different ways, that Parmenides’ real aim is to specify what it is to be the “nature” of a 
thing.178  On such a reading of the poem, Parmenides denies neither plurality nor change, and 
instead focuses his argument on the necessary ontological and epistemological criteria for all 
entities.  Rather than deny the possibility of cosmological inquiry, Parmenides instead seeks to 
establish a solid metaphysical foundation from which such inquiry must necessarily proceed.  It 
is this view and the implications that such a reading of Parmenides hold for the study of the idea 
of nature in early Greek philosophy that I take up in this chapter.  
Building on the predicational reading of Parmenides’ thought, this chapter traces the path 
that the Eleatic “purification” of the emerging concept of nature takes in Parmenides’ poem.179   
Broadly speaking, I argue that Parmenides develops the metaphysical foundations and limits of 
the concept of nature as an explanatory principle capable of giving an account of both the “real” 
and sensible worlds.  Hinging as it does on a critical revaluation of the standard “existential” 
interpretation, my account begins with a brief overview of the most influential ways that 
Parmenides’ project has been understood.  I argue that while any definitive interpretation of 
Parmenides’ poem remains elusive, the predicational reading provides a more comprehensive 
account since it is able to take far more facets of the poem into account and also better situates 
                                               
178 Scholars who follow this “significant minority interpretation” include Alexander Mourelatos, The Route of 
Parmenides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) and Patricia Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic 
Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004). Daniel Graham builds upon 
these predicational readings in Explaining the Cosmos, see chapters 6 and 7.  John Palmer groups these theories 
together under the rubric of “meta-principle interpretation” in Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 25-32.   
179 More recently, however, Michael Wedin attacks what he labels the “Ionian interpretation” in his monograph 
Parmenides’ Grand Deduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  Relying on a detailed analysis of the 
logical structure of Parmenides’ poem, Wedin’s arguments are in many ways a return to the existential reading of 
the mid-20th century that emphasizes textual analysis and all but abandon historical context and the rhetorical 
structure of the poem.  Wedin’s monograph is an expansion of similar arguments he makes earlier in "Parmenides' 
Three Ways and the Failure of the Ionian Interpretation,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 41 (2011): 1-65.  I 
argue against this way of reading Parmenides, broadly speaking, in the next section of this chapter.  
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the poem historically than competing interpretations.  As such, the predicational account 
provides a way to read Parmenides as playing a crucial role not only in the development of the 
idea of nature in Presocratic philosophy, including an immediate impact on his successors, but 
more broadly to influence the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of natures in profound and 
readily visible ways.  Far from the work of a philosophical renegade, or thinker utterly 
disconnected from his culture and the philosophical tradition, Parmenides’ poem instead blends 
the old and new, connecting tradition with innovation in a way that presents a novel approach to 
the study of nature.180  That is, nature both as the identity or essence of any “real” thing (τὸ ἔον) 
as well as dynamic idea of nature as the “works” or process governed by the idea of φύσις.  In 
the middle sections of the chapter, I first trace Parmenides’ development of the concept of nature 
as basic metaphysical criteria in the Alētheia section of his poem as the ground of all rational 
inquiry.181  
But while previous commentators have much to say about the idea of “nature” as 
metaphysical and epistemological criteria, they fail to provide an adequate account of the use of 
φύσις in Parmenides’ poem.  In various ways this gap in the scholarship is connected to the fact 
that φύσις is only found in the Doxa section of the poem.  I offer an analysis of Parmenides’ 
account of φύσις in the Doxa section of his poem, which both tethers him to, and liberates him 
from, his predecessors.  I argue that Parmenides’ repeated emphasis on the idea of limits 
(πείρατα) is a deliberate attempt to supply the concept of nature with a crucial component 
necessary for existence and knowledge.  Parmenides’ use of the idea of limits as the defining 
                                               
180 See Gerard Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature, pp. 134-140. 
181 Patricia Curd presents her theory in The Legacy of Parmenides but provides a more succinct synopsis in her 
chapter “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. Mary Louise Gill 
and Pierre Pellegrin (Malden, M.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 34-55.  The interpretation offered below, 
specifically in the section of the chapter titled “The Idea of Nature in Parmenides’ Alethēia” is heavily indebted to 
Patricia Curd’s work, specifically her account of the “predicational reading” of Parmenides. 
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feature of the nature of anything is connected in key ways to the poetic and divine components of 
the poem, specifically as it relates to the analogy of “paths.”  In the final section of the chapter 
then, I turn to a consideration of the purposive implications of Parmenides’ theory, specifically 
the didactic role of the idea of limits within the analogy of paths prescribed for humans by the 
divine.  I argue that recurring rhetorical images like shackles as limits and paths of inquiry are 
Parmenidean vehicles for sophisticated developments in the concept of nature that illustrate key 
purposive features.  Understood in this way, Parmenides’ role in opening up the possibilities in 
the conceptions of nature in chronologically subsequent theories becomes clearer as he paves the 
way for the bifurcation of the concept of nature in his philosophical successors.  
ANCIENT AND MODERN READINGS OF PARMENIDES’ POEM 
The question of the nature of things in Parmenides’ thought will seem strange to most 
readers not steeped in relatively recent scholarly debate.  After all, the idea of the nature of 
something seems to require some notion of “becoming,” “growth,” or “change,” particularly 
given the relationship between the substantive φύσις and the verbal form φύω.  Thus the 
widespread narrative concerning Parmenides’ thought holds that he famously denies the very 
possibility of change.182  Such denial is grounded in two basic premises frequently adopted by 
Parmenides’ readers: the idea that only one thing exists that is “spatially and temporally 
undifferentiated” and that “the world of our ordinary experience [is] a non-existent illusion.”183  
Any account of the idea of nature in Parmenides thought must then begin by staking out a 
position on broader interpretive questions: how should we understand Parmenides’ project? 
What is it that he really aims to accomplish in his poem?  In this section, I sketch the significant 
                                               
182 For histories that take Parmenides to be a numerical monist who denies the reality of change, see HGP, vol. 2, 
pp. 1-80, KRS, pp. 239-262, and PBS, pp. 145-173.  
183 John Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, p. 17. 
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features of the dominant strains of interpretations of Parmenides’ thought, both ancient and 
modern, so as to establish the necessary background for my account of Parmenides’ concept of 
nature.  While some interpretations have held sway for far longer periods of time, Parmenides is 
the most contentious figure in early Greek philosophy, and this is certainly reflected in the 
scholarship that aims to make sense of the broader implications of his work.  Each view thus 
faces difficulties that may ultimately prove insurmountable given the incomplete historical 
picture.  Nevertheless, I argue that the predicational reading is more compelling than the 
alternatives and serves as the most plausible foundation for any inquiry into the Parmenidean 
concept of nature.    
Aristotle’s caricature of Parmenides is anything but simple, though it has had a lasting 
impact.  The most influential accounts of Eleatic theory in the Aristotelian corpus can be found 
in the early parts of the Physics and Metaphysics.  Sketching the scope and history of the science 
of nature in the opening parts of the Physics, Aristotle summarily dismisses the idea that Eleatic 
views (strict monism that denies change) are worthy of pursuit by the student of nature (Physics 
185a1).  Instead, he develops a key point of difference between the Eleatics and the physiologoi 
when he notes the disagreement with respect to ἀρχή: “It is necessary for the source to be either 
one or many; and if one, either without motion, as Parmenides and Melissus hold, or in motion as 
the natural philosophers hold” (Physics 184b15-17).184  Separately in On the Heavens, Aristotle 
widens the philosophical divide between Eleatics and physiologoi when he says: 
Some removed generation and destruction from the world 
altogether. Nothing that is, they said, is generated or destroyed, and 
our conviction to the contrary is an illusion. So maintained the 
                                               
184 Gerard Naddaf greatly oversimplifies when he says, “the ancient tradition clearly saw Parmenides as a phusikos,” 
The Greek Concept of Nature, p. 135.  Though there are certainly parts of the ancient tradition that conceive of 
Parmenides as interested in the same kinds of questions, generally speaking, as the nature-thinkers of the Ionian 
tradition, asserting consensus among ancient interpreters on this issue goes too far.  Aristotle himself seems to be of 
two minds with respect to this question.     
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school of Melissus and Parmenides. But however excellent their 
theories may otherwise be, anyhow they cannot be held to speak as 
students of nature.  There may be things not subject to generation 
or any kind of movement, but if so they belong to another and a 
higher inquiry than the study of nature (On the Heavens 298b14-
22). 
Yet Parmenides’ text resists Aristotle’s attempts to group his predecessors neatly according to 
his own division of the sciences.  Later in Physics I, Aristotle seems to speak of Parmenides as 
though he were a natural philosopher when he suggests that even Parmenides subscribes to a 
theory of opposites to explain the natural world (188a20-22).  In his own study of this “higher 
inquiry,” Aristotle describes the Eleatic school as consisting of those who “spoke of the universe 
as if it were one entity” (Metaphysics 986b11-12).  He echoes his earlier suggestion of certain 
natural philosopher-like qualities in Parmenides’ ideas later in the Metaphysics, arguing that 
being “forced to follow the phenomena,” Parmenides supposes that “what-is is one in formula 
but many according to perception” and, as a result “posits two causes and two principles, calling 
them hot and cold” (986b31-34).  Within the Eleatic school, Aristotle admits subtle differences 
in specific features of their theories when he notes that Parmenides and Melissus differ with 
respect to “the excellence of their statement” and exhibit disagreement “in regard to the nature of 
the entity” (986b13-14).  Dismissing Melissus and Xenophanes, Aristotle takes Parmenides more 
seriously since the latter speaks “with rather more insight” (986b28).  Aristotle differentiates 
between the Eleatics when he says: “it appears Parmenides conceived of the Unity as one in 
definition, but Melissus as materially one.”185  He equivocates in the Physics too when he first 
                                               
185 Curd takes this line to be evidence that Aristotle “sees that Parmenides is primarily concerned with the unity of 
the nature or essence of a thing,” “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” p. 39.  At the very least, this line 
suggests a plurality of views on monism within the Eleatic school.  David Sedley notes that the difference extends to 
the treatment of both thinkers by modern readers, as he observes that “Too much has been written on Parmenides,” 
and “too little on Melissus.” Curiously, as a victim of his own diagnosis, in the very next sentence Sedley neglects to 
specify specific lacunae in the scholarship on Melissus, instead suggesting that more work should be forthcoming on 
Parmenides’ “detailed arguments for the individual characteristics of what-is.”  See “Parmenides and Melissus,” in 
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claims of both Melissus and Parmenides that “their premises are false and their conclusions do 
not follow,” before immediately backtracking by stating “or rather the argument of Melissus is 
gross and offers no difficulty at all” (Physics 185a9-11).  What then are we to make of 
Aristotle’s mixed treatment of Parmenides?  On the one hand, he seems quite alive to the fact 
that Parmenides’ position is a good deal more sophisticated than Melissus’ view and that rather 
than a “unique metaphysical position,” monism denotes a “family of positions.”186  Aristotle thus 
criticizes the Eleatics for bringing physical and metaphysical considerations too close together 
when, in Aristotle’s view, they ought to be separated.  Yet in different texts, Aristotle seems to 
deliberately conflate them in order to suit his own agenda or perhaps to avoid a more detailed 
discussion than is necessary.  The most likely explanation, given such varied treatment, is that 
Parmenides does not fit neatly into Aristotle’s scheme for his predecessors, crossing over 
between metaphysician and nature-thinker.  Aristotle’s account of nature as being distinct from 
metaphysical considerations arises much later, however, and Parmenides need not have thought 
them so clearly separable.  
If Aristotle is deliberate and careful in situating Parmenides’ monism differently 
according to his own philosophical agenda, another ancient commentator, Colotes, cares little for 
potential philosophical nuance in his unabashed criticism of what he takes to be Parmenides’ 
strict monism.  While Colotes’ work is no longer extant, Plutarch preserves a clear enough view 
in his repudiation of Colotes’ account.  Castigating the “sycophantic” (συκοφαντῶν) Epicurean 
for willfully misrepresenting Parmenides’ views for the sake of scoring rhetorical points when he 
attributes strict monism to the Eleatic, Plutarch contends that Parmenides is instead 
                                               
The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp. 113-133, at 113.   
186 Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, p. 38. 
 115  
 
assigning to each what is appropriate, as he places the intelligible 
in the class of what is one and being—calling it 'being' in so far as 
it is eternal and imperishable, and 'one' because of its likeness unto 
itself and its not admitting differentiation—while he locates the 
perceptible among what is disordered and changing (Adversus 
Colotes 1114D). 
Notably then it is Colotes, likely a thinker most have never heard of, who stands as the 
representative ancient thinker of the view that Parmenides has adopted a strict numerical monism 
that denies change.  Referencing the characteristics of “being” in B8, as well as the divide 
between parts of the poem, Plutarch’s own view establishes the foundation for modern 
interpretations that emphasize each part of the poem as pertaining to a particular subject: reality 
(Alētheia) or appearance (Doxa).187  Theophrastus echoes this reading, saying Parmenides 
“traveled both roads” in so far as he “declares the totality is eternal and tries to explain the 
generation of existing things.”188  Such early examples illustrate just how sharp the divergence is 
with respect to the interpretation of Parmenides’ thought. 
And yet the variety of views offered in antiquity is nothing compared to the breadth of 
interpretations in modern literature on Parmenides.189  Not surprisingly, modern commentators 
cannot even agree about whether or not something like a “standard interpretation” exists in 
recent Parmenidean scholarship.190  In the mid to late 20th century, however, the interpretative 
                                               
187 The features of these modern interpretations are discussed more fully in the later section of the chapter devoted to 
φύσις in Parmenides’ poem. 
188 Alexander Metaphysics 31, 9.  Alexander quotes Theophrastus, going on to say of Parmenides that “he does not 
hold the same view of both realms, but supposes that according to truth the totality is one, ungenerated, and 
spherical, while according to opinion of the many he posits two sources to explain the generation of appearances: 
fire and earth, the one as matter, the other as cause and agent” (31, 10-14). See Graham, TEGP, p. 209 for 
translation.   
189 As McKirahan notes, each subsequent generation seems to produce an even greater “divergence of opinion” with 
respect to interpretations of Parmenides’ poem, PBS, p. 151.  John Palmer’s history of the interpretation of 
Parmenides is an extremely thorough and balanced contribution to the field, those interested in a detailed yet concise 
introduction to the history of interpretative readings should see especially Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, 
pp. 16-44.   
190 Those who adopt the predicational reading generally maintain that G.E.L. Owen’s view constitutes the standard 
“Anglo-American” modern interpretation, see Mourelatos “Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,” The 
Monist 62:1 (1979): 3-14, at 3-4, and Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, pp. 9-18. More recently, in contextualizing 
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landscape was dominated by G.E.L Owen’s view as articulated in the influential article “Eleatic 
Questions.”191  If any account can be said to be the recent standard interpretation, it is Owen’s.192  
The central precept of Owen’s reading is that the subject of the poem, Parmenides’ “what-is” 
(ἐστι), is an existential qualifier.  Thus when the goddess differentiates the paths in B2 as “the 
one: that it is and that it is not possible not to be” (ἡ μὲν, ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι) 
and “the other: that it is not and that it is right it should not be” (ἡ δ᾿, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς 
χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι), she is distinguishing between what does exist and what cannot possibly 
exist.193  This prompts Owen to commit to the view that Parmenides holds that only one such 
thing exists and thus change is an impossibility.  Accentuating Parmenides’ disdain for the 
natural world as illusory, Owen conceives of Parmenides as the first true metaphysician whose 
chief concern is “what can be talked or thought about.”  Parmenides’ aim is thus to prove this 
single thing must exist and must have the attributes specified in B8: ungenerated, imperishable, 
whole, unperturbed, and complete (B8, 3-4).  On this view, Parmenides’ project and his methods 
constitute a radical and intentional departure from the phusikoi who preceded him.194  Their 
inquiry into nature, according to Parmenides, is entirely futile.     
A decade after Owen’s influential article, Alexander Mourelatos pioneered a new way of 
understanding Parmenides’ crucial arguments in The Route of Parmenides.  Mourelatos argues 
                                               
the history of Parmenidean scholarship, Palmer argues against any such notion of “standard interpretation,” see 
Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, p. 18.  
191 G.E.L. Owen, “Eleatic Questions,” The Classical Quarterly 10.1 (1960): 84-102. 
192 See Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, pp. 26-27, especially n. 9.  As Curd notes, Owen’s account has had 
significant influence on the histories of Presocratic thought, including HGP, KRS, PP, and, PBS. 
193 My translations generally follow traditional renderings. Although I follow the text in Graham’s TEGP and 
primarily rely on his translations, I occasionally use McKirahan’s or Curd’s translations where they are, in my view, 
a better fit for the particular discussion.  In all cases, I translate the variations of ὁδοὶ διζήσιός as “paths of inquiry” 
in order to draw out the purposive implications of “paths” in the poem. 
194 See Owen, “Eleatic Questions,” p. 84, and Guthrie, HGP, vol. 2, pp. 13-20.  Although many follow Owen in 
seeing Parmenides as intent on undermining Ionian inquiry into nature, some argue that Parmenides has other targets 
in mind, as when Coxon claims the poem is instead a rejection of Pythagorean beliefs. See A.H. Coxon, The 
Fragments of Parmenides (Assen:Van Gorcum, 1986), pp. 18-19.   
 117  
 
for a conception of Parmenides’ ἐστι as predicative, rather than existential.  In his effort to 
challenge a flawed, standard interpretation, Mourelatos is aided by relentless critiques of the 
existential reading of Parmenides ἐστι by Charles Kahn, who argues in favor of the veridical 
reading which suggests that Parmenides means “is” in the sense of “whether or not it is the case 
that p.”195  Mourelatos, as the original proponent of the predicative reading, however, argues in 
favor of speculative predication.  Dividing the traditional possibilities for inquiry between two 
flawed approaches (something like Herodotus’ ἱστορία or Heraclitus’ κατὰ φύσιν διαίρεσις), 
Mourelatos instead takes Parmenides’ to be aiming for “something more novel and radical: 
something closer to explanation and interpretation.”196  He develops this reading by suggesting 
that Parmenides intends the ἐστι to serve as the copula “grammatically,” but functioning 
“logically” as the “‘is’ of identity.”197  On this view, rather than the mere distinction and 
classification produced by existing methods of inquiry, the “route” of ἐστι establishes the 
possibility of “novel description and discovery.”198  In other words, Parmenides’ approach, 
unlike anything that previously exists in Greek thought, can tell us what something actually is.  
Patricia Curd’s interpretation expands on the predicative reading in Mourelatos by arguing for a 
greater connection between the Eleatic philosopher and the existing Ionian tradition.  Rather than 
outright rejection of cosmological inquiry, Curd argues that Parmenides’ aim is to legitimize the 
study of nature through an “explor[ation of] the natures of metaphysically basic entities in an 
                                               
195 See especially Charles Kahn, “Thesis of Parmenides,” Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969): 700-724, and “Why 
Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 
(1976): 323-334. For a thorough and helpful collection of Kahn’s essays on the idea of Being, particularly with 
respect to Plato and Parmenides, see Essays on Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  See also Kahn’s 
chapter “Retrospect on the Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being,” in The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, ed. 
Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 1-28. 
196 Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 56. 
197 Ibid., p. 57. 
198 Ibid. 
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explanation of the world reported by the senses.”199  This reading understands Parmenides as 
offering a way to discover the right conception of nature as an explanatory principle, through 
reason and not sense experience, and, as Curd writes elsewhere, “such a nature is the only 
appropriate starting point for successful inquiry into the natural world.”200  On Curd’s 
interpretation, Parmenides seeks to build on the Ionian tradition by rectifying errors and 
establishing a new, far more solid foundation for philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
things.201  In other words, this view understands Parmenides’ project to be the establishment of 
the metaphysical ground that allows for the possibility of real, and reasonably successful, inquiry 
into the natural world.    
Each of the modern interpretations faces difficulties, though some confront greater 
obstacles than others.  Those that favor the existential reading generally give significant effort to 
logical and linguistic analysis of the extant text in order to arrive at “explanatory clarity and 
economy.”202  Generally speaking, such approaches either ignore the question of philosophical-
literary milieu in which Parmenides’ ideas are developed or claim that Parmenides’ aim is so 
starkly different from his predecessors that the text is our only avenue to understanding him. 
Owen adopts this last approach when he concludes by saying that Parmenides “wrote as a 
philosophical pioneer of the first water and any attempt to put him back into the tradition that he 
aimed to demolish is a surrender to the diadoche-writers, a failure to take him at his word and 
‘judge by reasoning that much-contested proof’.”203  In their zeal for clarity, interpreters that 
                                               
199 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 15. 
200 Patricia Curd, “Anaxagoras and The Theory of Everything,” in The Oxford Handbook in Presocratic Philosophy, 
ed. Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 230-249, at 231. 
201 For an argument that the linguistic difficulties in Parmenides’ poem are intentionally connected to the idea of 
philosophical inquiry, see James Barrett, “Struggling with Parmenides,” Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004): 267-291.  
202 Alexander Mourelatos, “Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,” p. 4. 
203 Owen, “Eleatic Questions,” p. 101. 
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adopt the logical-linguistic approach conveniently ignore, or largely neglect, the poetic features 
and rhetorical devices in Parmenides’ work.  Regardless of whether they articulate it, their 
neglect of the form of Parmenides’ philosophy as a poem, betrays an attitude on par with 
Jonathan Barnes’ stated view:  
It is hard to excuse Parmenides’ choice of verse as a medium for 
his philosophy. The exigencies of metre and poetical style 
regularly produce an almost impenetrable obscurity; and the 
difficulty of understanding his thought is not lightened by any 
literary joy: the case presents no adjunct to the Muse’s diadem.204  
Barnes finds “little of philosophical importance” in the allegorical Proem, a view which is fairly 
common among interpreters who adopt this approach.  Such strong statements from the likes of 
Owen and Barnes undeniably exerted significant influence on those with competing views who 
only very tentatively raised the possible objections, as Mourelatos does when he couches his 
critiques of Owen’s interpretation only as a desire to “increase empirical content as much as 
possible” by making “connections” with the epic tradition, philosophical lineage, and less overt 
themes throughout the rest of Parmenides’ poem.205  Nevertheless, Mourelatos’ criticisms 
illustrate the way the standard interpretation is disconnected from “pre-Parmenidean 
speculation,” the “epic motifs” that figure prominently in the poem, and the purpose of the 
extremely specific Doxa part of the poem.206  In addition to these shortcomings, the standard 
                                               
204 PP, p. 155. 
205 Ibid., p. 5. 
206 Not all those who adopted a more historical approach were so tentative.  Hermann Fränkel rightly notes “much 
will be radically misunderstood, and many of the best, liveliest and most characteristic features of the doctrine will 
be missed, if one fails to read the work as an epic poem which belongs to its own period, and to approach it as a 
historical document, through its language,” “Studies in Parmenides,” in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, Volume 
II: The Eleatics and Pluralists, ed. R.E. Allen and David J. Furley (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 
1975), pp. 1-48, at 1.  Fränkel goes to significant lengths to demonstrate an “exact parallel” between the opening 
imagery of ascent via chariot in Parmenides’ poem and the corresponding image in Pindar’s 6th Olympian ode.  
Recently, M. Laura Gemelli Marciano argues instead that “the image of the chariot in Parmenides’ proem has its 
roots in religious tradition,” “Images and Experience: At the Roots of Parmenides’ Aletheia,” Ancient Philosophy 28 
(2008): 21-48.  Regardless of individual differences in locating Parmenides influences in the religious or poetic 
traditions, this line of interpretation understands the Eleatic as thoroughly grounded and innovating within tradition, 
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interpretation only draws on roughly twenty of the 150 surviving lines of Parmenides’ poem to 
fashion a “definitive” account.207  In short, the standard interpretation goes to great lengths to 
take virtually the smallest possible portion of the poem and largely ignores the early Greek 
literary-philosophical milieu when crafting definitive claims.  And yet dislodging Parmenides 
and his ideas from the traditional epic poetry and emerging philosophical traditions by arguing 
that he has nothing to do with his predecessors’ projects seems misguided, particularly in light of 
the concluding remarks of his book: “Thus, according to the views of men, have these things [of 
the natural world] arisen and [thus] do they exist at present; and from this point will they be 
nourished further and afterwards come to an end” (οὕτω τοι κατᾳ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι 
καὶ μετέπειτ᾿ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα· τοῖς δ᾿ ὄϝομ᾿ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ᾿ ἐπίσημον 
ἑκάστωι, B19).208  Here as before, the goddess points the youth toward the existing mortal 
opinions, even if only “so that no mortal judgment may ever overtake you” (B8, 61).  While her 
precise intent arguably remains obscure, the goddess’ efforts clearly suggest a practical use for 
the reasoned analysis she invites the kouros to participate in throughout the experience.  This 
practical use is situated in the realm of human knowledge and opinion, and he is perhaps called 
to propound the truths he learns from the goddess for others upon his return from the 
Underworld.  In any case, it seems clear that the didactic quality of the poem is not limited to the 
goddess and kouros interaction; it is meant to be instructive for all of Parmenides’ readers.  With 
such an emphasis on the oral component, it seems unlikely that Parmenides intended only a few 
                                               
rather than a radical logician bent on undermining it.  For additional criticism of the lack of historical awareness in 
the standard interpretation, see Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, pp. 11-12.  
207 Mourelatos claims that “an adequate base for SI (standard interpretation) is provided by B2, B3, B6.1-2 and the 
first three lines of B8.” See “Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,” p. 5. 
208 Using Kahn’s translation, Anaximander and the Origins of Cosmology, p. 200. 
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lines of the poem to be taken into account or that the lengthy cosmology is some sort of 
“extended jest.”   
Of course these types of epistemological questions, particularly as they pertain to the 
relationship between gods and mortals, were nothing new.  Homer has the gods sometimes being 
deceived by other gods, or deceived “for human reasons” by flimsy disguises or, perhaps an even 
worse reason for divine ignorance, simply “not being told.”209  Likewise, it is clear that humans 
in Homeric epics are sometimes unable to “know for certain.”210  In fact, Parmenides’ poem 
demonstrates clear ties to the attempts of his predecessors and contemporaries to provide 
answers to these questions through theogonies, cosmogonies, and cosmologies for the natural 
world.  Rather than running from the historical context, the predicational reading aims to situate 
Parmenides’ thought within the traditions of the early Greeks.  In many cases, scholars adopting 
such a view go to great lengths to show how their reading of the text is consistent with 
contemporary thinkers, etymological history, and epic tradition and motifs.  While one could 
never definitively rule out the “existential” reading, from the perspective of intellectual history, 
the picture it provides is, at best incomplete, and at worst, deliberately neglects some of the 
essential features of Parmenides’ poem and the early Greek period.  The more recent trend to 
consider Parmenides’ connection to the philosophical, literary, and historical milieu of early 
Greek life raises important questions that the existential reading has no interest in answering.  
For instance, if Parmenides so thoroughly rejected Ionian cosmology, why do subsequent Ionian 
thinkers like Anaxagoras not attempt to “defend the possibility of cosmology against 
                                               
209 Edward Hussey, “The Beginnings of Epistemology: from Homer to Philolaus,” in Companions to Ancient 
Thought: 1: Epistemology, ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 11-38, at 12 
n. 5. 
210 Ibid., n. 4. 
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Parmenides’s apparent rejection of the enterprise?”211  The predicational reading may raise more 
interesting questions than it alone can hope to answer, yet it has made a persuasive case that the 
broad aim of Parmenides’ poem is not a blatant rejection of previous thinkers and Ionian ἱστορία, 
but rather the practical path by which any individual may reach enlightenment about the true 
reality of things.  This path begins by reformulating the idea of nature. 
THE IDEA OF NATURE IN PARMENIDES’ ALĒTHEIA  
The didactic nature of Parmenides’ poem is readily apparent and confirmed at the end of 
the Proem, where the goddess proclaims to the kouros that he must “learn all things” (B1, 28). 
Although delivered in the dactylic hexameter of Homer, the goddess’ invitation signals an 
important shift away from passive mortal learning from the divine in Homeric epics.  Addressing 
the Muses directly, Homer asks them to tell him “who were the leaders and princes of the 
Greeks; for you are goddesses and you are present and know everything,” while humans “only 
hear the report and do not know anything” (Iliad II. 484-487).  By contrast, Parmenides’ goddess 
seeks to empower the youth as she begins the Alētheia section of the poem by describing the 
possible ways of inquiry using the metaphor of paths:  
εἰ δ᾿ ἄγε τῶν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, 
αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι· 
ἡ μὲν, ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, 
Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ, 
ἡ δ᾿, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, 
τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν· 
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν, οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν, 
οὔτε φράσαις. 
 
Come now and I shall tell, and do you receive through hearing the 
tale. 
Which are the only paths of inquiry for thinking 
The one: that it is and that it is not possible not to be, 
                                               
211 Daniel W. Graham, “Anaxagoras: Science and Speculation in the Golden Age,” in Early Greek Philosophy: the 
Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. Joe McCoy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2013), pp. 139-156, at 141. 
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Is the path of Persuasion (for she attends on Truth); 
The other: that it is not and that it is right it should not be, 
This I declare to you is an utterly inscrutable track, 
For neither could you know what is not (for it cannot be 
accomplished), 
Nor could you declare it (B2). 
 
Although her account is framed in terms of a story (μῦθον) that one is able to “receive through 
hearing,” the point of the story goes beyond revelation by proposing to teach the youth not what 
to believe but rather how to think.212  Grounded not in cosmogonical or theogonical history, the 
path of inquiry is a forward-leaning one of discovery by means of reason rather than revelation.  
The aim of good judgment requires the proper path for understanding and the goddess 
emphasizes mortal decision-making by framing her “tale” in terms of the choice of paths to 
follow or keep from following.  Thus the promise of the initial choice will be borne out in the 
future by continuing to follow the path where it leads. Defined by what they seek, these paths of 
inquiry correspond to “what-is” and “what-is-not,” respectively. The one deals with things that 
are, presumably derived from meditation on how they are what they are, while the other is the 
forbidden path of inquiry that entails speculation about “what is not.”  Such a path is forbidden 
by the goddess at the very least because it can never be completed.213  That is, empty speculation, 
about what is not or even about what could be, can never arrive at actual knowledge; in effect, 
the path goes nowhere and thus is not much of a path at all.  And yet, these paths seem to be 
more than just methods of inquiry aimed at producing knowledge, as Parmenides tells us: “...for 
the same thing is (there) for thinking and for being” (...τὸ γὰρ αὐτο νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, 
                                               
212 Thus we should take issue with Hussey when he says of Parmenides’ poem: “What is said is worthy of 
acceptance because, and only because, it is the utterance of a super-human authority.”  Or, rather, we should agree 
with the Hussey who says just a few short sentences later: “It is manifestly on the basis of his reasoned argument 
that Parmenides thinks the first main section of his poem, the exposition ‘concerning truth’, must be accepted,” “The 
Beginnings of Epistemology,” p. 29.   
213 Curd, “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” p. 37. 
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B3).214  The goddess reiterates her desire for the youth to think things through for himself when 
she elaborates on yet another path: 
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ᾿ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, 
μηδὲν δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ᾿ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. 
πρώτης γάρ σ᾿ ἀφ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἰργω>,215 
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ᾿ ἀπο τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν 
πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν  
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φορεῦνατι 
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, 
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται 
κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος   
 
It is right both to say and to think that it is what-is: for it is the case 
that it is, 
but nothing is not: these things I bid you ponder.  
for this is the first path of inquiry from which I hold you back, 
and then from that one on which mortals, knowing nothing, 
wander, two-headed: for helplessness in their 
breasts steers their wandering mind. They are borne along 
deaf and blind alike, dazed, hordes without judgment 
by whom it (namely, what-is) is thought both to be and not to be 
the same and not the same; but the path of all is backward-turning 
(B6).216   
Quite intentionally, the goddess saves her most damning criticism for the “path of mortals,” and 
not the path of “what is not.”  Passive by nature, this path is crowded with “hordes without 
judgment” that are “borne along” toward nowhere in particular and “steered” by “helplessness.”  
The imagery is not accidental: Parmenides’ criticism aims at the connection between how one 
thinks and how one lives.  The consequences of poor judgment extend beyond simply “bad 
thinking” or misperceiving reality.  When it comes to mankind, how one thinks is equivalent to 
who one is for Parmenides, and one who thinks along the wrong path is lost: “wander[ing],” 
“two-headed,” and “helpless” (B6, 5).  The aimlessness of this path leaves the many wandering 
                                               
214 Translation from Graham, TEGP, p. 213. 
215 Following Graham in supplementing Diels, TEGP, p. 214. 
216 Translation from McKirahan, PBS, pp. 146-147. 
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and because of this, their lives lack necessary focus and any sense of autonomy.  As a result, 
people that follow this path are not only poor thinkers, their lives are essentially devoid of 
meaning.  Since paths for Parmenides are “the same for thinking and for being,” it is the nature 
of the path to provide purpose for both human inquiry and human life.  
Drawing a tight connection between the paths and the available means for producing 
knowledge, the goddess advocates the movement away from the use of the senses and experience 
and toward critical reason as a way to evaluate her speech on the paths of inquiry: 
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· 
ἀλλα σὺ τῆσδ᾿ ἀψ᾿ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα  
μηδέ σ᾿ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, 
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λογωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον 
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.   
 
For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are,  
But restrain your thought from this path of inquiry, 
Nor let habit force you, along this path of much experience, 
To ply an aimless eye and ringing ear 
And tongue; but judge by reasoning the very contentious disproof 
That has been uttered by me. (B7) 
 
The path of “much experience” is the path of the many and marked by habit which uses “force.”   
This path is explicitly contrasted with the freedom the goddess advocates by encouraging 
reasoning that allows independent judgment.  The interplay of restraint and freedom emerges 
again and again throughout the poem.217  Restraint turns out to open up the possibility of 
freedom through knowledge.  Habit, the close ally of experience, is here connected to uncritical 
and unfocused behavior: “aimless eye and ringing ear and tongue.”  Parmenides rejects the 
empiricism of his predecessors, poetic and philosophical, to consider the idea of the “nature” of 
things as it relates to method of inquiry by reasoning alone.  Further, the goddess’ invitation for a 
                                               
217 For a sustained discussion of the “Theme of Fate-Constraint” in the poem, see Mourelatos, The Route of 
Parmenides, pp. 25-29. 
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mortal to question her “very contentious disproof” is unprecedented encouragement for human 
inquiry.218   
In addition to the paths being dictated, respectively, by reason and experience, the 
goddess emphasizes the connection between the path of inquiry and the particular qualities of the 
objects of knowledge that effectively constitute this path.  In terms of the first forbidden path, 
οὐκ ἔστιν, the qualification is simply that the objects or attributes that one speculates about do 
not exist.  But when it comes to the path one ought to follow, the path prescribed by reason and 
that concerns fundamentally “what-is,” the goddess elaborates by saying 
...μόνος δ᾿ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο 
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ᾿ ἐπὶ σήματ᾿ ἔασι 
πολλὰ μάλ᾿, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, 
οὖλον ποτ᾿ ἦν οὐδ᾿ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, 
ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ; 
πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; 
 
There is still left a single story 
Of a path, that it is. On this path there are signs 
Exceedingly many-that being ungenerated it is also imperishable, 
Whole and of a single kind and unshaken and complete. 
Nor was it ever nor will it be, since it is now, all together 
one, continuous. For what birth will you seek for it? 
How and from where did it grow? (B8, 1-7)219 
 
Having eliminated the paths that are impossible or deeply flawed, we are left with a single path 
forward for inquiry.  Of course, what defines any path, is first where it leads, the destination, but 
also the particular way one gets there.  With respect to the production of knowledge, the path is 
not understood merely by the end at which it aims, but also the limits that mark its boundaries 
thereby differentiating it from what is unnecessary, misleading, or “off track.”  Within the path 
                                               
218  For a summary of interpretations of the enigmatic phrase πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον, see James Lesher, “Parmenides’ 
Critique of Thinking: The poluderis elenchos of Fragment 7,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984): 1-30, 
at 1-4. 
219 Translation from David Gallop Parmenides of Elea: A Text and Translation with an Introduction (University of 
Toronto Press, 1991), but taking ὁδοῖο as “path” rather than “way.” 
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metaphor, Parmenides describes these limits as “signs” (σήματα) that point the traveler in the 
right direction, helping to keep them on the path.  Alexander Nehamas, playing appropriately on 
Parmenides’ poetic language, contends that these are “signposts…[that]...characterize a 
particular and very restrictive way of being” in that they “tell us what conditions must be met if a 
subject is to be something in the appropriate way.”220   But the identity of thinking and being for 
Parmenides means that the end of inquiry into “what-is” is knowledge of the fundamental 
essence of anything that truly exists.  As Curd argues, “A controlled noos, taking the path of 
what-is, engages in inquiry that ends (both completes its journey and perfects itself) in what-
is.”221  Thus do the “signs” take on the role of metaphysical and epistemological criteria both for 
thinking and for being.222  Suggested by reason itself, the authority of the “signs” as criteria for 
thinking and being is established through argument. 
 Parmenides declares that “what-is” must be ungenerated and imperishable on the grounds 
that it stands outside of temporal constraints.  That is, “since it is now, all together one, 
continuous,” it remains impossible to give an account either of its origin or its process of growth, 
past or future.  It is “Justice” that “holds it fast,” preventing what-is from either coming to be or 
perishing (B12-14).  Likewise, it is “whole and of a single kind” and “motionless in the limits of 
the great bonds” since it “is all full of what-is” and held in place by “mighty Necessity” (B8, 22-
30).  Finally, Parmenides argues that what-is cannot be incomplete “for it is not needy; if it were 
it would lack everything” (B8, 32-34).  But the most striking repetition in B8 is the ubiquitous 
use of the idea of limits in different capacities in each of the arguments for the necessary 
attributes of what-is.  It is the shackles of Justice by which “coming to be is quenched and 
                                               
220 Alexander Nehamas, “Parmenidean being/Heraclitean fire,” in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of 
Alexander Mourelatos, ed. Victor Caston and Daniel W. Graham (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 45–64, at 50. 
221 Curd, “Parmenides And After: Unity and Plurality,” p. 41. 
222 See Curd, “Anaxagoras and The Theory of Everything,” p. 231. 
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perishing unheard of” (B8, 21), thus necessitating that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable.  
Likewise, though less explicit, what-is is indivisible, or a “whole of a single kind” precisely 
because it lacks any kind of internal divisions or limits.  It is instead “all continuous, for what-is 
cleaves to what-is” (B8, 25).  Parmenides then describes what-is as “motionless in the limits of 
great bonds, it is without starting or stopping” (B8, 26-27) as a consequence of the banishment of 
coming to be and perishing by “true faith.”  Augmenting this confusing argument, however, he 
goes on to argue for the motionlessness of what-is: “Remaining the same in the same by itself it 
lies and thus it remains steadfast there; for mighty Necessity holds it in the bonds of a limit 
which confines it roundabout” (ταὐτόν τ᾿ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ᾿ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως 
ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει, B8, 
29-31).  Likewise, the final attribute of what-is, its completeness, Parmenides declares that  a 
short while later in arguing that one can only think about what-is, Parmenides contends this is so 
“since Fate shackled it” (ἐπεὶ τὸ γε Μοῖρ᾿ ἐπέδησεν, B8, 36-37).  He returns here to the notion 
that “the same thing is for thinking and is wherefore there is thought” (B8, 34).  The arguments 
offered for attributing these qualities to what-is are all linked to one another using this idea of 
limits.  
Parmenides’ move to use the idea of limits is a substantial one in the early history of the 
concept of nature.  Whereas the nature of something was understood somewhat ambiguously in a 
Homeric sense as the “dominant feature” of the thing, or some vague combination of origin and 
process in the theories of the Milesians, or by Heraclitus as a unity of conflicting features, in 
Parmenides’ thought, the idea of nature is defined in terms of limits and grasped through rational 
argument.  Indeed, the questions and arguments Parmenides poses are a critique of earlier 
concepts of nature, and while his predecessors may also have taken the idea of nature as “the 
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only subject of which knowledge was possible,” it is Parmenides who supplies the ideas of 
definable limits to the concept of nature as a way to orient thinking properly to what-is.223  
Rather than a concept that distinguishes and identifies among a plurality of things, the 
metaphysical criteria Parmenides establishes thus indicates the attributes each “real” thing must 
possess.  Thus, a kind of predicational monism emerges with the attributes argued for in B8.  
Within the development of the concept of nature, Parmenides’ move highlights the emergence of 
the idea of an unalterable essence that can be known as such, although both the physiologoi and 
the many have missed this since, as Curd argues, “mortals fail in controlling noos; not 
understanding the nature of its proper object, they fail to steer it properly.”224  In short, the path 
that leads to true knowledge is bounded by these “limits” of nature, according to which one must 
“steer” themselves to the goal by use of reason.  These limits are what makes any entity a 
genuinely “real” unity as well as what makes it knowable.    
In the Alētheia section, the nature of some thing, that is any thing that truly is, must be 
fixed by these particular limits.  Rather than use habit to follow the path of “much experience,” 
one must begin with the metaphysical and epistemological criteria for what “must be.”  The end 
of “Truth” in the poem is really only another beginning, however, particularly with respect to 
scholarly disagreement.  What follows in Parmenides’ poem is a perplexing inquiry into a whole 
range of theories with respect to traditional “physical” questions.  It is also the part of the poem 
where Parmenides makes explicit use of the traditional Greek word for nature, φύσις.  If 
Parmenides intends us to understand what-is as a description of the universal nature of all “real” 
                                               
223 A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, p. 18. Coxon describes Parmenides as expanding on Xenophanes’ 
rational conception of the divine by “showing that the characteristics which Xenophanes ascribed conjecturally to 
God must, together with others, be asserted of a transcendent subject not ‘probably’ but necessarily,” p. 18. 
224 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 49 
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entities, what are we to make of the very different account of nature as the φύσις of things that 
emerges in the Doxa? 
PHYSIS IN PARMENIDES’ POEM  
The portion of the poem historically attributed to mortal opinions (δόξα) is undeniably 
puzzling for Parmenides’ readers.  The reasons for confusion are considerable.  The goddess 
seems at the outset of the poem to present a stark contrast between the two components of 
knowledge in which she will instruct Parmenides. “There is need,” she tells him, “for you to 
learn all things--both the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth and the opinions of mortals, in 
which there is no true reliance” (B1, 28-30).  A bit further along in the poem she describes the 
path of inquiry preferred by mortals as that path, “on which, mortals, knowing nothing, wander, 
two headed: for helplessness in their breasts steers their wandering mind” (B6, 4-6).  In language 
that parallels Heraclitus’ sharp criticism of his contemporaries, the goddess complains of mortals 
that “they are borne along deaf and blind alike, dazed, hordes without judgment by whom it 
(namely, what-is) is thought both to be and not to be the same and not the same” (B6, 6-9).225  
Following such an introduction of the paths of inquiry, one cannot help but question why the 
youth need learn about mortal opinions at all.  Even if the answer to this question is, as the 
goddess later suggests, so that the kouros cannot be misled by future opinions proffered by his 
contemporaries (B8, 61), we should expect the bulk of the poem to concern the “unshaken heart 
of persuasive Truth” that unquestionably has much more intrinsic value.   
Yet despite the fact that significant portions of the Doxa have not survived to modern 
day, ancient reports indicate that this section of the poem was considerably longer and far more 
                                               
225 Heraclitus makes similar complaints when he criticizes his contemporaries: “Not comprehending, they hear like 
the deaf. The saying is their witness: absent while present” (B34). Ensuring beyond any doubt that his criticism 
extends to the masses, he elsewhere comments, “What wit or understanding do they have? They believe the poets of 
the people and take the mob as their teacher, not knowing that ‘the many are worthless’, good men are few” (B104).  
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detailed than the Alētheia.226  Plutarch comments on the impressive breadth of Parmenides’ 
cosmological and biological theories and Simplicius notes an extraordinary level of detail in the 
Eleatic’s accounts “down to the parts of animals.”227  At a minimum, the portion of the poem 
devoted to such diverse inquiry seems to have included a cosmogony, physiology, embryology, 
psychology, and even a related theogony.228  Not surprisingly, modern accounts that attempt to 
make sense of the Doxa and situate it within a more comprehensive reading of Parmenides’ 
poem diverge considerably.229  Despite their sharp disagreement over how to interpret the path of 
“what is,” some scholars, like Mourelatos and Owen, view the Doxa as “entirely false and 
deceptive” as they cling to the goddess’ classification of the “deceptive ordering” of the δόξα.230  
Other interpreters downplay the strength of the deception when they argue that the Doxa instead 
compliments the Alētheia because it deals with an entirely different subject, namely the sensible 
world of appearance.231  Karl Popper tries to rescue the Doxa from any notion of deception by 
suggesting that a grievous mistake by a careless copyist transformed Parmenides’ intended 
ἀπατητόν (“untrodden”) into ἀπατηλόν (“deceptive”).232  More recently, however, commentators 
                                               
226 Diels speculates that roughly one-tenth of the Doxa is extant, while nine-tenths of the Alētheia has survived, see 
Parmenides: Lehrgedicht (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897). 
227 See Guthrie, HGP, vol 2, pp. 60-61; Plutarch, Adversus Colotes 1114b-c; and Simplicius, De Caelo 559, 26-27.  
228 Herbert Granger, “The Cosmology of Mortals,” in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander 
Mourelatos, ed. Victor Caston and Daniel W. Graham, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002), pp. 101-116, at 101 n. 2. 
229 For helpful summaries of the range of interpretations, see Patricia Curd, “Deception and Belief in Parmenides’ 
Doxa,” Apeiron 25.2 (1992): 109-133, at 109-11, Granger, “The Cosmology of Mortals,” at 101-102, and Matthew 
R. Cosgrove, “What are ‘True’ Doxai Worth To Parmenides? Essaying a Fresh Look at His Cosmology,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 46 (2014): 1-31, at 1-4.  
230 See G.E.L. Owen “Eleatic Questions,” pp. 84-89; Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, pp. 226-27. Patricia 
Curd espouses such a view in “Parmenidean Monism,” Phronesis 36 (1991): 241-264, but reconsiders in a later 
article, arguing instead that “while there is deception in the Doxa...nonetheless the Doxa does not in principle 
renounce all human belief.”  See “Deception and Belief in Parmenides’ Doxa,” p. 110. 
231 For variations on this view see A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides and W.R. Chalmers, “Parmenides and 
the Beliefs of Mortals,” Phronesis 5 (1960): 5-22.  Curd aligns this modern perspective with Simplicius’ views in 
antiquity in “Deception and Belief in Parmenides’ Doxa,” see p. 110 n. 5. 
232 Karl Popper, The World of Parmenides (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 93-96.  Popper gives other alternative 
translations for ἀπατητόν: “very new,,” “unusual,” and “so far unused,” and offers six arguments supporting his 
proposed change, p. 94. The translation as “untrodden” is the only one offered by Liddell and Scott and represents a 
striking coincidence given Parmenides’ repeated use of paths to describe ways of inquiry. 
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have gone one step further in rehabilitating the Doxa.  Curd argues that Parmenides does in fact 
believe a “trustworthy cosmology may be possible” and that in the Doxa he “discloses what such 
a theory might be like and how it would be tested.”233  Still more recently, Mourelatos tries to 
make sense of how the “expressly disparaged” part of the poem contains “astronomical 
breakthroughs” that comprise “part of the record of early exploratory thrusts and gradual 
conceptual gains” in scientific knowledge.234  In short, Mourelatos and Curd both abandon 
previously held views, instead coming to regard the Doxa as playing a vital, positive role in 
Parmenides’ philosophical account.  Néstor-Luis Cordero alternatively argues that we have 
misunderstood what δόξα refers to through poor textual reconstruction and anachronistic 
readings of key distinctions in the text.235   For Cordero, the lines of the poem that deal with 
“physical” questions do not belong in the δόξα at all.  This means Parmenides’ cosmology is 
neither “deceptive” nor “unreliable,” and that the only “deceptive ordering” has been history’s 
failure to properly reconstruct the poem.  In the end, perhaps we are forced to agree with Kahn 
that “the vexing problem of the Doxa...on Parmenides’ principles is not really soluble at all.”236 
But if we cannot definitively answer the question of how to view the Doxa, how is an account of 
Parmenides’ notion of φύσις possible? 
                                               
233 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 100. 
234 A.P.D. Mourelatos, “Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism,” in Early Greek 
Philosophy: The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. Joe McCoy (Washington D.C., Catholic University 
Press, 2013), pp. 91-112, at 93.  In the same volume, Daniel Graham concurs, saying “If one reads the Alētheia, or 
true section, in light of the Doxa, or Opinion section, one sees the cosmology there as a new, improved version of 
what had been done poorly and unreflectively by earlier cosmologists. So Parmenides’s challenge is not to abandon 
cosmology, but to put it on a theoretically sound basis,” see “Anaxagoras: Science and Speculation in the Golden 
Age,” p. 141. Of course, Graham immediately equivocates by pointing to the modern view that holds that 
Parmenides really only intends to show the “futility of the enterprise” of cosmology.  Regarding those who argue for 
this view, Graham asserts non-committally “and they may be right,” p. 141. 
235 See Néstor-Luis Cordero, “Parmenidean ‘Physics’ is not part of what Parmenides calls ‘δόξα’,” in Parmenides, 
Venerable and Awesome: Proceedings of the International Symposium, ed. Néstor-Luis Cordero (Las Vegas: 
Parmenides Publishing, 2011), pp. 95-114.  
236 Kahn, “The Thesis of Parmenides,” p. 705. 
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An important fact that commentators sometimes overlook in their haste to answer the 
“central problem” presented by the Alētheia-Doxa distinction in the poem, is that Parmenides 
himself made no such strict division.  The division has been subsequently inferred largely on the 
basis of the goddess’ words in the Proem.  Setting aside the problems of accurate reconstruction 
of the poem, which we are not likely to solve, the order of the “parts” of the poem seems 
problematic for an interpretation that dismisses the content of the Doxa.  If the goddess’ intent is 
to show a better way of thinking by undermining mortal opinions, itself a code for Ionian 
inquiry, why does Truth come first?  Beyond the order of the poem, it seems highly unlikely that 
Parmenides spends so much effort in order to merely denounce φύσις as an unreliable concept of 
inferior Ionian inquiry and “mortal opinion.”  The goddess sketches a traditional inquiry into 
nature for the youth: 
εἴσηι δ᾿ αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ᾿ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα 
σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο  
λαμπάδος ἔργ᾿ ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,  
ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίψοιτα σελήνης  
καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμψὶς ἔχοντα 
ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ(α) ἐπέδησεν ᾿Ανάγκη 
πείρατ᾿ἔχειν ἄστρων. 
 
You shall know the ethereal nature and all the signs 
In aether, and the unseen works of the pure torch 
Of the blazing sun, and whence they came to be, 
And you shall learn the revolving works of the round-eyed moon 
And her nature, and you shall know surrounding heaven, 
Whence it grew and how Necessity led it in shackles to keep the 
limits of the stars. (B10)237  
 
In this passage, Parmenides’ use of φύσις captures what many believe to be the original meaning 
connected with the notion of growth, that is, “the sense of ‘becoming’ in the stem φυ-.”238  
Though some suggest this is the “primitive” use of the term, out-moded before the 5th century 
                                               
237 Graham translation, TEGP, p. 221. 
238 Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 62. 
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B.C., G.S. Kirk contends instead “that at the ‘primitive’ stage of language there is no distinction 
between ‘become’ and ‘be’.”239  Thus, Kirk continues, “the broad general sense of φύσις...is 
‘essence’ or ‘nature’, the way a thing is made...and, what is at times connected with this, the way 
it normally behaves.”240  Mourelatos infers from this that Parmenides, uniquely among his 
contemporaries, understands that “the quest for φύσις = ‘essence’ ...could not be a quest for 
φύσις = ‘becoming’.241  Instead, Parmenides aims to “purge” the concept of φύσις of 
“dynamism,” implicitly connecting this idea with the “routes” presented in Alētheia.242  
Mourelatos then contends that the explicit use of φύσις in the Doxa is “misapplied--by 
undiscerning mortals.”243   
Although Mourelatos’ perspective resolves the “fundamental dilemma” in a simple and 
efficient way, it hangs far too much on a few words of the goddess’ poetic discourse.  The 
suggestion that the explicit use of φύσις is somehow “misapplied” (a charge that Mourelatos 
does little to substantiate), and that an implicit account of φύσις is embedded by Parmenides in 
the arguments of B8, embraces an unnecessarily complicated approach.  Instead of attempting to 
purge φύσις of its dynamic components, Parmenides aims to properly situate it by grasping that 
one cannot understand the nature of things that change until one understands what it means to be 
a “nature” in the first place.  That is, one cannot understand becoming until one understands 
being, and inquiry ought not begin with cosmogony and cosmology.  Parmenides recognizes the 
failure of previous thinkers to properly distinguish between these two key aspects of the idea of 
nature as a new explanatory concept.  Thus, instead of seeing φύσις as implicit in Aletheia, we 
                                               
239 Kirk, HCF, p. 228 n. 1. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 62, his emphasis. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid., p. 63. 
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should understand Parmenides to be actively distinguishing the concept of nature into its identity 
and growth, or being and becoming, components.  Parmenides aims at giving a comprehensive 
account of “the nature of things” by moving from metaphysical to physical principles.  Only the 
former can be known for certain, however.  Physical properties, and nature as “works” can only 
ever be “likely,” thus they lack “true reliance.”  The concept of nature, for Parmenides, is 
therefore split into its metaphysical and physical components; the “being” or essence of real 
entities that necessarily entails the attributes listed in B8, and the φύσις of natural bodies as the 
active, “becoming” facet conceived of as process.  Insofar as anything is misleading or deceptive 
in the Doxa, it is therefore specifically a deceptive ordering (κόσμον ἀπατηλὸν, B8, 52).  
Beyond properly distinguishing the facets of the concept of nature, Parmenides’ poem also 
effectively places the Alētheia before the Doxa as appropriate steps on the path of inquiry.  The 
didactic poem thus serves as a model for inquiry itself, beginning with questions and subjects 
that are later associated with “first philosophy.”  Rather than the content of the Doxa, 
Parmenides’ reference to a “deceptive ordering” in all likelihood refers to his predecessors’ 
fascination with φύσις as the fundamental explanatory concept of nature as an inappropriate first 
step on the path.  In short, φύσις must be put in its proper place along the path of inquiry.  
The subjects of natural inquiry, according to the goddess, are those bodies that comprise 
the natural world, in this case the celestial part of it, though Parmenides’ interests extend to other 
more earthly natural bodies as well.  Like his philosophical predecessors, Parmenides indicates a 
departure from identifying the φύσις of something with its prevalent “outward characteristic” by 
linking φύσις explicitly with the “unseen works” of the extremely visible heavenly bodies of sun 
and moon.  The nature of these mysterious, distant objects is “ethereal,” but not divine, and 
distinctly juxtaposed with the “signs.”  To acquire knowledge of the φύσις of these bodies, the 
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youth will have to understand both what he can see and what he cannot.  Understanding requires 
both the “works” and “whence they came to be,” that is, the total process of becoming that 
includes its origin and activities.  Parmenides here offers a concept of nature that fits with the 
emerging philosophical understanding of φύσις as a dynamic relation of origin and process that 
originates in the Milesians and is broadened as a tool for classification in Xenophanes.244  
Strengthening the etymological connection to φύσις, Parmenides points, finally and more 
comprehensively, to “the surrounding heaven” and “whence it grew” (ἔνθεν ἔφυ).  But how does 
one grasp the φύσις of these things?  As the subject of knowledge in these accounts, φύσις 
includes both origin and process--how can mankind understand these for the sun?  There seem 
only two possible ways: 1) revelation or 2) observation and reason.  Since the φύσις of anything, 
including celestial bodies, has change involved in it, it can never move beyond opinion.  As 
process, φύσις alters and humans can have, at best, a kind of true belief.  Unlike with Heraclitus, 
where φύσις was the tool for distinguishing things, and thus for acquiring knowledge of the 
logos, in Parmenides, the “nature” as metaphysical criteria allows us to better understand 
physical phenomena and φύσις. 
The chronology and relationship of Parmenides and Heraclitus has intrigued both ancient 
and modern commentators in large part because of the diametrically opposed specifics they seem 
to espouse.245  The caricatures are familiar to all who engage in a cursory reading of ancient 
philosophy: Heraclitus the devotee of constant change, Parmenides the vehement change-denier. 
The usual chronology is that Heraclitus precedes Parmenides, and that the Eleatic’s arguments 
                                               
244 See Chapter 2 on Xenophanes and Chapter 3 on Heraclitus.  Coxon translates φύσις as “origin” citing Aristotle’s 
Physics 193b12ff in support, but this is only a part of the concept, especially here in Parmenides.  See The 
Fragments of Parmenides, p. 227.  
245 See Nehamas’ concise summary of “the facts” regarding the pair in “Parmenidean Being/Heraclitean Fire,” p. 45.  
Nehamas’ chapter disputes the connections Graham makes between the thinkers in his respective chapter in the very 
same volume.  
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can be read as a response to the Ephesian’s ideas, but more than a few scholars have argued that 
the reverse is true.246  The precise chronology is not so vital for the present study, yet it becomes 
clear that, in many traditional accounts of Presocratic philosophy, each is the face of a different 
facet of the emerging concept of nature in early Greek philosophy.  The etymological origins of 
φύσις contain both the notion of growth or change, and the idea of the “essential character” or 
identity of a thing.  The concept of nature, from a very broad perspective may be said to contain 
two distinct notions: a nature describes or defines what something fundamentally is and 
delineates the possibilities for what that something will become.  Simply put, φύσις as “the 
nature of the thing” originally contains both being and becoming, and yet for Parmenides φύσις 
is thoroughly about growth, change, or becoming.  As an explanatory concept, φύσις can explain 
the operation of natural bodies like the sun and the moon but we are forced to conclude that it 
fails to answer the question about what is real.  Or, put more precisely, how do we know what is 
real?  For Parmenides φύσις cannot move beyond becoming to tell us what is: ungenerated, 
imperishable, a whole of a single kind, unshaken, and complete (B8, 3-4).  Yet both seem to be 
objects worthy of inquiry to Parmenides.  Whereas Heraclitus understands φύσις to lead to an 
understanding of the λόγος, Parmenides establishes truth (ἀλήθεια) in order to properly ground 
inquiry into φύσις.  One must have the right metaphysical foundations, in Parmenides’ view, to 
allow for even the possibility of discovery of the φύσις of things.  Thus Mourelatos, no doubt 
because he consider the Doxa at the time of his monograph to be “the false doctrine of 
‘mortals’,” incorrectly aligns the two when he says that it is “because Parmenides grasped the 
                                               
246 Karl Reinhardt is the first to argue strongly in favor of dating Parmenides prior to Heraclitus. See Parmenides 
und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, pp. 221- 230. See also Michael C. Stokes, The One and Many in 
Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 109-112.  The recent consensus seems to be an explicit agnosticism with respect to the 
question of chronology, yet often the language used by scholars or the order in which these thinkers are discussed 
still reflects an implicit assumption that Heraclitus lived and wrote before Parmenides.  
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distinction between “being” and “becoming” that he conceived of the cognitive quest as directed 
toward ἀλήθεια, rather than toward φύσις.”247  Knowledge of both is possible for Parmenides, 
but φύσις at best only tells a “likely story” of how something operates, not what it is. 
Moreover, the study of the concept of nature in Early Greek philosophy sheds light on the 
debate between the principles of Parmenides and Heraclitus by showing that, at bottom, it is not 
only a debate about ultimate reality in the universe, but equally so about the φύσις of individual 
things within the cosmos and how the two are connected.  For Heraclitus, the essential structure 
of reality can only be discovered through φύσις, through the practice of distinguishing things 
according to their nature and understanding how everything is “fit together” in a kind of 
ἁρμονίη.  This knowledge, in turn, gives access to the λόγος, which is that unifying structure 
understood as a guiding principle for the entire cosmos.  But for Parmenides, the essential 
structure of reality is not accessible through φύσις, but only through reason and careful 
judgment.248  Thus, the goddess invites the youth to learn “all things,” even those in which there 
is “no true reliance,” that is, those subject to time and change. Though both Heraclitus and 
Parmenides recognize the philosophical significance of φύσις, they take steps to prevent us from 
mistaking φύσις for ἀλήθεια or λόγος.  For Heraclitus, φύσις is the path to λόγος, but for 
Parmenides, the concept of nature is divided as the “essence” of any entity that is truly real and 
the φύσις of natural bodies that move and change. 
LIMITS, PATHS, AND PURPOSE IN PARMENIDES’ POEM 
                                               
247 Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 63.  This seems to contradict his simultaneous suggestion that φύσις is 
implicitly embedded in the facets of what-is in B8. 
248 See Hussey, “The Beginnings of Epistemology,” p. 31. 
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Purposiveness in Parmenides’ poem admits of multiple layers and begins when he 
introduces the imagery of paths in the Proem that he returns to throughout the poem.  Noting the 
way the youth’s path has been ordained, the goddess allays potential fears when she says:  
ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι 
τήνδ᾿ ὁδόν, ἦ γὰρ ἀπ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστιν, 
ἀλλὰ Θέμις τε Δίκη τε. 
 
Since no ill fate sent you out to travel  
this path (for it is indeed far from the beaten track of human 
beings) 
But Right and Justice (B1, 26-28)249 
 
Established by divine forces, the paths play a crucial, natural role in the poem in at least two 
senses.  First, paths are a natural metaphor in that they do not rely on convention or context for 
understanding.  As embodied creatures trying always to go somewhere, we intuitively understand 
paths that help us navigate from one point to another.  Among Parmenides’ contemporaries, we 
find by contrast that Heraclitus is fond of contextual metaphors, and his use of the bow and lyre 
to describe ἁρμονίη is one such example.  Without knowing what a lyre or a bow is, one would 
not be able to grasp his point that it is the tension, the conflicting pull in opposite directions, 
which produces the unity of the thing itself.  Parmenides’ use goes beyond metaphor here, 
however, because he thinks of the possible ways of being and thinking as actual paths, rather 
than simply a heuristic.  Summing up the possible ways of advancing toward a goal, these paths 
exhaust all possibilities “both for thinking and for being.”  In other words, the second sense in 
which paths are natural is that they are nature’s way of teaching us which way to go, that is, of 
directing humans toward an end.  Further, if thinking and being are the same, as Parmenides 
suggests, then these paths are not just about possible methods of inquiry: they also represent 
corresponding paths of being.  The choice between the alternatives is precisely the judgment 
                                               
249 Curd translation, The Legacy of Parmenides, pp. 24-25. 
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(κρίσις) that the goddess is clarifying for the kouros, we elect to set out on a path not only of a 
particular way of thinking but the corresponding way of living.  In that they necessarily imply a 
destination as well as a means of steering oneself toward this goal or “remaining” on the path, 
the paths used by Parmenides inherently contains both purposive elements.  The limits of the 
path act as guides, and by keeping within the limits, one is led inevitably to the end.  And the 
destination, the telos, keeps us on the path as continuously oriented toward something.  In short, 
the idea of paths in Parmenides’ poem is inherently purposive, and the repetition of this motif 
shows this purposiveness to be intentional.  
At the heart of the poem, Parmenides’ use of paths is complex, with multiple paths 
conceived of and discussed in various ways and with different ends.  The first path the goddess 
references is the path that has brought the youth to her, to the divine, that is “far from the beaten 
track of human beings.”  The youth is led here in the chariot by knowing steeds, this path often 
considered to be the path toward divine knowledge.  The use of paths is extended when the 
goddess transitions from discussing the path that has brought the kouros to her to the possible 
paths of human inquiry.  An examination of how the two faulty paths fail helps illustrate the 
purposive features.   
Commentators often draw a brief comparison between Parmenides and Descartes, using 
the father of modern philosophy to elucidate more complex features of Parmenides’ thought.250 
Yet they fail to appreciate the striking connection between the two thinkers with respect to paths 
of inquiry and philosophical method.  In Part II of the Discourse on Method, Descartes suggests 
with respect to his decision to abandon all his previously held beliefs that “the world is largely 
                                               
250 See KR, p. 266, Owen, “Eleatic Questions,” p. 95, and Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 26, as just a few 
examples of those who draw comparisons to Descartes. 
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composed of two types of minds for whom it is quite unsuitable.”251  The first are hasty and lack 
the patience necessary to “direct all their thoughts in an orderly manner” with the predictable 
result that “they could never stick to the track that must be taken” thereby “remain[ing] lost all 
their lives.”  The second kind of mind is far more “modest” in recognizing their limitations and 
thus need “to follow the opinions of others rather than seek better opinions themselves.”  This 
type of person lacks the ability to lead himself along the path, signaling an unmitigated 
dependence on others.  Of course, Descartes is in neither camp, thus there is a third kind of mind 
that should emulate Descartes’ philosophical method beginning with radical doubt.  This kind of 
mind has precisely the opposite attributes of the first two: he is able both to stick to the necessary 
path and judge for himself how to arrive at his destination. 
Descartes continues this analogy in the next section of the work that deals with morality, 
thus linking method of inquiry with action.  There, in describing his second maxim as being firm 
and decisive in my actions,” he draws the analogy of a traveler lost in a forest.  How does one 
escape such a situation?  First, he points to the two common mistakes such travelers make, 
warning that one should not “wander about turning this way and that” or “still less stay in one 
place.”  Both, Descartes implies, stand little chance of ensuring that one gets to their destination. 
The real solution is to choose a path and commit to it unwaveringly.  Descartes supposes a 
connection between the first kind of mind and the first path--the aimless wandering of a hasty 
individual who lacks the patience to stick to the limits of the path they have chosen.  Likewise, 
                                               
251 See Rene Descartes Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the 
Sciences in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 111-151, at 116-126.  The interpretation offered here 
owes much to the work of Richard Kennington and Timothy Sean Quinn, see Richard Kennington “Descartes’s 
Discourse on Method,” in On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus and Frank 
Hunt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 105-122, at 113, and Timothy Sean Quinn “Descartes’s Revised 
Averroism,” Review of Metaphysics 67 (2014): 769-789.       
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the second path is the one taken by those who are unable to lead themselves out of difficult 
situations, thus their path goes nowhere and they remain, perhaps forever, stuck in one place. 
Parmenides’ possible paths of inquiry bear a remarkable likeness to those suggested by 
Descartes.  The path of mortals is the path of the “wandering, two-headed, helpless,”  
while the path of what-is-not simply does not go anywhere at all, that is, it “cannot be 
completed.”  The failures that correspond to each path are different.  Those who choose the 
wandering path of mortals cannot stick to the path, because they fail to recognize the “limits” or 
“signs” along the way.  Rather than reason, it is the “helplessness in their breasts [that] steers 
their wandering mind” as they “are borne along deaf and blind alike” (B6).  The path of what-is-
not, on the other hand, cannot be completed because the “end” of the path is nothing at all.  That 
is, such a path effectively goes nowhere, since following this path of inquiry would mean we 
would need to give a “negative account of what something really is,” that is to say “it is not this, 
or this, or this….”252   Thus, it is “an utterly inscrutable track, for neither could you know what is 
not, nor could you declare it” (B2, 6-8).  The only path to take is the one that moves unerringly 
toward the goal, and in both cases, this goal is knowledge of what-is as defined by the limits, or 
criteria, found in B8.   
An integral component of the choice facing the youth, and by extension all human beings, 
is the kind of life he wants to have which is determined by the goal at the end of the path.  The 
disturbing imagery of the second forbidden path provides a more compelling account that 
Parmenides understands paths to be about more than inquiry.  As a result of poor thinking, most 
mortals are indecisive, helpless, and wandering through life.  In the first path, there is no goal, in 
the second path, the goal is unintelligible.  Thus, only the path of what-is can be called a true 
                                               
252 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 46. 
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path.  Still, the end at which this path aims is difficult to see.  In describing the only path the 
goddess permits, Hermann Fränkel notes twin goals, one for thinking: “the actual aim of the 
journey is the knowledge of pure Being” and one for being: “the goal was a state in which the 
Self extinguishes the world of Seeming and is freed of its separate existence.”253  Curd claims 
that “the subject of the routes of inquiry...is the genuine nature of a thing,” so the ultimate aim is 
knowledge of a the metaphysical criteria of “real” things.254   The specific end may be subject to 
interpretation, perhaps intentionally so, but broadly speaking there is an undeniable similarity 
with the “rough, steep path” that Socrates describes in the allegory of the cave (Republic 515e).  
There can be little doubt that the path to what-is leads in some sense from ignorance to 
enlightenment. 
Beyond purpose in human endeavors, Parmenides’ cosmology mixes natural and 
supernatural purposive explanation for particular phenomena and order of the cosmos when he 
says: 
αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πλῆνται πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο, 
αἱ δ᾿ ἐπι ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ ψλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα· 
ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἥ πάντα κυβερνᾶι· 
πάντων γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει 
πέμπουσ᾿ ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν τό τ᾿ ἐναντίον αὖτις  
ἄρσεν θηλυτέρωι 
 
For the narrower (rings) are full of unmixed fire, 
Those over these with night, and a portion of flame follows after. 
And in the midst of these is the deity who steers all things. 
For she rules over frightful childbirth and copulation of all things, 
Sending the female to mingle with the male and again contrariwise 
The male to mingle with the female (B12). 
 
Here Parmenides presents the familiar notion of a steered universe that is ubiquitous in early 
Greek philosophy.  For Parmenides, however, the deity who steers all things is not the 
                                               
253 Fränkel, “Studies in Parmenides,” p. 38 n. 14. 
254 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 49. 
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thunderbolt we find in Heraclitus or Anaximander’s apeiron, but the unnamed goddess.  The 
ambiguity of the text makes it difficult to determine what goddess Parmenides has in mind, 
particularly given the references to various divinities throughout the poem.  Parmenides specifies 
here that she steers the universe by dominion over the natural process of copulation, so the 
goddess may be justice, who naturally holds an esteemed place of rule.  Perhaps, Parmenides 
intends an expansion of the authority Hesiod grants to Justice: “Fishes and beasts and fowls of 
the air devour one another.  But to man, Zeus has given justice. Beside Zeus on his throne Justice 
has her seat.”255  With respect to the earlier portions of the poem, the different divinities such as 
Justice, Constraint, and Fate “appear as cognate agents in the containment of what-is.”256  
Contrasting Parmenides’ ἐόν with the external compulsion found in Anaximander and 
Heraclitus’ conceptions of the cosmos, Mourelatos notes that Parmenides’ notion is “an inner-
directed justice, innocent of the temptation of aggrandizement or of the spirit of ressentiment 
[that] draws on intrinsic rather than extrinsic sanctions and reward.”257  The idea of limits 
established through the poetic repetition of “the language of ‘bounds’, ‘fetters’, and ‘shackles’” 
suggests how the cosmos is “steered,” but by combining these images with the “divine notion of 
πίστις,” the result is in fact a cosmos guided through limits by “gentle persuasion.”  That is, as 
Mourelatos argues, “it is not only “inevitable” and “fated” and “just” that the real should lie 
within the bounds circumscribed in B8; it is also “agreeable” that it should do so. The real 
identifies with its limits or bounds and accepts them willingly.”258  Subtly then, Parmenides 
modifies the early Greek assumption that the cosmos and man operate in a parallel fashion by 
                                               
255 Works and Days, II. 276-281. 
256 Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 152. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid., p. 153. 
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advancing a notion of justice grounded in “civilized agreement and positive teleology.”259  In 
stark contrast with Homer and Hesiod, and paving the way for Plato and Aristotle, the cosmos is 
not so hostile to man after all.  
CONCLUSION: PARMENIDES’ IMMEDIATE LEGACY 
The history of the concept of nature in early Greek philosophy takes a sharp turn with 
Parmenides, or rather, the path forks considerably in the wake of the Eleatic’s poem.  As a result 
of the revolutionary division Parmenides makes between the “being” and “becoming” of nature,  
the concept of nature employed in explanations by subsequent philosophers becomes bifurcated 
in similar, though not identical, ways.  The next two chapters examine the essential “pluralist” 
thinkers who develop their theories in the wake of Parmenides’ significant influence.  These 
different thinkers, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Philolaus, and Democritus, are frequently 
understood as attempting to make good on Parmenides’ critical arguments by properly 
identifying the fundamental building blocks of nature in a way that allows for multiplicity and 
change.  From the perspective of the concept of nature, however, these thinkers accept another 
starting point: the “nature” of anything is in some sense bifurcated between what something is 
and the process by which things become what they are.  By teasing these facets apart, 
Parmenides has reformed earlier convoluted concepts of nature that imprecisely combine, or 
haphazardly employ, the “identity” aspect and the “process” aspect of nature. This model of 
“being” and “becoming” as distinct but interrelated facets of the concept of nature is at the heart 
of the theories of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Philolaus. Although the theories offered by the 
pluralists accentuate different features, processes, and mechanisms according to which nature 
operates, and thus is defined, each is nevertheless marked by the two distinct “halves” of the 
                                               
259 Ibid. 
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concept of nature that diverge in the wake of Parmenides’ poem. The next chapter turns to 
tracing the emergence of this bifurcated concept of nature in three very different thinkers and the 
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Chapter 5: The Early Greek Pluralists and the Bifurcation of Nature 
We are instinctively willing to believe that by due attention, more can be found in nature than that which is observed 
at first sight. But we will not be content with less. What we ask from the philosophy of science is some account of 
the coherence of things perceptively known. 
       –A.N. Whitehead 
The philosophical views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles are often taken as a direct 
response to the arguments presented by Parmenides.260  The pluralist theories advanced by these 
thinkers are an attempt to make sense of a world of change while paying homage to Parmenides’ 
concept of what-is and the criteria that it entails for what constitutes an essential unity, or the 
“nature” of any actual thing.261  In a similar fashion, the first Pythagorean thinker whose written 
work survives, Philolaus of Croton, can also be understood as a pluralistic response to 
Parmenides’ ideas.262  Specifically, the changes Parmenides makes in the way “nature” is 
conceived lead to pluralist responses that bifurcate the concept of nature in various ways.  This 
chapter shows how this occurs in the accounts offered by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and 
                                               
260 Few scholars reject the notion that the pluralists were in some way responding to, or incorporating arguments 
used by, Parmenides; for perhaps the most notable example, see M.L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, 
p. 219.  Not surprisingly, however, although most scholars generally accept the fact that Parmenides’ ideas impact 
the pluralist thinkers that follow him, they are deeply divided with respect to the extent of that influence.  For 
discussions that deal specifically with Anaxagoras and Parmenides, see David J. Furley, “Anaxagoras’ Response to 
Parmenides,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. II (1976): 61-85 and Montgomery Furth, “A 
‘Philosophical Hero?’ Anaxagoras and the Eleatics,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991): 95-129.   For 
commentary that assigns various degrees of Parmenidean influence to Empedocles’ ideas, see Brad Inwood, The 
Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with an Introduction (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 
1992), pp. 24-33; Denis O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments and Secondary 
Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 239-249; Catherine Osborne, “Empedocles Recycled,” 
Classical Quarterly 37 (1987): 24-50, at 49-50; and M.R. Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 29-30.  For extended discussions that argue for a much greater degree of 
Parmenides’ influence on Empedocles and Anaxagoras, see Patricia Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, pp. 128-171, 
and John Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 225-317.   
261 The interpretation offered here follows from my reading of Parmenides’ poem in the previous chapter and is 
indebted to the “predicational monism” reading offered by Patricia Curd in The Legacy of Parmenides. 
262 Barnes calls Empedocles and Anaxagoras the first “neo-Ionians,” PP, vol. 2, p. 5, and Graham contends that such 
a term “allows us to class philosophers of Italy and Sicily, such as Philolaus and Empedocles, with later 
philosophers from Ionia, such as Anaxagoras.”  See Daniel W. Graham, “Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses 
to Parmenides,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 159-180, at 177 n.1.  For an account that interprets Philolaus’ arguments as a direct 
response to Parmenides, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Eleatic Conventionalism and Philolaus on the Conditions of 
Thought,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 83 (1979): 63-108.  
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Philolaus.  Prior to Parmenides, early Greek thinkers who considered nature can be classified as 
those who understood it as material or structural components and those who instead emphasize 
the process or becoming element of nature.  Another way to think of this would be to see the 
divide as between those who conceive of nature as “stuffs” and, alternatively, as “powers.”263  In 
all likelihood, this division corresponds to the identity and growth facets of φύσις, and yet at 
best, one could argue that both elements are included in any one earlier theory only in a very 
rudimentary way.  By distinguishing and properly situating these different aspects of nature, 
Parmenides initiates a significant shift in how nature is understood, but the pluralists go further 
in dividing and then combining the two facets into unified concepts of nature.264  With such a 
move, the purposiveness that has operated in the background of the previous theories emerges in 
much more explicit ways.  The “becoming” facet of nature, that is, the “power” that brings about 
change, exhibits explicitly purposive imagery. Empedocles’ Love (φιλότης) and Strife (νεῖκος), 
Anaxagoras’ Nous, and Philolaus’ἁρμονίη each demonstrate purposive qualities in their 
respective roles in the construction of all things, albeit in very different ways.  This chapter thus 
analyzes the different directions that the concepts of nature and purpose take in these three 
figures and their philosophical responses to Parmenidean monism.   
The three views may be sketched very generally as follows.  Empedocles uses the idea of 
“roots” (ῥιζώματα) and mixture (μίξις) as material constituents of everything combined with the 
notions of Love and Strife as purposive forces.  Although also associated with mixture, 
Anaxagoras’ pluralism travels a different course as he argues for homeomerous substances as the 
essential building blocks which are mixed and molded by his concept of Nous.  Finally, the most 
                                               
263 See Patricia Curd, “Where are Love and Strife? Incorporeality in Empedocles,” in Early Greek Philosophy: The 
Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. Joe McCoy (Washington D.C., Catholic University Press, 2013), pp. 
113-138, at 122. 
264 Ibid., p. 123. 
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oft-overlooked pluralist thinker among the Presocratics, Philolaus constructs his account of φύσις 
as the limiters and unlimiteds brought together by an inherent ἁρμονία.  In short, among the 
pluralists here discussed, nature emerges alternatively and nearly simultaneously as 1) the ratio 
of fundamental elemental constituents, 2) the predominance of a single ingredient in a 
homeomerous mixture, and 3) the ratio as a specific relation of limiters and unlimiteds.  Thus, 
through the following analysis of the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Philolaus, I argue 
that the pluralists most clearly illustrate the significant degree of differentiation and resulting 
rapid evolution in the various early Greek notions of nature.  Despite the diversity, each concept 
of nature is bifurcated into what constitutes the ratio or relation on the one hand, and what 
produces it, on the other.  The latter facet, I will argue, assumes an increasingly purposive role in 
the formation and guidance of all things, laying important foundations for the more significantly 
teleological accounts of nature found in Plato and Aristotle.    
EMPEDOCLES OF ACRAGAS 
In a period of philosophical history marked by interesting, sometimes extreme characters, 
there can be little doubt that Empedocles of Acragas is the most colorful figure.  Tales of his 
exploits range from the miraculous, as when he supposedly brings a woman back from the dead, 
to the politically prescient, as when he shirks his aristocratic birthright to defend democratic 
ideals, to the simply outrageous claim that he leapt to his death in a volcano to prove his divinity.  
He is variously described as a doctor, politician, and renowned poet, though some of these 
descriptions may be self-aggrandizing exaggerations based on the claims found in his own 
poetry.265  He certainly shows no lack of confidence in his own abilities, claiming a 
transcendence for himself when he says: “I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal, go 
                                               
265 See Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, p. 7. 
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among all, honoured just as I seem: wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands” (ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑμῖν 
θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα, ταινίαις τε 
περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις, B112, 4-6).266  Renowned for his rhetorical skill, and 
oftentimes considered more a mystic than philosopher, Empedocles aims at the broadest of 
syntheses of the different strands of Greek culture.267  Using the masterful language of the poets, 
he blends “Eleatic metaphysics, Ionian physics and cosmology, and Orphic-Pythagorean 
religious doctrine” into his account of the origin and growth of the cosmos.268   
Unlike most of his Presocratic contemporaries, a great deal of Empedocles’ written 
material survives the ravages of history.  Unfortunately, scholars remain perplexed about the 
attribution of these fragments to specific works.  The long-established view holds that recovered 
fragments could be attributed to two principal poems, On Nature (Peri Physeos) and 
Purifications (Katharmoi), though scholars seldom agree on which fragments should be assigned 
to which poem.  Even this view may presume too much, however, as another frequent point of 
dispute is whether there were really two poems at all, or merely two parts of a single poem.269  In 
                                               
266 All translations of Empedocles’ fragments are taken from Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, unless 
otherwise noted. 
267 Aristotle, however, is much less impressed than most with Empedocles’ poetic skill and offers criticism of 
Empedocles’ “long circumlocutions,” “ambiguous utterances” and “vague generalizations,” see Rhetoric 1407a35-
1407b1.  For an account that emphasizes Empedocles’ mysticism, see Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, 
and Magic: Empedocles and the Pythagorean Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
268 Graham, TEGP, p. 328. 
269 Guthrie provides a succinct history of the reception of the two poems in HGP, vol. 2, pp. 124-128.  More recent 
scholarly opinions cover the range of the spectrum.  Osborne argues in favor of a single poem, “Empedocles 
Recycled,” pp. 24-27.  Inwood asserts that “no broad consensus has yet appeared on this topic,” suggesting that we 
should accept Osborne’s “one poem hypothesis,” but admitting there is not much evidence for this conclusion, The 
Poem of Empedocles, pp. 8-10. In light of the discovery of the Strasbourg papyrus in the mid-1990s, Oliver 
Primavesi offers a much more optimistic take as he suggests that “the artificial fog surrounding the Hellenistic 
catalogue of Empedocles’ work has been dispelled.”  Primavesi, who played a vital role in the translation of the 
material from the papyrus, contends that the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of a single poem.  See 
“Empedocles: Physical and Mythical Divinity,” in The Oxford Handbook in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. Patricia 
Curd and Daniel W. Graham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 250-283, at 250.  Patricia Curd 
presents a more cautious perspective, adopting an agnostic stance on the “counting issue” and instead contends only 
that the Strasbourg discovery “suggests that the division between the subject matters...is not as stark as some have 
supposed.”  See “A New Empedocles? Implications of the Strasburg Fragments for Presocratic Philosophy,” 
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recent years, these old debates have found new life with the discovery of the Strasbourg papyrus, 
an ancient scroll containing fragments of Empedocles’ poem.270  Though his ideas on nature are 
intermingled with religious imagery and poetic diction, Empedocles advances a theory of the 
four basic elements that will serve as the basic scientific understanding of the essential building 
blocks of the cosmos for over two thousand years.271     
THE ROOTS AND MIXTURE 
 Empedocles’ suggestion that four elements—fire, air, water, and earth—comprise the 
essential constructive units of the universe was remarkably groundbreaking.272  Although 
previous thinkers had speculated about the “foundational” status of various individual materials, 
Empedocles is the first to combine them into a basic pluralist scheme.  He labels these 
fundamental elements “roots” (ῥιζώματα), a simultaneous acknowledgment of both their original 
and organically foundational status.  Likening the roots to particular Homeric gods, he says, 
“First, hear of the four roots of all things, gleaming Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus 
and Nestis, who moistens with tears the spring of mortals” (τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα 
πρῶτον ἄκουε· ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ᾿ Ἀιδωνεύς, Νῆστις θ᾿ ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει 
κρούνωμα Βρότειον, B6).  In their fundamental nature then, the roots seem to possess the divine 
                                               
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 17 (2001): 27-49, at 28.  See pp. 29-32 for a 
fuller discussion of the “two poems problem.” 
270 See Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi, L'Empédocle de Strasbourg:(P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665-1666) (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1999).  While M.F. Burnyeat calls the discovery of the Strasbourg papyrus the “find of the 
century,” Peter Kingsley takes aim at the tendency to overinflate the value of this discovery, offering a far more 
sober assessment in his extended discussion. See M.F. Burnyeat, “Of Love and Strife: Startling new light on the 
Presocratic universe,” Times Literary Supplement, (May 28, 1999), pp. 7-8, and Peter Kingsley, “Empedocles for the 
New Millennium,” Ancient Philosophy 22 (2002): 333-413.  For other accounts that evaluate the impact of the 
Strasbourg papyrus on Empedocles studies, see also Catherine Osborne, “Rummaging in the Recycle Bins of Upper 
Egypt: A discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L'Empédocle de Strasbourg,” Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy (2000) 18: 329-356, and Patricia Curd, “A New Empedocles? Implications of the Strasburg Fragments 
for Presocratic Philosophy.”  
271 Empedocles’ four elements theory holds sway until Robert Boyle directly challenges it as untenable in the 
Sceptical Chymist in 1661. 
272 Aristotle credits Empedocles with being the first to articulate this scheme in Metaphysics 985a31–3. 
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quality of a primordial reality.273  Perhaps in an effort to naturalize religious custom, Empedocles 
may conceive of the roots as “new gods” that are “worthy of wonder” primarily because of “their 
eternal and unchanging nature.”274   
Empedocles begins his story of the cosmos with an account of unity, plurality, and the 
movement of the roots: 
  δίπλ᾿ ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μὸνον εἶναι  
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ᾿ αὖ διέφυ πλέον᾿ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι, 
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος,  
 
I shall tell a double tale. For at one time [they] grew to be one alone 
from many, and at another, again, [they] grew apart to be many from 
one—fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air, (B17, 
16-18) 
 
Discussing the relationship of the roots with one another, Empedocles elaborates, noting that 
certain elements “dominate as the cycle goes around” (ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο 
κύκλοιο, B26, 1), and then subsequently “shrink into each other and grow in the turn[s assigned 
by] destiny” (καὶ φθίνει ἐις ἄλληλα καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης, B26, 2).  He further affirms the 
fundamental reality of the ῥιζώματα when he describes the way they interact in the production of 
other phenomena: “For these very things are, and running through each other they become 
humans and the kinds of other beasts” (αὐτα γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι᾿ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γιγνοντ᾿ 
ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν, B26, 3-4).  He makes a key distinction between “the things 
that are real (the roots)” and the “temporary phenomena that result from the mixing...of the 
                                               
273 In this regard, Martin West compares Empedocles to his near contemporary Theagenes of Rhegium, suggesting 
that both aimed at “interpreting the Homeric deities as allegories of the physical world.”  See “Early Greek 
Philosophy,” in The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 113-123 at 
119.  For a brief account of the dispute in the ancient tradition “as to which element is characterized by which 
divinity,” see James Longrigg, “The ‘Roots of All Things’,” Isis 67.3 (1976): 420-438, at 422-423.  
274 Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, p. 22.  Wright contends that Empedocles merely follows the 
philosophical tradition in an innovative way in his “aim to replace the traditional myths with a more seemly logos 
about the gods,” and that the “equality of power” of the roots mimics Homer’s description of the “equality of 
privilege and allotment of power enjoyed by Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades,” pp. 22-23.  
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roots” when he reiterates: “But these very things are, and running through each other they 
become different at different times and are always, perpetually alike” (ἀλλ᾿ αὔτ᾿ ἔστιν ταῦτα, 
δι᾿ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γιγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα, B17, 34-35).275  
Empedocles’ division between those things that “are” and those things that “become” reflects the 
division Parmenides makes in the nature of things.276  And in fact, Empedocles provides ratios of 
roots for certain kinds of natural things: “And pleasant earth in here well-built channels received 
two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight and four of Hephaistos; and they become white 
bones fitted together with the divine glue of harmony” (ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι 
τὰς δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μοιράων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ᾿ Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ᾿ ὀστέα λευκὰ 
γένοντο, ἁρμονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίῃσιν, B96).  The distinction between what-is, the 
roots, and what becomes, natural phenomena, is made possible by the plurality of the roots.  Yet 
only the nature of the roots is truly persistent, all else is merely a temporary combination of roots 
in particular ratios.  For Empedocles, nature so conceived means that “knowledge of the roots 
and the forces can lead to a principled understanding of the phenomenal world.”277  His account 
of the true nature of things also allows Empedocles to correct a misconception when he says: 
οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο, 
ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι, 
τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, 
πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ᾿ εἰσιν  
 
A man wise in his thoughts would not divine such things: 
That while they live what they call life 
For so long they are, and have good and evil things, 
But before they are formed as mortals and <when> they are 
dissolved, they are nothing. (B15) 
 
                                               
275 Curd, “Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality,” p. 43. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
 154  
 
Mortals, like all else in the phenomenal world, exist always as roots.  On certain occasions, they 
are mixed into the form of humans, other times separated out into pure roots, but, at no time are 
they “nothing.”  Only fools, Empedocles implies, could arrive at such a conclusion.  
The reality of the roots implies that the basic condition of the cosmos is not a unity but a 
plurality of fundamental substances.  In light of the supposed Parmenidean attack on plurality, 
and the apparent persuasiveness of this account, however, the lack of any argument by 
Empedocles aimed to legitimately establish the plurality of roots is striking.  Instead, 
Empedocles simply ignores the question as he adopts and incorporates Parmenidean arguments 
into his own cosmology, in particular the denial of generation and corruption.  This may be 
because Empdocles does not take Parmenides to be attacking plurality, but establishing the true 
nature of what-is.  Taking direct aim at the connection between φύσις and generation, 
Empedocles suggests that growth and decay are at best misnomers and at worst anthropomorphic 
projections: 
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐπέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάτων 
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή, 
ἀλλὰ μὸνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων 
ἔστι, φύσις δ᾿ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. 
 
I shall tell you something else: there is no growth (φύσις) of any of 
all mortal things,  
neither any end of destructive death, 
But only mixture and separation of mixed things 
Exist, and growth (φύσις) is a term applied to them by men. (B8)  
 
If φύσις is understood as the origin and growth of something from nothing, then it does not exist. 
Undeniably, however, a process exists by which things come to be what they are, and it is 
through this process that Empedocles principally seeks his own reform of the concept of nature 
as origin and growth.  The “nature” of any thing is nothing more than roots combined through 
mixture (μίξις).  Echoing his claim elsewhere that “birth” is conventional in his account of the 
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“double story” of the cosmic cycle, Empedocles fully admits that he himself submits to the 
linguistic habits of the conventional ways of discussing the ideas of birth and growth contained 
in φύσις: 
οἱ δ᾿ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ᾿ είς αίθέρ᾿ ἵ κωνται 
ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων  
ἠὲ κατ᾿ οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τὸ λέγουσι γενέσθαι, 
εὖτε δ᾿ ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ᾿ αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον· 
ἧι θέμις οὐ καλέουσι, νόμωι δ᾿ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός 
 
And men, when as these things are mixed together they come to 
Aether in a man, 
Or in the race of wild beasts or of bushes 
Or birds, then <they call> it birth [or: coming to be], 
And when they are separated, this in turn they call pitiful fate; 
They do <not> speak rightly, but I myself concur in the custom.278 (B9) 
Not only is φύσις as birth or growth only a “term applied to them by men” in lieu of the actual 
process of mixture, but death is the customary placeholder of the actual process of separation. 
Empedocles’ view of nature is also more temporally extended than those views that place great 
emphasis on origin, as he also expresses contempt for those who hold similar misconceptions 
about death: 
νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, 
οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν  
ἤ τι καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντηι.  
 
Fools! Their reflections are not far-reaching,  
Who expect what was not before to come to be, 
Or that something will die out and perish utterly. (B11) 
 
Empedocles thus repeatedly belabors the idea that generation and corruption are “not real” if this 
means coming to be from, and returning to, nothing.  Failure to grasp this important distinction, 
Empedocles thinks, means one not only fails to understand how the natural world works, but the 
necessary implications for human life.  
                                               
278 Translation from Graham, TEGP, p. 349. 
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Although birth and growth presume a false point of origin as well as a false 
“completion,” this does not mean that there are no processes of becoming, strictly speaking, only 
that the actual processes have been misunderstood and mislabeled.  Empedocles’ reform of the 
idea of φύσις into μίξις centers on the idea that the roots have a fixed, stable “nature” in an 
absolute sense, as a genuinely real thing.  The other things we take to be entities, such as 
ourselves, are only a particular mixture of the roots “run through.”  The reflection of the 
“unenlightened” (νήπιοι) stops with what they observe, but Empedocles channels Parmenidean 
argumentation to support his claims: 
ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδάμ᾿ ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι 
καί τ᾿ ἐὸν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον· 
αἰεὶ γὰρ τῆι γ᾿ ἔσται, ὅπηι κέ τις αἰὲν ἐπείδηι. 
 
For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is 
not, 
and that what is should be destroyed is unaccomplishable and 
unheard of; 
for it will always be there, wherever one may push it on any 
occasion. (B12)  
 
Although an easy conclusion may be that Empedocles’ roots are simply a specification of 
Parmenides’ what-is and thus constitute the only real idea of nature in the pluralist’s views, while 
φύσις is merely a misleading convention, a look at additional fragments suggests a more 
complex picture.  In another elliptical fragment, however, Empedocles seems to claim that the 
φύσις of individual things is dispersed and thus possesses some kind of physical reality: “But the 
nature of the limbs has been torn apart, partly in a man’s…” (ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἡ 
μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός, B63).  Elsewhere still, he seems to hold out the possibility of nature dictating the 
development of a thing: “For these will grow in each character, according to its own nature” 
(αὐτα γὰρ αὔξει ταῦτ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι, B110).  The referent for 
“these” is unspecified, but the context indicates that Empedocles seems to be referencing 
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cognitive development in a way that parallels physical development.  The right kinds of ideas, 
and Empedocles here means his theory of nature as ratio of ῥιζώματα, can be conceived of as 
cognitive roots that will take on a life of their own and be nurtured so that “you will acquire 
many others” (B110, 4).  The alternative he presents is that one can fall into the old circular trap 
of generation and destruction by “reach[ing] out...for the ten thousand wretched things which are 
among men and blunt their meditations” (B110, 6-7).  Empedocles thus speaks of φύσις in 
several senses.  Sometimes φύσις is merely a customary label used by his contemporaries that 
signifies very little.  At other times for Empedocles, however, φύσις is a ratio of roots in a given 
mixture that governs individual growth.         
Given that Empedocles is one of the earliest philosophers to exhibit a recorded interest in 
medicine and the body, his concept of φύσις may have been developed more in contrast with 
other medical theorists and practitioners than with the conceptions developed by early Greek 
philosophers.  As with much of the chronology and authorship in the early Greek period, the 
Hippocratic corpus remains shrouded in mystery. Yet the notion of “nature” in the Hippocratic 
tradition is remarkably clear.  Rather than the result of philosophical speculation on the origin 
and development of the natural world, those thinkers generally grouped under this tradition 
developed a notion of nature based on the study of “the body, its affections and processes,” and 
the effects of various illnesses and substances on the human body.279  Of course, the boundaries 
between the disciplines of medicine and philosophy are not quite so clear cut at this early stage, 
as common interests result in a great deal of crossover such that the “medical writers” very often 
“emphatically put their investigations of the human body in a physicist and cosmological 
                                               
279  See Philip van der  Eijk, “The Role of Medicine in the Formation of Early Greek Thought,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, ed. Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 385-412, at 390. For a specific discussion of the “concept of nature and its relation to the divine” see pp. 
390-395.  
 158  
 
framework.”280  In seeking to develop natural explanations for various illnesses, the early 
medical writers must develop a notion of individual nature such that diseases, like epilepsy, often 
regarded as “demonic possession,” instead have a “nature” that can be readily identified.  
According to the author of On the Sacred Disease, understanding the nature of the disease as a 
cause allows for the development of a cure: 
This disease seems to me to be not in any respect more divine than 
the others. Rather, it seems to me that, just as other diseases have a 
nature out of which each originates, this one, too, has a nature and 
a cause, and it derives its divinity from the same things as the 
others and is no less curable than others.281 
 
Here the disease is described as having a nature as “origin,” but the author elsewhere describes 
epilepsy “as if the disease comes into being and grows like a plant, according to a definite, 
intrinsic pattern.”282  It is precisely this growth that the therapeutic remedies aim to prevent: 
“There is a risk however that the disease will be nourished and grow with the patient, unless 
appropriate remedies be used” (11.22-24).  For the medical authors, the φύσις of diseases like 
epilepsy is very real and acts as a cause in bringing about certain effects on the human body.  
While Empedocles equivocates on the causal power of φύσις, for the medical writers who 
oppose his theory, φύσις must always be grasped as a causal power that must at certain times be 
counteracted by medical practice.      
Even if it is only “called” φύσις by Empedocles, the nature of anything and everything is 
a fixed ratio that is the result of the mixture and separation of the ῥιζώματα.  Nature understood 
as such eradicates bad belief and fear of the “pitiful fate” which men believe awaits them on 
                                               
280 Ibid., p. 388.   
281 This passage is taken from On the Sacred Disease 2.1, the translation here is from van der Ejik, “The Role of 
Medicine in the Formation of Early Greek Thought,” p. 391.   
282 van der Eijk, “The Role of Medicine in the Formation of Early Greek Thought,” p. 391, citing On the Sacred 
Disease 13.13. 
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death.  But what is responsible for specific ratios, that is, the production of specific entities?  
Who or what dictates what mixture will take place, determining ratios or overseeing which 
combinations will arise and which will not?  Mixture alone is insufficient to explain why the 
natural world operates as it does.  In the wake of Parmenides’ arguments and his commitment to 
explaining the observable plurality in the cosmos, Empedocles commits himself to a theory 
which includes two constitutive elements very different in kind from the ῥιζώματα. These 
elements, Love and Strife, arguably mark the first representations of nature as a kind of force.  
LOVE AND STRIFE: PURPOSIVE FORCES OF NATURE 
Although he is the first to schematize the constituent elements into the now familiar 
group of four, it is Empedocles’ use of Love and Strife as forces that mix the roots, effectively 
shaping everything in the cosmos, that marks his theory as truly innovative.  While the 
conceptualization of the basic material nature of everything as consisting of four elements had a 
larger impact on the development of subsequent physical theories, the idea of the dual forces of 
Love and Strife garners much more attention from modern scholars.283  The dominant view is 
that Love and Strife are material in nature.284  Generally speaking, those who hold this view 
maintain that immaterial things were inconceivable for the Presocratics--everything must be 
made of something.  Others, like Rosemary Wright and Patricia Curd, go to great lengths to 
show that there are numerous examples in Presocratic philosophy of immaterial conceptions: 
                                               
283 Among the many contentious points in Empedoclean scholarship is the materiality of Love and Strife. Some 
scholars argue that all early Greek conceptions of “stuffs” are necessarily material.  Others extend this argument 
further by claiming that Presocratic philosophers could conceive of immateriality.  See Robert Renehan,  “On the 
Greek Origins of the Concepts Incorporeality and Immateriality,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 21 (1980): 
pp. 105-138 but also Martha Nussbaum, “ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, I,” Phronesis 17.1 (1972): 1-16 and “ΨΥΧΗ in 
Heraclitus, II,” Phronesis 17.2 (1972): 153-170.  For a recent and helpful synopsis of the corresponding views, see 
Curd, “What are Love and Strife? Incorporeality in Empedocles,” pp. 117-119.   
284 See Inwood, Poem of Empedocles, p. 38, Burnet, EGP, p. 232; KR, p. 330.   
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Xenophanes’ One God, Parmenides’ what-is, Heraclitus’ logos, and Anaxagoras’ Nous.285  Thus, 
the alternative view is to consider Love and Strife as immaterial forces that act on the roots in 
order to shape the natures of everything.  Waxing and waning in dominion, the conflicting forces 
of Love and Strife alternatively drive all things together or separate them, as Empedocles 
describes:  “And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time all coming 
together by love into one, and at another time all being borne apart separately by the hostility of 
strife” (καὶ ταῦτ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν᾿ εἰς ἓν 
ἅπαντα, ἄλλοτε δ᾿ αὖ δίχ᾿ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει, B17, 6-8).  The roots and forces both 
have an equally fundamental status: “For these things [roots and Love and Strife] are all equal 
and of like age in their birth, but each rules over a different prerogative and each has its own 
character and they dominate in turn as time circles around” (ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα 
γένναν ἔασι, τιμῆς δ᾿ ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ᾿ ἦθος ἑκάστῳ, ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι 
περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο, B17, 27-29).  
Empedocles conceives of the alternating dominion of Love and Strife as a cycle that 
perpetuates all existence.  The cycle is repetitive in its basic structure: the roots come together 
under Love, the union of all things results, and the roots separate under Strife.286  During the 
stages of rule of Love and Strife, all things are produced in the form of one or possibly two 
cosmogonies and zoogonies.  The existence of a second period of creation during Strife’s 
dominion is a contentious claim.  Aristotle holds that Empedocles did in fact suggest a second 
cosmogony, but that the Presocratic thinker had not thought through the implications of his 
                                               
285 See Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, pp. 32-33 and Curd, “Where are Love and Strife? 
Incorporeality in Empedocles,” pp. 114-115.  Philolaus’ conception of limiters and unlimiteds should be added to 
Curd’s list as they are principles which govern the material world without themselves being material in nature. 
286 Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, p. 41. 
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suggestion.287  Modern commentators, not surprisingly, have argued both for and against a 
second “zoogonical stage.”288  While some contend that Empedocles envisions the dominions of 
Love and Strife to be in every way equal, including in the production of living things, albeit in 
different ways, others suggest that only Love is capable of such creation.289  Although the 
particulars of the cycle Empedocles envisions may be perpetually in dispute, we should 
nevertheless avoid the mistake of presuming that Empedocles understands the cycle to be a kind 
of “eternal recurrence of identical events.”290   
Empedocles appeals to human experience in the broadest possible capacities to establish 
the prevalence of Love and Strife.  Sounding a familiar Presocratic refrain, he remarks that these 
cosmic forces have really been right in front of humans all along, if only they could see in the 
right way: “And you, gaze on her [Love] with your understanding and do not sit with stunned 
eyes.  For she is deemed even by mortals to be inborn in [their] bodies” (τὴν σὺ νόῳ δέρκευ, 
μηδ᾿ ὄμμασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς· ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροις, B17, 21-22).  
Empedocles infers a cosmic theory involving these two forces “from the observed fact that these 
have the greatest influence on the behavior of men.”291  More specifically with regard to Love, 
Empedocles suggests that it is “by her [that] they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of 
unity calling her by the names Joy and Aphrodite” (τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα 
                                               
287 See On the Heavens 301a14-19 for Aristotle’s critique. 
288  For interpretations that maintain the existence of a second creative period in Empedocles’ cosmic cycle, see 
O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle, pp. 196-236 and Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, pp. 40-48.  For 
an account that argues in favor of a single cosmogony and zoogony, see A.A. Long, “Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in 
the Sixties,” in The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A.P.D. Mourelatos (Garden City: 
Anchor/Doubleday Press, 1974), pp. 397-425.  For a succinct summary of the controversy, see Graham, 
“Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides,” pp. 161 and 178 n. 5. 
289 See Sarah Broadie, “Rational Theology,” pp. 216-217. 
290 This is how Barnes interprets Empedocles’ cycle, PP, vol. 2., p. 8.  For counterarguments see Geoffrey Brown, 
“The Cosmological Theory of Empedocles,” Apeiron 18 (1984): 97-110, and Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, p. 
40 n. 89. 
291 Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, p. 31. 
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τελοῦσι, Γηθοσύνην καλεόντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ᾿ Ἀφροδίτην, B17, 23-24).  Thus, both the activities 
of the natural world and human beings are governed by Love and Strife.  More specifically, Love 
guides those actions that aim for, or tend toward, unity, while Strife guides those that aims at 
division.  Empedocles elaborates when he says:    
τοῦτο μὲν ἀμ᾿ βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὄγκον· 
ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεθ᾿ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα  
γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῇ· 
ἄλλοτε δ᾿ αὖτε κακῇσι διατμηθέντ᾿ ἐρίδεσσι 
πλάζεται ἄνδιχ᾿ ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο. 
 
This is very clear in the bulk of mortal limbs: 
at one time we come together into one by love, 
all the limbs, [that is], which have found a body, in the peak of 
flourishing life; 
at another time again, being divided by evil quarrels, 
they [the limbs] wander, all of them separately, about the breakers 
of life. (B20) 
 
Empedocles thus broadens the possible approaches to the study of the nature such that “the study 
of human behavior enables one to understand the nature of the cosmic principles.”292  Far from 
rejecting sense experience, as Parmenides seems to have done, Empedocles expands the role the 
senses and experience play since they facilitate access to both the roots and Love and Strife.293 
The inherent differences in the way Empedocles describes Love and Strife, on the one 
hand, and the ῥιζώματα on the other, provide the clearest indication that Empedocles understands 
both facets as co-present yet equally primordial facets of nature.  As forces, Love and Strife are 
known and defined by their actions, by what they produce.  By supposing two different, 
competing forces, Empedocles affords nature the power to govern multiple processes of change.  
His concept of nature thus not only expands what nature can do, it expands what the concept of 
nature can explain.  True generation from nothing may be impossible, but the observable fact of 
                                               
292 Ibid., p. 32. 
293 For passages that suggest sense experience enables knowledge of the roots, see fragments B5, B96, and B98. 
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change seems inescapable.  The dual forces explain both kinds of perceivable change by acting 
as efficient causes with a particular intent, as Wright notes: “Love is good insofar as she is the 
efficient cause of good, her agency resulting in a desirable state of affairs, whereas the 
consequences of the working of Strife are deplorable, though inevitable.”294  If Empedocles’ 
contribution to the idea of nature is the conceptualization of nature as a force that both mixes and 
separates, to what extent can we understand Love and Strife to be purposive forces?  
 The conception of forces as acting without an end, that is, simply shaping or pushing a 
body in a purely mechanical way is possible, but this is not at all how Empedocles describes 
Love and Strife.  Instead, he views these forces as functionally defined by the ends that they 
seek.  Love as a unifying force seeks total unity, or “the One,” as its final goal.295  Likewise, 
Strife is defined by the absolute dispersion that is its aim, fulfilling its telos as an established 
duty at the appointed time: 
αὐτὰρ επεὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐνι μελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη, 
ἐς τιμάς τ᾿ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο, 
ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ᾿ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου 
 
But when strife had grown great within its limbs 
And leapt up to its prerogatives, as the time was being 
accomplished 
Which has been established for each in turn by a broad oath (B30) 
 
Empedocles speaks in multiple passages of the “prerogatives” or “offices” (τιμαί) of Love and 
Strife, thereby reinforcing the idea of the rule of Love and Strife.  The “established” rule of each 
is marked by the effect produced on the roots and compounded mixtures.  Each force is therefore 
separately purposive in the sense that the ends are immanent within the forces themselves, but 
also in that over the course of time, the rule of each force is characterized by movement toward a 
                                               
294 Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, p. 31. 
295 Friedrich Solmsen, “Love and Strife in Empedocles’ Cosmology,” Phronesis 10.2 (1965): 109-148, at 111. 
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particular end.  Insofar as there are alternating ends at which all things must aim, that is absolute 
unification or total dispersion, all things in the cosmos are continuously being directed toward 
one or the other end.  Instead of a single end, Empedocles produces a dual telos in nature.      
Empedocles also deliberately imports purposive imagery into some of his descriptions of 
Love and Strife. In a way that anticipates Aristotle, Empedocles discusses nature as an artist.  
The forces of Love and Strife are depicted as painters that “take in their hands many-coloured 
pigments, mixing them in harmony, some more, others less” (οἵ τ᾿ ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα 
φάρμακα χερσίν, ἁρμονίῃ μιξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ᾿ ἐλάσσω, B23, 3-4). The pigments are 
the ῥιζώματα and “from them they prepare forms resembling all things, making trees and men 
and women and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish and long-lived gods, first in their 
prerogatives” (ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ 
γυναῖκας, θῆράς τ᾿ οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς, καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῇσι 
περίστους, B23, 5-8).  Individual natures are an aesthetic collaboration of these poetic forces to 
produce specific mixtures of the ῥιζώματα that humans, for better or worse, label as the φύσις of 
a thing.  As an aesthetic creation, each individual mixture that both comes together and slowly 
separates thus bears the mark of its artists, Love and Strife.    
Beyond each individual force, the perpetuation of the cosmos as a whole is purposive.  
As a never-ending cycle between Love and Strife, continued existence is itself an end of the 
processes of mixture and dispersion.  Empedocles supposes dual ends but ultimately one end—
the cyclic endurance of the cosmos where unity spawns multiplicity and multiplicity produces 
unity.  And so Empedocles may agree with Nietzsche that “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is 
existence and the world eternally justified.”296  And this matches Empedocles’ own poetic 
                                               
296 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 38.  
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commitments, as one commentator puts it: “Imaginative vividness took hold of [Empedocles] 
with more persuasiveness than did logical consistency, and he inevitably baffles minds not 
constituted like his own.  The important thing in understanding him is to stop thinking at the 
right moment.”297 
ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE 
Perhaps on account of the shared influence of Parmenides and their mutual fascination 
with mixture, it is rare to find modern discussions of Empedocles without mention of 
Anaxagoras somewhere nearby.  Of the relation between these two thinkers, Aristotle famously 
claims that “Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, earlier than him [Empedocles] in date but later in his 
works, declares that the principles are infinitely many” (᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῇ μὲν 
ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὢν τούτου τοῖς δ᾿ ἔργοις ὕστερος ἀπείρους εἶναι φησι τὰς ἀρχάς, Metaphysics 
984a10-13). The curious phrase “later in his works” has alternatively been suggested to mean 
either that Anaxagoras was born before but began his philosophical career after Empedocles or 
simply that Aristotle believes Anaxagoras’ ideas “to be later and worth less.”298   In answering 
Parmenides’ challenge, Anaxagoras also uses the idea of mixture that figures prominently in 
Empedocles’ theory but moves beyond the four roots when he enigmatically suggests that 
“everything is in everything,” thus the infinitely many principles Aristotle mentions.   
And yet, as fascinating as his theory of homeomerous mixture is, it is Anaxagoras’ 
description of a cosmic Nous that generates the greater interest among commentators both 
                                               
297 Clara Elizabeth Millerd, On the Interpretation of Empedocles (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1908), p. 21. 
Millerd continues: “On almost every problem his thought, when pushed beyond a certain point, presents 
contradictions and absurdities, up to that point it is singularly suggestive and clear,” p. 22. 
298 Alexander, Metaphysics, 28, 6.  For an account that defends the view that Aristotle considers Empedocles’ theory 
superior to Anaxagoras’, see Denis O’Brien, “The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,” Journal of Hellenic 
Studies 88 (1968): 93-113, at 97-105.  More recently, Mansfeld argues that Aristotle holds that Anaxagoras’ doctrine 
to be “more advanced” than Empedocles’, “although Empedocles’ work is more recent,” see Jaap Mansfeld, 
“Aristotle on Anaxagoras in Relation to Empedocles,” Philologus 155 (2011): 361-366, at 365.  
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ancient and modern.  In fact, of all of the early Greek philosophers, Anaxagoras is the one to 
whom the idea of purposive nature is most easily attributed, at least on the face of things.  
Perhaps establishing the aim of philosophical inquiry for the first time, Anaxagoras contends that 
the goal of best possible life is “to study the heaven and the order of the whole cosmos” (A30).  
In the Phaedo Socrates comments that Anaxagoras suggests that the universe was constructed 
according to the principle of arrangement for the best (Phaedo 97b8-98c2).  In rough outline, 
Anaxagoras holds that the infinite principles, or “homeomerous stuffs” as they are later called, 
are arranged and ordered by a cosmic Mind (Nous).  A primitive forerunner to theological 
notions as well as the Aristotelian notion of nature as a final cause, Nous guides the production 
of all things in the cosmos as a supreme intellect.  Nevertheless, ancient commentators, 
especially Plato and Aristotle, were sharply critical of the purposive failures of Anaxagoras’ 
theory.  On their view, he did not carry Nous far enough, nor was he clear about precisely how it 
operated in the arrangement of all things.  In the following section, I trace the way Anaxagoras 
bifurcates nature into the structure of homeomerous “stuffs” and the shaping force of Nous.  
Despite similarities with Empedocles’ theory, the concept of nature that emerges in Anaxagoras 
arguably has more in common with a much older notion of the nature of things.  For Anaxagoras, 
the nature of something is not a ratio of these fundamentals “stuffs” within a given mixture; 
rather, each entity is a mixture of everything and the nature of the individual is determined by the 
predominance of specific ingredients within that mixture.  Following this, I examine 
Anaxagoras’ fragments concerning Nous.  There I argue that, while his theory fails to live up to 
the teleological expectations of Plato or Aristotle, their recognition of implicit, if deficient, 
purposiveness illustrates a key shift in the development of the idea of purposive nature.  That is, 
following Anaxagoras, the purposiveness of nature is not simply being directed toward a 
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particular end, but rather the arrangement and operation of nature can now be conceived of in 
terms of what is best.         
SEEDS AND MIXTURE  
Anaxagoras presents his own naturalistic account of cosmic origins that appears to satisfy 
Parmenides’ criteria for what-is: 
ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα· καὶ 
γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ πὰντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν 
ἔνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος· πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ 
κατεῖχεν, ἀμφότερα ἄπειρα ἐόντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν 
τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει.  
All things were together, unlimited both in amount and smallness, 
for the small, too, was unlimited. And because all things were 
together, nothing was evident on account of smallness; for air and 
Aether covered all things, both unlimited, for these are the greatest 
among all things both in amount and in largeness.299 (B1) 
Beginning from a primal mixture of all things implies that “the things (whatever they are) that 
are in this mix neither came to be, nor will they pass away.”300  In fact, Anaxagoras uses some of 
the same principles as Empedocles in his critique of his contemporaries’ inadequate conceptions 
of generation and corruption:  
τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες· 
οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδε ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπὸ ἐόντων 
χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς 
καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι 
διακρίνεσθαι. 
The Greeks do not think correctly about coming to be and passing 
away; for no thing comes to be or passes away, but is mixed 
together and separated from the things that are. And thus they 
would be correct to call coming-to-be mixing together and passing-
away separating apart. (B17) 
                                               
299 All translations of Anaxagoras’ fragments are from Patricia Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and 
Testimonia, A Text and Translation with Notes and Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), unless 
otherwise noted. 
300 Curd, “Anaxagoras and The Theory of Everything,” p. 233.  
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Similarly to Empedocles, the processes are real, only poorly understood.  The similarities 
between the two are fairly limited, however, as Anaxagoras articulates a fundamentally different 
understanding of the physical world.  Much debated but with little consensus, Anaxagoras’ 
“system” involves several key principles that are interpreted in starkly different ways.  Rather 
than a determinate number of fundamental constituents, Anaxagoras suggests that “in everything 
there is a portion of everything” an idea made possible by the corollary that every “thing” is 
infinitely divisible.  Finally, the predominant ingredients in a substance are responsible for its 
most distinctive features.301  This last principle, I argue below, is Anaxagoras’ conception of the 
nature of anything, and it is a conception that itself relies on a compound of the oldest definition 
of φύσις with a post-Parmenidean emphasis on mixture as a new way to think about growth. 
The claim that “everything is in everything,” is nearly synonymous with Anaxagoras’ 
name.  Anaxagoras tells us that “since the shares of the large and the small are equal in number, 
in this way too, all things will be in everything” (καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ 
τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα, B6).  Offering further arguments, he 
contends, “since it is not possible that there is a least, it would not be possible that [anything] be 
separated, nor come to be by itself, but just as in the beginning, now too all things are together” 
(ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ᾿ ἂν ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ 
ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ, B6).  Anaxagoras expands on the identity of existing 
mixtures when he says: “Since these things are so, it is right to think that there are many different 
things present in everything that is being combined, and seeds of all things, having all sorts of 
forms, colours, flavours” (τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν 
                                               
301 For an account that breaks down Anaxagoras system into the preceding three tenets as the “hard core of 
Anaxagoras’ physics,” see Colin Strang, “The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras,” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 45 (1963): 101-118.   
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πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καί σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιὰς 
καὶ ἡδονάς, B4a).  Some scholars seize upon the idea of seeds, “rich in creative potency,” as 
Anaxagoras’ conceptual model not only for the original mixture out of which all things arose, but 
for how to think about “everything is in everything.”302  These seeds contain a bit of everything, 
thus allowing for the explanation of the development of particular features.  Driving home his 
point, Anaxagoras keenly asks, “For how could hair come from not-hair, and how could flesh 
come from not-flesh?” (πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρὶξ δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν διακρίνεσθαι;, 
B10).  Thus he claims that “things in the one world-order are not isolated from each other, nor 
are they cut off by an axe—neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot” (καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ 
οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδε ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ψυκροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, B8).  In fact, Anaxagoras offers only one exception to 
the principle of “everything is in everything” when he elsewhere clarifies: “In everything there is 
a portion of everything except mind. And in some things mind too is present” (ἐν παντὶ παντὸς 
μοῖρα ἔνεστι πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἔνι, B11).  
 Though the notion of mixture dominates Anaxagoras’ thought as well as Empedocles’, 
Anaxagoras understands the nature of any individual thing to be the predominance of a single 
ingredient in the mixture.  Anaxagoras asserts that “All Nous is alike, both the greater and the 
smaller.  Nothing else is like anything else, but each one is and was most manifestly those things 
of which there are the most in it” (νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ 
οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν, 
B12).  Aristotle helpfully summarizes Anaxagoras’ position by saying: “For nothing, they say, is 
purely and entirely white or black or sweet, or bone or flesh, but the nature (φύσις) of a thing is 
                                               
302 Gregory Vlastos, “The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras,” Philosophical Review 59 (1950): 31-57, at 32-41. 
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held to be that of which it contains the most” (Physics 187b4-6).  Elsewhere Aristotle clarifies by 
saying Anaxagoras “makes the homeomerous bodies elements--I mean bone, flesh, marrow, and 
those others whose parts have the same name as the whole” (On Generation and Corruption 
314a17).  Aristotle’s account reflects the dominant view in antiquity that the “stuffs” of 
Anaxagoras’ physics included everything that exists now.303  While this view is argued for, in 
various capacities, by a number of modern commentators, a competing interpretation holds that 
Anaxagoras only intends the opposites as the basic elements out of which all things are made.304  
A moderate interpretation walks a fine line between these views by arguing that one can 
understand the original “stuffs” to be somewhere in between everything that exists now and the 
essential opposites like hot, cold, dry and wet.305  Short of the discovery of new evidence, it 
seems there is no permanent resolution to this “unending debate.”  Fortunately, regardless of how 
questionable the precise range of “stuffs” may be, Anaxagoras seems clear in grasping the nature 
of anything produced from the primordial mixture as the principal ingredients.  This reflects an 
affinity with the oldest notion of nature as the “outward characteristic” of a thing.  All things 
possess respective dominant ingredients, because they possess all ingredients, from the 
beginning of time.  On this view, growth and change are a process of recombining new mixtures 
taken in by the thing.  Change is, in effect, the “re-sorting of ingredients.”306 
  
                                               
303 For modern commentators that, broadly speaking, hold such a view, see Barnes, PP, pp. 322-330, Montgomery 
Furth, “A ‘Philosophical Hero?’ Anaxagoras and the Eleatics,” pp. 95-129, and Guthrie, HGP, vol. 2., pp. 279-294. 
304 For proponents of this interpretation of Anaxagoras’ “stuffs,” see Brad Inwood, “Anaxagoras and Infinite 
Divisibility,” Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986): 17-33, Malcolm Schofield, Essay on Anaxagoras, pp. 68-79, and 
Gregory Vlastos, “The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras,” pp. 41-57. 
305 See Patricia Curd’s essay “The Original Mix and the Seeds,” in Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, pp. 157-171. 
306 David Furley, “Anaxagoras, Plato and the Naming of Parts,” in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of 
Alexander Mourelatos, ed. Victor Caston and Daniel W. Graham (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002), pp. 119-126, at 121. 
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NOUS AND THE PURPOSIVE POWER OF INTELLECT 
Although “everything is in everything,” Anaxagoras describes Nous as having a special 
status since it is “unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing” (νοῦς δέ ἐστιν 
ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, B12).  In light of these descriptions, 
Anaxagoras’ successors are full of both praise and criticism for his theory of Nous.  Famously, 
Socrates describes his initial encounter with Anaxagoras’ ideas in the Plato’s Phaedo as being 
pleased with the notion of Nous as the “arranger and the reason for everything.”  Believing this 
would lead to an account of how Nous had in fact “place[d] each thing in the best way,” Socrates 
nevertheless confesses disappointment because Anaxagoras fails to make adequate use of Nous 
as being responsible “for the ordering of things.” Likewise, in pointing to the failure of earlier 
theories, Aristotle explains the rise of thinkers like Anaxagoras on the principle that previous 
thinkers were unable to give “the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both in their 
being and their coming to be” (Metaphysics 984b11-12).  Anaxagoras was “like a sober man in 
contrast with the random talk of his predecessors” since he maintained that “Nous was present--
as in animals, so throughout nature--as the cause of the world and all its order” (984b15-20).307  
The criticism immediately follows, however, as Aristotle claims that Anaxagoras’ broad 
speculation makes him like an untrained fighter who sometimes gets in a lucky punch (98514-
15).  The Presocratic philosopher’s lack of explanatory discipline means that he “uses Nous as a 
deus ex machina in world making, and he drags it in whenever he is puzzled about the reason 
                                               
307 Aristotle locates the rudimentary foundations of such thought earlier, however, pairing Parmenides and Hesiod 
together as the earliest thinkers to suggest this kind of final cause.  For Hesiod, love is created third, behind chaos 
and earth.  Parmenides, on the other hand, maintains that “First of all the gods, she devised Eros” (πρώτιστον μὲν 
Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητισατο πάντων, B13).  Thus, beyond the ongoing steering of all things and the continued governance 
of all activities relative to the reproduction of all living organisms, the universe seems designed from its origins.  
Eros being “devised” (μητισατο) signals purposive effort in the construction of the universe, and the primacy 
indicates the intended effects of “love” as a final cause in the cosmos (984b24-32).  Anaxagoras’ Nous may be a 
closer parent to Aristotelian idea of purposive nature since it is associated more with reason than emotion. 
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why something is as it is necessarily, but in other cases he makes the causes of what happens 
everything except Nous” (985a18).  But what then are we to make of Nous?   
According to Anaxagoras, Nous derives its power from its unique unmixed status since 
“the things mixed with it would hinder it from ruling any object” (B12), and both Plato and 
Aristotle report this assessment.308  Defined by what it does, Nous first initiates the whirl which 
begins the process of separation of all things from the primal mixture:  
καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς 
ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· 
κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον 
ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι  
When Nous began to move [things], there was separation off from 
the multitude that was being moved, and whatever Nous moved, all 
this was dissociated; and as things were being moved and 
dissociated, the revolution made them dissociate much more. (B13) 
In addition to this, Nous is not only self-ruling (αὐτοκρατές), but it “has control over all things 
that have soul.”  Yet Nous not only controls all things but also “knew them all: the things that are 
being mixed together, the things that are being separated off, and the things that are being 
dissociated.”  The knowledge of Nous spans all time as it not only understands “whatever sorts 
of things were going to be, and whatever sorts were and now are not, and as many as are now 
and whatever sorts will be,” but also “sets all these in order.”  The ability of the cosmic force to 
control or order all things is a Presocratic commonplace; framing this force as one that “knows” 
all things is, however, a new feature.  Although other early Greek philosophers have conceived 
of ways that order is imposed by cosmic forces like Xenophanes’ one God, Heraclitus’ λόγος, or 
Empedocles’ Love and Strife, Anaxagoras’ Nous is characterized by the possession of 
knowledge in the task of setting all things in order.  The addition of the cognitive component 
                                               
308 See Cratylus 413c and On the Soul 405a15. 
 173  
 
implies that the cosmos is not merely guided by a natural purposive process, but knowingly 
mixed and ordered with the respective place and identity of all things in mind.  Frustratingly for 
Plato and Aristotle, as well as modern readers, Anaxagoras is not remotely as explicit about how 
Nous does this.  Certainly by comparison to what Socrates or Aristotle might have hoped for, the 
teleological nature of Anaxagoras’ Nous seems deficient. Yet in their critiques, both Socrates and 
Aristotle point to the possibility of a new facet of purposiveness in nature in Anaxagoras’ 
theory—that nature orders everything: “for the best.”  Although such a way of thinking about the 
cosmos is standard following Plato and Aristotle, among the Presocratic philosophers, 
Anaxagoras’ Nous understood in such a new way of thinking about the end of all things and one 
that starkly contrasts with the Homeric understanding of the cosmos.  Far from being hostile to 
man, and beyond merely being goal-oriented, as some earlier forms of purposive nature may be, 
a cosmos arranged and driven by Nous implies not just the usual “everything has its place,” but 
that this place is, in the sense of the whole, optimal.  As such, the prescriptive and normative 
powers of φύσις begin to expand, beyond determining what something will be, to indicating what 
should be.  Thus with the incorporation of Nous into his theory of nature, Anaxagoras opens the 
possibility of φύσις playing a more definitive role as a normative guide in the affairs of men. 
PHILOLAUS OF CROTON 
Often considered a minor figure in early Greek philosophy, Philolaus of Croton 
nevertheless represents history’s earliest Pythagorean since fragments attributed to him are the 
earliest surviving Pythagorean texts.  Readers familiar with Plato and Aristotle will recognize 
Philolaus’ theory of ἁρμονία of the soul as a rival view that figures in the Phaedo and the 
Timaeus dialogues as well as in Aristotle’s On the Soul.309  Although some commentators have 
                                               
309 See Phaedo 85e, Timaeus 35a-37a, and On the Soul 407b27-408a19.  
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argued that Plato invents this theory and Aristotle merely mimics his teacher’s account, it is more 
likely that Plato “is giving more definite formulation of previous trends of thought.”310  The most 
well-articulated account of ἁρμονία prior to Plato is from Philolaus.  And yet, ἁρμονία for  
Philolaus extends far beyond psychological discussions to the very origin and arrangement of the 
cosmos.  For Philolaus, ἁρμονία governs and shapes all things in the natural world.  In this 
section, I examine Philolaus’ conception of φύσις as the fitting together of limiters and 
unlimiteds via ἁρμονία.  Adapting a bifurcated view of nature between basic structural but non-
material facets and an inexplicable cosmic force that orders those facets in the construction of all 
things, Philolaus in effect redefines nature as a specific kind of relation.  This relation, conceived 
on the model of ratio as relation, as opposed to ratio as recipe in Empedocles, accounts not only 
for what something is, that is, a kind of internal relation governed by internal harmony, but also 
its place within the cosmos itself, governed by an overarching cosmic ἁρμονία, that is, an 
external relation governed by external harmony.  
NATURE’S CONSTRUCTION: LIMITERS AND UNLIMITEDS 
Although we have no specific account of how he arrived at his theory, Philolaus’ work 
likely originates from a critical assessment of basic assumptions in previous notions of nature, 
namely, by raising the question along the following lines: what if the defining feature of the 
central constructs, the “matter” of nature, are not material at all?  Pursuing his answer in the 
wake of the challenges presented to φύσις in Parmenides and Empedocles, Philolaus announces a 
new understanding of φύσις when he begins his book by saying, “The nature in the world-order 
was constructed of unlimiteds and limiters, both the whole world order and everything in it” (ἁ 
                                               
310 Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 105 n. 5.  For those who argue that Plato invents the theory of ἁρμονία, see 
H.B. Gottschalk, “Soul as Harmonia,” Phronesis 16 (1971): 179-198 and William Charlton, “Aristotle and the 
harmonia Theory,” in Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies Presented to 
David M. Balme on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Allan Gotthelf (Pittsburgh: Mathesis, 1985), pp. 131-150. 
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φύσις δ᾿ ἐν τῶι κόσμωι ἁρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων, καὶ ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν 
αὐτῶι πάντα, B1).311  The elements or “stuffs” are not the defining features of the nature of 
everything; instead, nature begins on an even more basic level, with the minimal attributes that 
allow for anything at all to be “composed.”  Embedded in such a suggestion is an implicit 
criticism of previous accounts since Philolaus evidently holds that more than this cannot be said 
about the basic components of nature.  Theories of nature that imply that “all things are water,” 
or condensed/rarefied air, or a mixture of the four roots presume far too much, on Philolaus’ 
view.     
Of the fundamental constituents of nature, Philolaus argues they must be two rather than 
one when he says, “It is necessary for existing things to be all either limiters or unlimiteds, or 
both limiters and unlimited, but not in every case only unlimited” (ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα 
ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐκ ἀεί, B2).  This division 
extends throughout the cosmos as the general principle by which all things are what they are: 
“Now since it is evident that they are not made up of all limiters or all unlimiteds, it is clear then 
that both the world order and the things in it are constructed from both limiters and unlimited” 
(ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ᾿ ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ᾿ ἐξ ἀπαίρων πάντων, δῆλον τἆρα 
ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι συναρμόχθη, B2).  Philolaus 
derives these basic principles by means of reason and experience: “The actions of things also 
make this clear.  For the things composed of limiters limit; those from both limiters and 
unlimited both limit and do not limit; and those from unlimited will appear to be unlimited” 
(δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων περαίνοντα, τὰ δ᾿ ἐκ 
περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντι, τὰ δ᾿ ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα 
                                               
311 All translations of Philolaus’ fragments are from Graham, TEGP, unless otherwise noted. 
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φανέονται, B2).  While Schofield complains that Philolaus “fails to disclose even the identity of 
the limiters and unlimiteds he has in mind, and thereby emasculates his argument,” it seems 
plausible that for Philolaus, the structural facets of nature are differentiated only by active 
properties, rather than inert, and more readily describable, attributes like materiality.312  Walter 
Burkert maintains that a “close relationship” between the atomists and the Pythagoreans means 
that limiters and unlimiteds can be identified with “material atoms and the ‘empty’ interstices, 
which do yet ‘exist’.”313  Schofield suggests tentatively that limiters are odd numbers, while the 
unlimiteds are even numbers.314  Barnes, on the other hand, asserts that shapes may be the 
limiters and masses of “unformed stuff” are the unlimiteds.315  Though each bemoans the silence 
of the doxography on the subject, the lack of specific examples or further details may be because 
Philolaus believed that the vague descriptions of limiters and unlimiteds was, plausibly, the most 
one could confidently say about the components of nature.  In essence, limiters allow for 
enumeration and specification within the continuum of a particular unlimited.  The nature of any 
entity must contain the two fundamental elements, as Hussey explains “Whatever stuff an 
individual is thought of as being ‘made of’ is in itself not ‘bounded’: for it might be present in 
any quantity.  But for there to be an individual, there must also be a ‘bound’.”316   
In a number of ways, nature for Philolaus is equally grounded on the model of artifice 
and growth.  Rather than a principle of identity through blended mixture, Philolaus conceives of 
the identity facet of nature as a specifically constructed interplay between the “opposing” 
                                               
312 KRS, p. 326. 
313 Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, ed. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 259. 
314 KRS, p. 326.  This is largely drawn from Aristotle’s observation in Physics 203a10. Schofield thinks Aristotle a 
credible source that accurately reflects Pythagorean views; Barnes does not. 
315 PP, p. 86. 
316 Hussey, “The Beginnings of Epistemology,” p. 33. 
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elements of limiters and unlimiteds found in each thing.  This “fitting together” is not an organic 
mixture but rather understood on the model of particular, numerically-oriented arrangement.  
Thus, the ratios involved may therefore be even more easily quantifiable than the “recipes” of the 
roots that Empedocles offers (see B96).  At the same time, however, Philolaus seems to conceive 
of becoming in terms of the more organic model of seeds: “For all things sprout and grow from 
seed” (πάντα γὰρ ἀπὸ σπέρματος καὶ θάλλοντι καὶ βλαστάνοντι, B13).  Although we have no 
synthesis of these ideas in the fragments themselves, one plausible explanation is that Philolaus 
understands seeds of all things to contain a blueprint of the specific ratio of limiters to unlimiteds 
that effectively maps out how the entity will be come into being and grow in specified ways. 
Philolaus keenly points out that the idea of knowledge itself presupposes a division 
between limiters and unlimiteds: “There will not be anything at all that will know, if all things 
are unlimited” (ἀρχὰν οὐδὲ τὸ γνωσούμενον ἐσσεῖται πάντων ἀπειρων ἐόντων, B3).  Following 
Parmenides and others, Philolaus takes limit to be a principle of knowledge.  He suggests an 
important corollary to this idea when he says, “And indeed all things that are known have 
number. For it is not <possible> that anything at all should be thought or known without this” 
(καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ ὁτιῶν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε 
γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτω, B4).  In addition to narrowing the scope of the definition of φύσις to 
limiters and unlimiteds, Philolaus assigns an epistemological role to number.  As Carl Huffman 
summarizes, “the world is known through number, not made up of number.”317  And yet 
knowledge itself has its limits, specifically the third element of nature: the “fitting-together” or 
ἁρμονία of things. 
  
                                               
317 Carl Huffman, Philolaus of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic: A Commentary on the Fragments and 
Testimonia with Interpretive Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 68. 
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PURPOSE AND ἁρμονία 
Believing he has identified the basic conditions for both existence and knowledge, 
Philolaus clarifies the connection between his notion of φύσις and ἁρμονία: 
περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἁρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· ἁ μέν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὰν ἁ φύσις θείαν γα καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν πλάν γα ἤ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τ᾿ ἦν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων 
καὶ γιγνωσκομένων ὑφ ἁμῶν γεγενῆσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τᾶς 
ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὦν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν 
περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων.  
Concerning nature and harmony, this is how it is: the essence of 
things, being eternal, and nature itself admit of divine but not 
human knowledge; except that it is not possible that any of the 
things that exist and are known by us could have come to be unless 
the essences of things, from which the world order is composed, 
existed—namely, limiters and unlimited. (B6) 
Specific knowledge of ἁρμονία as it relates to φύσις is limited to the divine but the difference in 
the natures of limiters and unlimiteds, what Philolaus calls the ἀρχαὶ, means that unified 
existence cannot be explained without ἁρμονία: 
ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ᾿ ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἤδη 
ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρμονία ἐπεγένετο 
ὡιτινιῶν ἅν τρόπωι ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα 
ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ 
ἰσοταγῆ, ἀνάγκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁρμονίαι συγκεκλεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλοντι 
ἐν κόσμωι κατέχεσθαι. 
 And since the sources were not alike nor of the same kind, it was 
impossible for them to be organized unless a harmony came upon 
them, in whatever way it did. Now things that were alike and had 
of the same kind had no need of harmony, but things that were 
unlike and of a different kind and rank, these had to be combined 
by harmony, if they were to be held fast in an arrangement. (B6) 
Similar to Heraclitus’ notion, Philolaus’ concept of ἁρμονία binds together two contraries, in 
effect producing or constructing the entity in question.  But Philolaus’ notion of ἁρμονία goes 
beyond Heraclitus’ because it supposes the entire cosmos to be so constructed, not just 
identifiable individual entities.  Though the paucity of evidence provides little in the way of 
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examples from Philolaus, he offers this principle as the foundation of his cosmology, saying, 
“The first thing constructed, the one in the middle of the sphere, is called the hearth” (τὸ πρᾶτον 
ἁρμοσθέν, τὸ ἕν ἐν τῶι μέσωι τᾶς σφαίρας, ἑστία καλεῖται, B7).  He describes the coming-to-be 
of the unified cosmos as a process that radiates outward from this central construct: “The world 
order is one.  It began to come to be at the middle, and from the middle upwards in the same way 
as downwards, <and> the things above the middle are arranged opposite to those below” (ὁ 
κοσμος εἶς ἐστιν, ἤρξατο δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἄχρι τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἀπο τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τῶν 
αὐτων τοῖς κάτω <καὶ> ἔστι τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω, B17).  Another 
substantial difference with Heraclitus’ conception of a hidden ἁρμονία, is that Philolaus’ limiters 
and unlimiteds are not bound together in a tension that produces an attunement, but something 
closer to the model of a harmonic scale.  The universe is a harmony in its very multiplicity and 
the unity produced is one of every part being in harmony with every other part.   
While Philolaus is necessarily vague regarding how the “harmony came upon them” 
since this is beyond the scope of human knowledge, happening as he says “in whatever way it 
did,” it is the idea of number that gives humans access to the ἁρμονία in the cosmos.  In 
painstaking detail, Philolaus describes a comprehensive harmony by which the various parts are 
all mathematically related to all other parts:  
ἁρμονίας δὲ μέγεσθός ἐστι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι ᾿ ὀξειᾶν. τὸ δὲ δἰ ὀξειᾶν 
μεῖζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόωι. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας εἰς μέσσαν 
συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσσας πότι νεάταν δι ᾿ ὀξειᾶν, ἀπο δὲ νεάτας ἐς 
τρίταν συλλαβά, ἀπο δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι ᾿ ὀξειᾶν. τὸ δ᾿ ἐν 
μέσωι μέσσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον, ἁ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ 
δι ᾿ ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον. οὕτως ἁρμονία 
πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι ᾿ ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ 
δίεσις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δύ ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις  
The magnitude of the harmony is the fourth and fifth. The fifth is 
greater than the fourth by a ratio of 9:8.  From the lowest tone to 
the middle is a fourth; from the middle to the highest is a fifth.  
From the highest to the third string is a fourth, and from the third 
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string to the lowest is a fifth.  The interval between the middle 
string and the third string is in the ratio 9:8, the fourth is in the 
ratio 4:3, the fifth 3:2, and the octave 2:1.  Thus the harmony is 
five tones and two semitones.  The fifth is three tones and one 
semitone.  The fourth is two tones and one semitone (B6a). 
For Philolaus, ever the Pythagorean, the specificity and universality, that is, the consistency of 
application of the harmony throughout the cosmos, provides all the experience one needs in 
order to recognize that all nature is arranged as a harmonic ratio.  One can both perceive the 
harmony as well as quantify and reconstruct it through number.  Without a doubt, Philolaus 
believes he has given a far clearer account than the pluralists who precede him.  After all, we can 
imagine him asking Empedocles: how do we know this is the recipe for bone?  In a similar 
fashion, he might ask Anaxagoras regarding the mixture of infinitely small ingredients, if they 
are infinitely small, how can we know they exist as such?  By contrast, Philolaus presents a 
harmony that is remarkably consistent and identifiable.  Number plays the crucial role in making 
such limited knowledge possible, allowing for the recognition of the universal ἁρμονία, though 
also opening up the theory to an inaccurate oversimplification that “all things are number.”318     
But how is Philolaus’ notion of harmony purposive?  Freely admitting that humans can 
give no account of why such harmony exists, or precisely how it works, Philolaus maintains that 
the attunement running throughout the cosmos is in some sense divine.  The basic notion of 
ἁρμονία, however, is not just any principle of arrangement, but arrangement as an excellence, 
that is, one that is perfectly attuned.  According to Aristotle, the mysterious ubiquitousness of 
harmony in humans leads many to draw the conclusion that the soul is a kind of harmonia: 
“There seems to be in us a sort of affinity to musical models and rhythms, which makes many of 
the wise say that the soul is a harmony, others, that it possesses harmony” (Politics 1340b17-19).  
                                               
318Metaphysics 986a1-13.  See also Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, p. 39, and pp. 57-74. 
 181  
 
The idea of attunement as a means of explaining multiplicity and unity is an attractive one and 
perhaps one of the reasons music education figures so prominently in the political schemes of 
both Plato and Aristotle.  The idea of an excellence in the ancient world is closely connected 
with the concept of relation, as Aristotle clearly illustrates: 
We say that all excellences depend upon particular relations. Thus, 
bodily excellences such as health and fitness we regard as 
consisting in a blending of hot and cold elements in due 
proportion, in relation either to one another within the body or to 
the surrounding; and in like manner we regard beauty, strength and 
all the other excellences and defects. Each of them exists in virtue 
of a particular relation and puts that which possesses it in a good or 
bad condition with regard to its proper affections, where by 
“proper” affections I mean those by which the thing is naturally 
produced or destroyed. (Physics 246b3-10) 
This principle of harmony as an attunement of excellence extends throughout the entire cosmos 
for Philolaus. That is, for Philolaus, the natural world is not a never-ending aesthetic cycle of 
existence but rather the harmony of existence is the perpetually excellent arrangement of all parts 
of the cosmos in relation to one another.  Individual things must be what they are in order to “fit-
together” in the harmony of the cosmos, and though they may move and change, the harmony as 
a necessary relation moves and changes along with them.  It is in this way that cosmos itself 
always aims at the most excellent arrangement of all things.  
CONCLUSION: STRUCTURE AND FORCE IN NATURE 
 Commentators have often made much of the dual facets of the pluralists’ accounts, albeit 
separately.  What has been less consistently appreciated is the degree to which this bifurcation 
follows in the wake of Parmenides’ modifications to the concept of nature as well as the specific 
ways it plays out in different concepts of nature among the pluralists.  Although each thinker 
recognizes the need to give an account based on a concept of nature that can simultaneously 
explain both what something is, that is, its structural components, and how it became that way, 
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that is, its force components, they modify the conceptual features of the idea of nature differently 
in order to do so.  Drawing from different aspects of the human experience, each thinker in effect 
discovers a different way of thinking about nature.  
Nature for Empedocles is a precise ratio of the roots drawn together into a single entity 
by Love and slowly unfolding or separating in a process governed by Strife.  Though mixture 
factors into Anaxagoras’ theory of nature, the identity of anything is not conceived of as a ratio, 
but rather as the predominant ingredient in the mixture of “everything in everything.”  In this 
way Anaxagoras combines perhaps the oldest understanding of φύσις, as the “dominant or 
outward appearance of a thing” with new theories of mixture that avoid the problems of 
generation and corruption.  In a similar fashion, Philolaus conceives of φύσις as a specific 
relation of limiters and unlimiteds as the fundamental constituents of anything and everything.  
The nature of all things in the cosmos, and by extension the cosmos as a whole, is thus “fitted-
together” into a precise harmonious relation.  Not only is the concept of nature sufficiently 
diverse among the pluralists, but we might also argue that each develops the concept of Nature as 
a larger collective force.     
Understood in such a way, the pluralists’ theories of nature illustrate two broader 
conclusions about the concept of nature in Early Greek philosophy.  First, the diversity in the 
fundamental facets of the idea of nature among the pluralist theories serves as perhaps the 
clearest evidence yet that there are numerous variations of the concept of nature in early Greek 
philosophy.  As an explanatory concept, nature as ratio is significantly different from nature as 
predominant ingredient, and this too is a completely different way of conceiving of the natural 
world from a harmonious relation that fits together limiters and unlimiteds, as Philolaus 
contends.  Perhaps more importantly for the present study, however, is that the pluralists’ 
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theories illustrate a much greater explicit purposiveness than the preceding Presocratic theories 
of nature.  In short, more dynamic concepts of nature are required in order to provide more 
comprehensive explanations in the wake of Parmenides’ arguments.  The connection with 
epistemological questions also comes into sharper focus, particularly with Philolaus’ criticisms 
that harness elements of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides to consign the knowledge of 
some things to the divine.  Taken together, these two conclusions illustrate a significant shift in a 
kind of common concept of nature to a normative force that not only describes the cosmos in a 
fundamentally teleological way, but is capable of rivaling convention (νόμος) as a prescriptive 
guide for human life.   
Turning now to Philolaus’ contemporary, Democritus, we find a very different pluralist 
theory in ancient Greek atomism.  Peripatetic accounts beginning with Aristotle typically present 
the atomist as a vocal opponent of the idea of purposiveness in nature, but in the few fragments 
concerning his physical and epistemological theory, Democritus displays caginess in avoiding 
the use of φύσις rivaled only by Parmenides.  Coupled with the frequent and perplexing use of 
φύσις in his ethical fragments as a normative concept with peculiarly purposive features, it seems 
that Democritus’ idea of the nature of things is not quite as straight-forward as readers of 
Aristotle have been led to believe.   
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Chapter 6: Democritus and the Tale of Two Natures 
  We have our philosophical persons to make modern and  
       familiar, 
       Things supernatural and causeless. 
–Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well (ii.3.2-3) 
For many of the Presocratic philosophers it is difficult to untangle the threads of poetry, 
mysticism, and science.  Nevertheless, Democritus is credited with developing a strictly 
mechanical explanatory framework that could be said to render the natural world “modern and 
familiar” in place of the “supernatural and causeless.”319  He intends, as one commentator puts it, 
to “be rid once and for all of the mysterious, semi-religious external forces, which previous 
philosophers, and even more markedly his own contemporaries had postulated as the efficient 
causes of their systems.”320  Not surprisingly, philosophers in the early modern period reach back 
to Democritus as an exemplar in their own attempts to eradicate Aristotelian forms of natural 
explanation that seem too closely intertwined with supernatural causes.321  The traditional 
narrative thus presents the early atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, as the bulwark against the 
conceptual connection between nature and purpose that permeates the early Greek intellectual 
landscape in the various capacities thus far discussed.  Conceiving of the nature of things as 
entirely reducible to atoms implies a deterministic causal framework, as Leucippus suggests 
when he says, “Nothing happens in vain, but all things happen for a reason and from necessity” 
                                               
319 Leucippus is often considered the founder of ancient atomism but most credit Democritus for developing the 
theory in any kind of substantial capacity.  For accounts of Democritus as mechanistic thinker, see Guthrie, HGP, 
vol. 2, pp. 414-419, Barnes, PP, vol. 2, pp. 40-75, KRS, pp. 402-433.  
320 Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 121. 
321 While Francis Bacon praises all the Presocratic philosophers as he denigrates Aristotle, he holds Democritus in 
particularly high esteem, arguing that Democritus’ school “penetrated more deeply into nature than the others,” The 
New Organon I.LI.  While Descartes’ philosophy undeniably shares common points with atomism, the Frenchman 
was dismayed at frequent comparisons made between the two, saying in a letter to his friend Mersenne, “I wonder at 
those who say I have written only a patchwork of Democritus, and I would like them to tell me from what book I 
could have taken those patches, and if anyone has ever seen any writings where Democritus has explained salt, 
hexagonal snow, the rainbow, etc., as I have,” as translated by Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), p. 119.  The original may be found in Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. III, 
Charles Adam and Paul Tannery eds., (Paris: J. Vrin., 1899), at 166. 
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(οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης, 67B2).322  By using the 
phrase “happens for a reason,” Leucippus does not mean that “there is a governing mind” but 
only that “everything has an explanation.”323  Aristotle informs us that the rejection of 
purposiveness in nature extends to Leucippus’ student as well when he says “Democritus, 
ignoring the final cause, refers all the operations of nature to necessity” (Generation of Animals 
789b2).  Lack of historical evidence, however, makes it difficult to determine the precise nature 
of Democritus’ account since his extant fragments do not present the term necessity (ἀνάγκη) in 
connection with his physical theory, nor is it clear whose views he may have been responding to 
or rejecting by making such assertions.324  Some have interpreted his strictly mechanical 
description of the workings of the cosmos to be a reaction to Socrates’ purposive understanding 
of the cosmos, while others have argued that it is more likely that Socrates’ “theological notion” 
is in fact a reaction against atomic mechanism.325  In either case, scholars have not questioned 
Democritus’ commitment to the idea of φύσις as atoms and the corresponding mechanistic 
explanation of natural phenomena.   
Strangely enough, however, φύσις is entirely absent from those extant fragments dealing 
with Democritus’ physical and epistemological theory.  While this lacuna may be due to a lack 
of surviving B-fragments, nevertheless it is a curious and inescapable fact that the account that 
explicitly links φύσις with the basic tenets of early Greek atomism is found only in the 
                                               
322 Translations of Leucippus and Democritus’ fragments are from C.C.W. Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and 
Democritus: Fragments A text and translation with a commentary, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 
unless otherwise noted. 
323 PBS, p. 320. 
324 Guthrie points out that Democritus’ use of both ἀνάγκη and τύχη is limited to the ethical fragments, HGP, vol. 2., 
p. 415, n. 3 and n. 5.  No discussion of “necessity” or “chance” with respect to the physical theory survives in the 
extant fragments.  Interestingly, however, both terms show up repeatedly in the ethical fragments. 
325 David Sedley argues that, rather than conceiving Democritus’ ideas as a rejection of Socrates’ theological notion, 
it is more likely that the reverse is true; see Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, pp. 134-135. Of course, one can 
look much further back than Socrates to see the entanglement of divinity and the idea of nature; see my discussions 
of the Milesians and Xenophanes in Chapters 1 and 2.  
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Aristotelian tradition.  Regardless of whether Democritus aims to undermine the animism of 
earlier Greek theories of nature, or is simply tracing the logical implications of the atomic theory 
for questions of causality, the inevitable conclusion from the Peripatetic reading of Democritus’ 
views is that purposiveness in nature is at best a mistake and at worst a fiction by which human 
beings consciously and unnecessarily deceive themselves.  And yet Democritus’ ethical 
fragments tell a very different tale; there φύσις is ubiquitous and presented as both knowable and 
thoroughly purposive.   
The broader subject of the relationship between Democritus’ physical and ethical theories 
has been the subject of a fair amount of debate, particularly in the mid-20th century.  The views 
argued for in the early and mid-20th century literature run the gamut from those who think there 
is little or no connection to those that suggest a very tight integration of the ethical with the 
physical.326  This chapter focuses on examining the two very different concepts of nature that 
emerge in the fragments of Democritus.  The first section of the chapter explores the idea of 
nature in the testimonia and fragments from Democritus which deal with his epistemological and 
physical theories, albeit in a limited way.  Despite a broad association between φύσις and atoms 
in the subsequent tradition, no such link exists in the few extant fragments from Democritus. 
Instead, Democritus uses ἐτεή, a term of his own invention, to describe atoms and void as a 
fundamental yet opaque reality.  I argue that he deliberately avoids the use of the term φύσις in 
order to advance his atomistic theory of nature that fits with Parmenidean metaphysical criteria, 
                                               
326 For the former, see Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study; for the latter see Gregory Vlastos, “Ethics 
and Physics in Democritus (part I),” Philosophical Review 54 (1945): 578-592 and“Ethics and Physics in 
Democritus (part II),” Philosophical Review 55 (1946): 53-64, and C.C.W. Taylor, “Pleasure, Knowledge, and 
Sensation in Democritus,” Phronesis 12: (1967): 6-27.  Although Vlastos and Taylor both argue for substantial 
connections between the ethical and physical theories, Taylor advocates only a “structural parallel,” while Vlastos 
seeks to develop a much tighter connection.  Taylor later modifies some of his critique of Vlastos’ reading while 
nevertheless refusing to accept the view “that there are law-like connections between physical and ethical 
descriptions,” see The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, p. 233.  
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while simultaneously creating the necessary space to repurpose φύσις as an ethical concept tied 
to how humans ought to live.  Turning then to the ethical fragments, I explore the ways 
Democritus’ concept of φύσις fits into his conception of the best life in prescribing the way 
humans ought to live.  On this reading, then, the link between φύσις and atoms is a Peripatetic 
anachronism that fails to distinguish appropriate nuance as Democritus retains φύσις only for 
more dynamic conceptions of nature that clearly contain distinctly normative features.  Instead of 
bifurcating nature into material constituents and motive force, as the other pluralists do, 
Democritus separates the atomic particle “reality” of the physical world from the purposive 
φύσις of human life. 
PHYSIS IN EARLY GREEK ATOMIC THEORY: THE ESTABLISHED STORY  
Aristotle and Theophrastus both attribute the founding of atomism to Leucippus, of 
whom precious little information remains. Cicero reports that “Leucippus postulated atoms and 
void, and in this respect Democritus resembled him, though in other respects he was more 
productive,” but the evidence for real differences in the theories is thin.327  Historically, some 
commentators have disputed the existence of Leucippus thanks to Epicurus, but more recently 
scholars have generally avoided the question.328  Of Leucippus’ two reported works, Great 
World System and On Mind, only a single fragment has survived, but the standard account of the 
relationship between Leucippus, Democritus and the founding of atomic theory is that Leucippus 
                                               
327 Academica priora, II, 37, 118, as cited in KRS, p. 403.  For a recent attempt to argue that there are substantial 
differences between the theories of the two atomists, see Daniel W. Graham, “Leucippus’s Atomism,” in The Oxford 
Handbook on Presocratic Philosophy, ed. Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 333-352.   
328 For Epicurus’ supposed skepticism regarding the existence of Leucippus, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of 
Philosophers, 10.13. The most famous debate regarding this question is between Rohde, Natorp, and Diels. See 
Erwin Rohde, “Ueber Leucipp und Demokrit [1],” Verhandlungen der Philologen-versammlung (1881): 64-89, and 
“Ueber Leucipp und Demokrit [2],” Jahrbuch für classiche Philologie (1881): 741-748; Paul Natorp, “Nochmals 
Diogenes und Leukippos,” Rheinisches Museum 42 (1887): 374-385; Hermann Diels “Leukippos und Diogenes von 
Apollonia,” Rheinisches Museum 42 (1887): 1-14. 
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sketched the broad strokes in Great World System and Democritus elaborated on it by providing 
a more detailed account of the theory in Little World System.329  Dating to Aristotle, the standard 
view understands the development of atomism as a response to Parmenidean monism, though it 
has sometimes been argued that atomic theory was asserted as a mediation or compromise 
between the monism of Parmenides and the pluralism of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.330  This 
reading understands the atomists to hold that nature on the broadest level is composed of “an 
infinite number of small particles” thereby plausibly illustrating that “pluralism is absolute” 
while simultaneously satisfying the criteria established by Parmenides’ what-is. Unlike the other 
pluralists, for the early Greek atomists “all the infinite particles are exactly similar in substance” 
and “each one of the particles is in itself a One.”331  Aristotle illustrates the plurality and unity in 
the atomic theory, connecting these specifically to the idea of φύσις when he says of atoms that 
“they are differentiated by their shapes, but their nature is one, just as if each were a separate bit 
of gold” (On the Heavens, 275b31).   
In the only surviving fragment from Aristotle’s lost work On Democritus, which was 
preserved in Simplicius’ commentary on On the Heavens, we have a substantial account of the 
connection between the movement and combination of atoms and the φύσις of a particular thing.  
There Aristotle asserts that “Democritus considers the nature of everlasting things to be tiny 
substances infinite in number” (Δημόκριτος ἡγεῖται τὴν τῶν ἀιδίων φύσιν εἶναι μικρὰς οὐσιας 
πλῆθος ἀπείρους, A37).332  Such knowledge must be derived from speculation since Democritus 
                                               
329 Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study, p. 37; KR, p. 403. 
330 KR, p. 401.  
331 Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study, p. 71.  Some commentators interpret Leucippus’ atomism as 
a response to Melissus, later developed more substantially by Democritus. Others suggest that Parmenides is the 
original target of Leucippus’ critique and inspiration for the subsequent development of atomic theory.  For brief but 
competing accounts of the precise origins of atomism, see Burnet, EGP, p. 335, KR p. 406, and Guthrie, HGP, vol. 
2, p. 392.  
332 Translation of A37 from Graham, TEGP, p. 527. 
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“believes the substances are so small as to escape our senses” (νομίζει δὲ εἶναι οὕτω μικρὰς τὰς 
οὐσιας, ὥστε ἐκφυγεῖν τὰς ἡμετέρας αἰσθήσεις, A37).  The fact that these tiny substances “have 
all kinds of forms, all kinds of figures, and differences of size” (ὑπάρχειν δὲ αὐταῖς παντοίας 
μορφὰς καὶ σκήματα παντοῖα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος διαφοράς, A37), suggests that “from these 
elements he creates visible and perceptible masses by compounding” (ἐκ τούτων οὐν ἤδη 
καθάπερ ἐκ στοιχείων γεννᾶι καὶ συγκρίνει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοφανεῖς καὶ τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς ὄγκους, 
A37).  But the movement of the atoms is such that “they conflict with each other and travel in the 
void because of their dissimilarities” (στασιάζειν δὲ καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν τῶι κενῶι δαί τε τὴν 
ἀνομοιότητα, A37) and yet “as they travel they strike each other and become entangled in such a 
way as to produce mutual contact and proximity” (φερομένας δὲ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ περιπλέκεσθαι 
περιπλοκὴν τοιαύτην, ἣ συμψαύειν μὲν αὐτὰ καὶ πλησίον ἀλλήλων εἶναι ποιεῖ, A37).  Relevant 
to the atomists’ idea of nature, Aristotle concludes: “but this does not in any way create a 
genuinely single nature from them.  For it is completely absurd to think two or more things could 
ever come to be one” (φύσιν μέντοι μίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν οὐδ᾿ ἡντιναοῦν γεννᾶι· 
κομιδῆι γὰρ εὔηθες εἰναι τὸ δύο ἢ τὰ πλείονα γενέσθαι ἄν ποτε ἕν, A37).  There are parallels and 
differences with the other pluralists here.  Only atoms technically have a “nature” in this sense--
the nature of anything is explicitly not a combination of the atoms that make it up.  But in the 
other pluralists the compounds do have some notion of a nature, that is, of an identity, even if 
these are composed of still more primary ingredients like Empedocles’ roots, or Anaxagoras’ 
ingredients, or Philolaus’ limiters and unlimiteds.  In those theories, the mixtures have an 
identity determined by ratio or priority of ingredient; yet, according to the Aristotelian 
interpretation of atomic theory, the identity of any entity is merely a conglomeration of atoms 
without discernible pattern or scheme of association.  Thus it is hard to see in the atomist theory 
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how this idea of nature functions to explain difference in the world in an identifiable way.  That 
is, what something is cannot be meaningfully connected to its φύσις. 
The nominal connection between atoms and φύσις is repeated in Simplicius’ commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics, as he develops an account of the movement of the atoms and the relation 
to the processes associated with nature: 
ταῦτα [τὰ ἄτομα] γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φύσιν ἐκάλουν καὶ ἔλεγον κατὰ τὴν 
ἐν αὐτοῖς βαρύτητα κινούμενα ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ εἴκοντος καὶ 
μὴ ἀντιτυποῦντος κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι· περιπαλάσσεσθαι γὰρ 
ἔλεγον αὐτα. καὶ οὐ μόνον πρώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνην ταύτην οὑτοι 
κίνησιν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀποδιδόασι, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τοῖς ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων· αὐξάνεσθαι γὰρ καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ 
γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι προσκρινομένων καὶ ἀποκρινομένων 
πρώτων σωμάτων φασίν.  
They called these [atoms] nature (φύσις) and maintained that they 
moved in place by using their own weight in the void which yields 
and does not resist; they said they scatter about. And they ascribe 
this to the elements not just as their primary, but as their only 
motion for they ascribe the other motions to compounds of 
elements. Thus they claim things increase, decrease, alter, come to 
be, and perish by the aggregation and segregation of the primary 
bodies.333  
On this account, which clearly follows Aristotle’s interpretation, atoms and nature are 
synonymous.  Beyond what something is, however, the concept of nature must explain why the 
entity behaves or moves in a particular way.  The atomist explains all the processes and motions 
of nature, previously either attributed to various inherent properties of the natural world or 
simply denied outright, to the “aggregation and segregation of the primary bodies.”  Yet motion 
is completely random, there is no regularity of why atoms move the way they do or why they 
combine with those they do and not others.  On this view, φύσις is merely a static descriptor, 
lacking any notion of an active principle that governs behavior, process, and growth, and instead 
                                               
333 Graham, TEGP, p. 537.  
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merely assigning limited motion directly to the atoms.  As a result, φύσις is effectively stripped 
of its explanatory power.  Some commentators suggest such a position may have been 
Democritus’ intent, as Guthrie notes when he says, “the materialism of Leucippus and 
Democritus has restored the idea of motion as nature to matter and hence belonging to it from all 
time, but from this conception they have removed the last traces of animism.”334  And yet the 
preceding interpretation of the tenets of atomism as connected with the account of φύσις is 
drawn entirely from the Peripatetic tradition, leading to the question: is this account corroborated 
or countered by Democritus’ own words concerning metaphysical and physical topics? 
NATURE (PHYSIS) AND REALITY (ETEĒ) IN DEMOCRITUS’ FRAGMENTS  
Despite the preponderance of evidence provided by the doxographical tradition, there are 
certain difficulties with accepting too readily this account of Democritus’ view of nature.  Curd 
expresses these worries succinctly when she characterizes the evidence of Peripatetic sources as 
“sketchy.”335  Aristotle is more forceful of his criticisms of the atomists than the other 
Presocratic philosophers because he judges that they omit crucial facets or fail to explain things 
in a way that would satisfy his requirements for a scientific explanation.336  Turning to the extant 
B-fragments that are not associated with ethics, only one instance of Democritus’ use of φύσις 
survives, and yet it is completely disconnected from any notion of atoms and void.  Instead, 
Democritus uses φύσις to indicate mortal participation in divine nature, saying, “Homer, by 
getting a share in the divine nature, accomplished the ordering of all kinds of verses” (῾´Ομηρος 
φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων, B21).  Although the precise 
understanding of φύσις in this fragment remains open to interpretation, it cannot mean the atomic 
                                               
334 Guthrie, HGP, vol. 2, p. 399. 
335 Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, p. 180. 
336 See On the Heavens 300b8 and Metaphysics 1071b31; also, Guthrie, HGP, vol. 2.  Even Francis Bacon, who 
generally offers high praise of Democritus, says of the Abderan that “in explaining his first motions [he] is to be 
ranked even below mediocre philosophers,” The New Organon, II. XLVIII.  
 192  
 
construction of divine beings.  According to the Aristotelian interpretation, such a conglomerate 
of atoms would not even be considered a “nature,” and even if this were possible, it is difficult to 
see how some atoms could be considered “divine” and not others.  The praise Democritus offers 
of Homer is instead connected to the kind of activity that defines divine beings, that is, an 
activity of arranging or ordering disparate parts into a unified whole that fits a specific pattern.  
The comparison between the order of the universe and the ordering of verses of poetry reinforces 
the creative quality associated with such a nature.  Moreover, the emphasis is also on the 
aesthetic quality inherent in such ordering.  By “getting a share” of this nature insofar as he does 
the same with various verses, Homer arranges words and phrases in a way that constructs a 
harmonious and beautiful whole out of disparate parts.  So conceived, nature as φύσις is 
something that applies to divine beings and indicates a choice-worthy behavior in which mortals 
can participate. This fragment raises obvious difficulties for the Aristotelian interpretation of 
Democritus’ conception of φύσις.  Either Democritus used the idea of φύσις haphazardly with 
little regard for consistency or he has a more sophisticated account of nature than was 
appreciated by the Peripatetics. 
 Instead of differentiating it from φύσις, Democritus contrasts convention (νόμος) with  
ἐτεή (reality) when he says: “By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, 
by convention cold, by convention colour; but in reality atoms and void” (νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ 
πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, B125).  The standard 
explanation that ἐτεή and φύσις are interchangeable is not satisfactory, despite Galen’s attempt to 
clarify by saying: “By the expression ‘by convention’ he means ‘conventionally’ and ‘relative to 
us’ not according to the nature of things themselves, which he calls by contrast ‘reality,’ forming 
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the term from ‘real’ which means ‘true’” (A49).337  Galen indicates that Democritus invented this 
word ἐτεή, raising the possibility that the atomist deliberately avoids using the term φύσις in 
conjunction with atoms and void.  But if Democritus’ intends to undermine purposive accounts 
of φύσις or even faith in the “truth” of convention, why avoid the term here?  Given the 
emerging φύσις-νόμος debate of the 5th century, Democritus could easily have reduced φύσις to 
nothing but atoms and void while simultaneously undermining the status of convention.   
Numerous additional fragments strengthen the suggestion that Democritus’ choice of ἐτεή is not 
accidental but rather is governed by a desire to deliberately reinforce the connection, or lack 
thereof, between nature and knowledge.  Linking his new term to the philosophical tradition, he 
says: “That in reality we do not know what kind of thing each thing is or is not has been shown 
many times” (ἐτεῇ μέν νυν ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν ἤ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίεμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδήλωται, 
B10).  Democritus’ avoidance of φύσις to identify individual nature, or “what kind of thing each 
thing is,” sounds remarkably Eleatic.  He strengthens his claim by suggesting that this knowledge 
“in reality is impossible” (B8), thus beyond the basic description of the fundamental 
characteristics of atoms and void, further knowledge is impossible.  Further describing 
epistemological limits in a way that channels Parmenidean thought, he displays a flair for the 
poetic when he says, “In reality we know nothing; for truth is in the depths” (ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδἑν 
ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια, B117).  But this contrasts with the picture of φύσις Democritus 
has presented in the fragment concerning Homer.  There φύσις is recognizable and knowable, 
both in the display of human activity and its connection to divine activity.  This contrast of 
obscure ἐτεή and knowable φύσις becomes even more apparent in Democritus’ ethical fragments 
as his account of the goal-driven good life hinges on φύσις being knowable by all. 
                                               
337 Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, p. 144. 
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If he is seeking to distinguish between the two, Democritus’ use of ἐτεή helpfully avoids 
the notion of growth contained in φύσις.  So nature as reality (ἐτεή) instead of φύσις preserves 
the idea of an obscured physical structure of things that identifies what-is rather than providing a 
blueprint for change or activity.  This critical distinction leads him to conclude that “By this 
principle man must know that he is removed from reality” (γιγνώσκειν τε χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ 
κανόνι ὅτι ἐτεῆς ἀπήλλακται, B6).  But this is a strange sentiment unless “reality” explicitly 
means atomic structure.  For in what other way would humans be separated from the real?  The 
nature of the fragment means that the exact principle to which Democritus refers remains vague, 
but a plausible explanation that connects the different strands of his epistemological fragments is 
that humans both live and know things primarily in a realm of change and becoming, according 
to their senses. So it is not only that the atomic structure or reality of things evades our 
knowledge because of its imperceptible nature, but the fact that humans are fixed in a realm of 
becoming also obscures our ability to perceive the static reality of atoms.  Thus, the realm of the 
senses, of becoming, naturally lends itself, in a Parmenidean way, to a clear divide between 
opinion and knowledge: “This argument too shows that in reality we know nothing about 
anything, but each person’s opinion is something which flows in” (δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ 
λόγος ὅτι ἐτεῇ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις, B7).  Strangely, 
Democritus elsewhere seems to hold out the possibility of a more authentic criterion for 
knowledge: 
γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι. ἡ μὲν γνησίη ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης 
μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις ἀκοὴ ὀδμὴ γεῦσις ψαῦσις, ἡ δὲ γνησίη, 
ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης. ὅταν ἡ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύναται μήτε ὁρῆν 
ἐπ᾿ ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὀδμᾶσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῇ 
ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ λεπτότερον 
There are two forms of knowledge, genuine and bastard. To the 
bastard form belong all these, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, 
but the genuine is separate from this…When the bastard form can 
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no longer see anything smaller or hear or smell or taste or perceive 
by touch, but to a finer degree… (B11) 
The fragment cuts off prematurely, but Democritus seems to differentiate here between sense 
perception and a more refined, “genuine” form of knowledge that goes beyond what is perceived 
or perceivable, perhaps something akin to speculation.  The reality of atoms is imperceptible, yet 
a higher reason allows for a speculation about the existence of the fundamental features of 
reality.  Given his repeated insistence that we “know nothing of reality” it is difficult to know 
how to piece these fragments together in a coherent theory of knowledge. The genuine 
knowledge may go beyond “each person’s opinion” in that it is “finer” and perhaps better 
substantiated, but the inescapable conclusion remains for Democritus that ἐτεή, as the 
fundamental “nature” or atomic structure of any individual thing, remains opaque to humans. 
In sum then, rather than linking atoms with φύσις, Democritus deliberately describes his 
fundamental particles as “reality” (ἐτεή), in a way that channels the Parmenidean arguments in 
the Alētheia.  Democritus’ atoms satisfy the metaphysical criteria Parmenides establishes for the 
real (ὄν), and maintains the Eleatic separation of this concept from the idea of nature as φύσις.  
Instead of linking φύσις with the ever-changing world of bodies or the physical structure of 
reality, however, Democritus’ single use of φύσις in fragments outside the ethical collections is 
connected much more closely with purposive human activity.  And it is this notion of φύσις that 
appears repeatedly in his ethical fragments. 
PHYSIS IN THE ETHICAL FRAGMENTS  
The absence of φύσις in the fragments concerning his physical and epistemological 
theory makes its frequent presence and varied use in the ethical fragments more intriguing.  If 
Democritus deliberately avoids using φύσις in conjunction with his theory of atoms, as I have 
argued, then the theoretical concept associated with φύσις has features that can only be 
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determined by closely reading his actual usage of the term in the appropriate context.  The 
following section draws out the concept of φύσις that emerges in Democritus’ ethical fragments.  
While some commentators have expressed doubts regarding the authenticity of the ethical 
fragments, they are now generally accepted by most scholars.338  As a multi-faceted concept 
absolutely vital to living the good life, φύσις cannot be reduced to atomic composition.  Further, 
while the reality (ἐτεή) of atoms is such that they are unknowable and utterly non-purposive in 
their random movements, the idea of φύσις that emerges in his ethical fragments is both 
knowable and purposive in its prescriptiveness.  Although some scholars, most notably Bailey, 
suggest otherwise, Democritus is certainly philosophically adept enough to understand the 
implications of his apparently competing claims.339  The conclusion I argue for is thus that 
Democritus effects a similarly intentional distinction with Parmenides’ division between the use 
of what-is for the fixed, metaphysical reality and φύσις for the changing, dynamic world, with 
the twist that for Democritus it is not physical or celestial bodies that are governed by φύσις but 
human action.    
In contrast to his contemporary Thucydides, who portrays social order as the defining 
norm in human life, Democritus “maintained that the way for the individual to secure his own 
good was to attend to his nature qua man.”340  The Abderan was thus the first thinker who 
“explicitly posited a supreme good or goal,” suggesting that each person strive to achieve 
                                               
338 For a brief historical analysis of the authenticity of the ethical fragments, see Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus 
and Democritus, pp. 223-227.  For a defense of the authenticity of the fragments, see R. Phillipson, “Demokrits 
Sittensprüche,” Hermes 59 (1924): 369-419. 
339 Bailey contends that Democritus fails to appreciate the “fundamental question of determinism” as he “proceeds 
to lay down his directions for the moral life with a simple naïveté, unconscious of the problem which he himself had 
raised by his insistence on the supremacy of ‘necessity’ in the physical world,” The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, p. 
188.   
340 Cynthia Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The invention of politics in classical Athens (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988), p. 192. 
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“cheerfulness” (εὐθυμίη).341  As a result, a historical caricature of the atomist as the “Laughing 
Philosopher” emerges and remains a popular image in art and literature through the Renaissance 
period, often portrayed in conjunction with Heraclitus, the “Weeping Philosopher.”  The 
tradition of pairing Heraclitus and Democritus together among the Presocratics as the definitive 
philosophers of contrary dispositions dates back at least as far as Sotion in the 1st century who 
reports that “among the wise, instead of anger, Heraclitus was overtaken by tears, Democritus by 
laughter.”342 A century later, Lucian satirizes the pair in the Sale of Creeds, linking Democritus’ 
atomism with the cheery dismissal of human cares:  
Democritus: “There is no taking [the affairs of men] seriously. All 
is vanity. Mere interchange of atoms and void.”  
 
Heraclitus: “I weep to think that nothing abides. All things are 
whirled together in confusion. Pleasure and pain, knowledge and 
ignorance, great and small; up and down they go, the playthings of 
Time.” 
Despite the satirical twists, however, Democritus’ notion of cheerfulness is nothing like the 
carefree picture Lucian paints, nor is there any explicit indication of the atomic theory in ethical 
fragments.343  Instead, cultivating a disposition of cheerfulness is a serious ethical goal that is 
intimately connected with the idea of one’s nature: 
τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν, μήτε ἰδίῃ μήτε 
ξυνῇ, μηδὲ ἅσσ᾿ ἂν πράσσῃ ὑπέρ τε δύναμιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωυτοῦ 
καὶ φύσιν· ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἔχειν φυλακήν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τύχης 
ἐπιβαλλούσης καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον ὑπηγεομένης τῷ δοκεῖν, 
κατατίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πλέω πορσάπτεσθαι τῶν δυνατῶν. ἡ γάρ 
εὐογκίη ἀσφαλέστερον τῆς μεγαλογκίης.  
                                               
341 C.C.W. Taylor, “The Atomists,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 181-204, at 197.  Most translators opt for “cheerfulness,” 
Graham, however, suggests that εὐθυμίη is better translated “contentment” since “cheerfulness” seems too narrow 
and emotional,” TEGP, p. 682. 
342 Stobaeus, III 20.53.   
343 The reading of Heraclitus is similarly misguided, since it rests “partly on Theophrastus’ well-known attribution 
to Heraclitus of μελαγχολία (Diog.L. IX, 6), by which, however, he meant ‘impulsiveness’ (see Aristotle’s 
description at Eth. Nic. H8, 1150b25) and not ‘melancholy’ in its later and its modern sense,” KRS, p. 183. 
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He who is going to be cheerful must not do many things, either in 
private or in public life, and in his choice of what he does must not 
exceed his own nature and capacity, but must be watchful, so that 
even when fortune seizes him and urges him further in his 
imagination, he sets it aside and does not attempt more than what 
is possible. For a good amount is safer than a great amount.  (B3) 
Democritus suggests that the key to living well is imposing limits set by one’s “own nature and 
capacity” on his activities.  Prescribing what is possible for individuals in a way that is both 
knowable and applicable to particular choices, individual nature acts as a counter-balance to the 
temptations of fortune (τύχη) which entice us into unwise ventures beyond our means.  A 
necessary step in being able to follow Democritus’ guidance, however, would be understanding 
one’s nature (φύσις) to the extent that the individual can use it to determine those endeavors 
which are actually possible and thus desirable.  Without such knowledge, the path to 
cheerfulness is impossible to follow.  Democritus reiterates the contrast between nature and 
fortune as guides for human action when he says: “Fortune gives great gifts, but is undependable, 
while nature is self-sufficient; so its dependable inferiority excels the greater advantage which 
one hopes for [sc. from fortune]” (τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ᾿ ἀβέβαιος, φύσις δὲ αὐτάρκης· διόπερ 
νικᾷ τῷ ἥσσονι καὶ βεβαιῳ τὸ μεῖζον τῆς ἐλπίδος, B176).  Allowing fortune to guide one’s 
actions means being governed by hopes and urges.  Nature, on the other hand, represents the 
moderate, steady approach that will never aim higher than it should.  The contrast is one of 
imagination and capacity, the former resting on wishes for future possibilities, the latter 
grounded on knowledge of capabilities based on existing disposition, strengths, or character.  In 
addition, one must wait on fortune, ever at its mercy for opportunity to present itself clearly, 
while nature provides a more durable, ever-present, dependable guide.344  
                                               
344 Graham, TEGP, p. 683. 
 199  
 
Elsewhere, instead of fortune, Democritus contrasts nature with habit or practice: “More 
people become good by practice than by nature” (πλέονες ὲξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ 
φύσιος, B242).  Practice is the more dominant normative force in human life, but the 
comparative πλέονες indicates Democritus’ belief that φύσις does have the power to make some 
people good.  In at least some cases, then, nature plays the dominant role in governing how 
individuals will turn out; that is to say, φύσις is inevitably partially responsible for change.  In 
another passage, Democritus connects the pedagogical role for nature with the idea of 
development when he contends that “There is understanding among the young and lack of 
understanding among the old; for it is not time which teaches one to think, but mature 
development and nature (ἔστι που νέων ξύνεσις καὶ γερόντων ἀξυνεσίη· χρόνος γὰρ οὐ διδάσκει 
φρονεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ὡραίη τροφὴ καὶ φῦσις, D48).”345  The description of φύσις here as a capacity for 
learning is difficult to reconcile with the image of atomic composition as the φύσις of some 
entity.  The connection of φύσις with “mature development” (ὡραίη τροφὴ) suggests a dynamic 
quality to φύσις in that it prescribes what is possible, rather than simply a descriptive account of 
individual identity.  Nature has the capacity to make some people good, some people thinkers, 
and others neither of these things.  For Democritus, nature as φύσις is causal in that it is at least 
partly responsible for who an individual becomes by helping people “become good” and 
“teaching one to think.”  
But Democritus draws an odd parallel between teaching and nature elsewhere when he 
says: “Nature and teaching are similar. For teaching reshapes the man, and in reshaping makes 
his nature” (ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυθμίζει τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυθμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ, B33).  Here we find another word invented by 
                                               
345 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1095a2-11. 
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Democritus; the use of φυσιοποιεῖ, “unique in Greek literature,” suggests a deliberate 
understanding of φύσις as something that is constructed or shaped, in this case by teaching.346  
This may have been an attempt by Democritus to correct the contrast Pindar established between 
innate nature and learning, but it also lends credence to the idea that Democritus may have been 
deliberately avoiding the word in other contexts.347  Rather than insert words that would have 
been commonly understood yet perhaps somewhat imprecise, Democritus goes to the trouble to 
fashion new words that more accurately convey his meaning.  In this case, his use of φυσιοποιεῖ 
“suggests the force with which Democritus grasped the idea of ‘human nature in the making’.”348  
Conceiving of nature as “made,” especially through human art, inevitably presents difficulties for 
interpretations of Democritus’ notion of φύσις as atomic composition. Gregory Vlastos, the 
staunchest advocate of tying Democritean physics firmly together with the ethics, navigates the 
difficulties by arguing that Democritus means that teaching reconfigures a man’s soul atoms.349  
Vlastos contends that the soul is “a specific atomic cluster, dependent for its integrity upon 
another cluster (the body),” and that εὐθυμίη is thus the “physical and moral state of the 
‘cheerful’ soul” that is “defined positively as a healthful balance (krēsis), negatively as the 
absence of violent motion.”350  Although C.C.W. Taylor originally criticizes this view, he walks 
back his criticism in subsequent commentary many years later, specifically conceding that he 
does believe that B33 is correctly interpreted as saying “that teaching creates a new nature by 
altering the configuration of soul-atoms.”351  Taylor is not willing to go so far as Vlastos, 
                                               
346 Vlastos, “Ethics and Physics in Democritus,” p. 55. 
347 Pindar, Olympian Odes, 2.86. 
348 Vlastos, “Ethics and Physics in Democritus,” p. 55. 
349  For a succinct list of the “concepts which mark the main junctions between ethics and physics,” according to 
Vlastos, see “Ethics and Physics in Democritus,” p. 63.  
350 Ibid. 
351 For Taylor’s original assessment of this interpretation, see “Pleasure, Knowledge, and Sensation in Democritus,” 
and for a softening of his criticism of Vlastos’ claims, see The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, p. 233. 
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however, contending only that “teaching, like thought and perception, is for Democritus a 
physical process,” and stopping short of “endorsing the thesis that Democritus sought to derive 
ethical conclusions from his physical theory.”352 
But the reconfiguration of φύσις need not be a physical reconstruction, but rather a kind 
of reorientation of one’s nature specifically as an activity.   In fact, as we have seen, φύσις is 
never used in fragments authored by Democritus to apply to a physical reality nor even on the 
Aristotelian reading does φύσις apply to the atomic aggregate.  At best, the individual atom is 
φύσις, but these are impossible to reconfigure or alter, so this cannot be what Democritus 
intends.  A more plausible interpretation that fits better with the fragments is that for Democritus 
φύσις is a capacity tending toward activity.  In short, φύσις is a normative set of tendencies to 
perform certain actions and as such it provides limitations for acceptable choices (B3) in a 
moderate, dependable way (B176) while simultaneously being shaped by teaching but also 
shaping by serving as a capacity for learning and guiding human action as a tendency (B48 and 
B33).   
Democritus discusses the idea of individual nature in more traditional ways in several 
strange fragments, illustrating that while φύσις may sometimes be constructed, it is also innate: 
ὅτεῳ χρήμη τεά ἐστι παῖδα ποιήσασθαι, ἐκ τῶν φίλων τεύ μοι 
δοκεῖ ἄμεινον εἶναι. καὶ τῷ μὲν παῖς ἔσται τοιοῦτος, οἷον ἂν 
βούληται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκλέξασθαι οἷον ἐθέλει· καὶ ὃς ἂν δοκῇ 
ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι, κἂν μᾶλιστα κατὰ φύσιν ἕποιτο. καὶ τοῦτο 
τοσοῦτον διφέρει, ὅσον ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἔστι τὸν παῖδα λαβεῖν 
καταθύμιον ἐκ πολλῶν, οἷον ἂν δέῃ. ἢν δέ τις ποιῆται ἀπὸ ἑωυτοῦ, 
πολλοὶ ἔνεισι κίνδυνοι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ὅς ἂν γένηται, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι.  
If anyone needs to have a child, it seems to me better that he 
should choose from his friends’ children. That way he will get the 
sort of child he wants, for he can choose the one he likes; and the 
one that seems suitable will follow his bidding as far as its nature 
allows. And this is a great difference, in that he can choose from 
                                               
352 Ibid. 
 202  
 
many the one he prefers, according as he thinks it should be. But if 
he has one of his own, there are many dangers he has to make do 
with the one that is born to him. (B277) 
Democritus displays great trust in the strength of friendship, or perhaps assumes that parents are 
over-burdened in their abundance of offspring, since he believes that parents will give away their 
children so easily, particularly the likable ones.  Humorous though his suggestion may be when 
not taken too seriously, Democritus suggests several important features of his concept of nature 
in this passage.  The direct association between the φύσις of the child and behavior illustrates 
that nature does dictate choices in some way, fitting with the idea of capacity.  The nature of a 
child is largely unpredictable through genetic inheritance, Democritus implies, but is instead 
recognizable by means of observation.  The idea of nature is also prescriptive, according to 
Democritus, in that it is φύσις that drives human beings to have children in the first place: 
ἀνθρώποισι τῶν ἀναγκαίων δοκεῖ εἶναι παῖδας κτήσασθαι ἀπὸ 
φύσιος καὶ καταστάσιός τινος ἀρχαίης. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ζῴοισι· πάντα γὰρ ἄκγονα κτᾶται κατὰ φύσιν ἐπωφελείης γε 
οὐδεμιᾶς εἵνεκα· ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν γένηται, ταλαιπωρεῖ καὶ τρέφει 
ἕκαστον ὡς δύναται καὶ ὑπερδέδοικε, μέχρι σμικρὰ ἦ, καὶ ἤν τι 
πάθῃ ἀνιᾶται. ἡ μὲν φῦσις τοιαύτη πάντων ἐστὶν ὅσσα ψυχὴν ἔχει· 
τῷ δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπῳ νομίζον ἤδη πεποίηται, ὥστε καὶ ἐπαύρεσίν 
τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκγόνου 
People think of having children as necessary because of their 
nature and their long-established constitution. This is clear from 
the other animals too; they all have young in accordance with their 
nature, but not for any benefit. But when they are born each one 
takes trouble to rear them as best it can and fears for them when 
they are little and grieves if anything happens to them. The nature 
of all living things is like that. But as far as mankind are concerned 
the opinion has grown up that there is some advantage to be 
derived from one’s offspring. (B278) 
Here again and in a different context, φύσις dictates likely pursuits or patterns of activities. In 
this specific case, nature is augmented by “long established constitution” (καταστάσιός τινος 
ἀρχαίης) that most men, Democritus himself a rare exception, do not attempt to challenge.  And 
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yet in this context, φύσις as a normative concept that regulates behavior extends beyond human 
beings.  For Democritus, “all living things” that produce offspring inevitably tend to be fearful, 
protective, and thus susceptible to grief.  Human beings add to this natural tendency the 
misguided belief that “some advantage is to be derived from one’s offspring,” when in reality no 
such advantage exists.  The implication seems to be that φύσις as a normative tendency to certain 
kinds of action ought to at times be questioned or mitigated by forethought and insight.  And yet 
it is difficult to see how this conception of φύσις could be consistent with a deterministic, 
mechanical ethics based upon necessity.  Although nature acts as a guide in certain ways to 
prescribe what is possible, it nevertheless cannot serve as an absolute guide for human life, 
making teaching, practice, and right thinking essential for the cheerful life.       
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRITUS’ TWO NATURES 
 Democritus’ views mark a curious intersection in the development of the philosophical 
concept of nature.  On the one hand, he is firmly entrenched in the tradition of Greek 
philosophers who are searching for ways to understand and explain the physical world.  Relying 
on certain Eleatic principles and the resulting view of the nature of things in terms of “what-is,” 
Democritus nevertheless expands the explanatory power of the basic nature of things by 
providing an account for the existence of plurality. Yet he also acknowledges the inherently 
speculative quality of this endeavor, owing to the fact “that in reality we do not know what kind 
of thing each thing is or is not has been shown many times” (B10).  The nature of specific things 
as their reality (ἐτεή) is, on some level, beyond our complete comprehension.    
At the same time, Democritus is also attuned to what one might call the sophistic attitude 
toward nature, as reflected in the ethical fragments.  Here nature (φύσις) is almost universally 
understood to mean human nature, or at the very least, it directly applies to and impacts human 
beings.  Contrary to nature as the physical structure of reality that is atoms and void, the idea of 
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nature as φύσις operates as a normative guide, often (though not always) in ways that distinctly 
benefit mankind.  Unlike ἐτεή, one can know the φύσις of things, both of themselves and more 
generally.  This knowledge can then, in turn, be used to make more “fitting” decisions in the 
pursuit of the best life.  The dual facet of nature goes beyond the ἐτεή-φύσις distinction, 
however, as Democritus also develops, roughly, the idea of “first” and “second” natures, or a 
φύσις that is innate and a φύσις that can be molded by teaching and practice. 
Democritus sits at the crossroads of these two uses of nature as an intersection of past and 
future philosophical thought concerning nature in the mid-5th century.  While Democritus’ 
predecessors worked to shape the idea of nature as it applied to the cosmos, a new breed of 
thinkers in the 5th century, often grouped together under the term “sophists,” turned almost 
exclusively to practical, human affairs.  Their reactions to, and uses for, the idea of nature are 
markedly different both from the physiologoi and from one another.  It is to these thinkers that 
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Conclusion: The Concept of Nature after the Presocratics 
 
“Keeping company with me, use [your] nature, leap, laugh, consider nothing shameful!” 
–Aristophanes, Clouds 
 
 The precise origin of the debate remains unknown, but at some time during the middle of 
the 5th century B.C., interest in the conflict between the concepts of φύσις and νόμος explodes 
among intellectual circles in ancient Greece.  Despite the rapid rise of the idea of φύσις among 
the physiologoi in the preceding century, the powerful influence of custom persists in a timeless 
way, as Herodotus famously illustrates with an anecdote: 
When Darius was king, he summoned the Greeks who were with 
him and asked them what price would persuade them to eat their 
fathers’ dead bodies.  They answered that there was no price for 
which they would do it.  Then he summoned those Indians who are 
called Callatiae, who eat their parents, and asked them (the Greeks 
being present and understanding by interpretation what was said) 
what would make them willing to burn their fathers to death.  The 
Indians cried aloud, that he should not speak of so horrid an act.  
So firmly rooted are these beliefs; and it is, I think, rightly said in 
Pindar’s poem that custom is lord of all. (III.38)353  
 
Herodotus’ point is well-taken: the pervasive influence of custom is impossible to deny.  
Stretching back to the Archaic period, νόμος both explains the “way” things are and serves as a 
normative guide for human action.354  The subsequent rise of philosophical investigation of the 
natural world is marked above all by the rise and development of a concept of nature that begins 
to rival νόμος.  At least among some intellectuals, φύσις overtakes custom both as a means of 
explaining what things are and why they behave in particular ways; eventually this idea is 
extended in concrete ways to the idea of human nature, competing directly with custom or law as 
a superior guide for human endeavor.  The prescriptive force of νόμος was always a fundamental 
                                               
353 Herodotus, The Persian Wars: Books 3-4, trans. A.D. Godley, (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 
1938), with slight modifications to Godley’s translation of the final line (νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι). 
354 Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 82. 
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feature of the idea of custom such that it must “give some kind of direction or command 
affecting the behavior and activities of persons and things.”355  But as a viable alternative guide 
for how individuals live and and how political communities should be organized, the prescriptive 
qualities of φύσις become ever more apparent and vital.  In its broad complexity and sharply 
divergent conclusions regarding nature, however, the legacy of the earliest nature philosophers 
survives intact: the sophistical engagement with the scope and powers of φύσις is as varied as 
their Presocratic predecessors.  Even among those sophists embroiled in the φύσις-νόμος debate, 
the basic features of the idea of nature remain highly contested, in effect illustrating yet another 
step in the continual process of reform and refinement of the idea of nature for the Greeks.  In 
short, the broader intellectual interest in φύσις that arises in the fifth century, especially as part of 
the sophistical movement, only provides further compelling evidence for one of the central 
theses of this study: no consensus “Greek concept of nature” exists in early Greek philosophical 
thought.  The stakes have risen considerably, however, in what is sometimes referred to as the 
Greek Enlightenment.  Rather than pursuing answers to cosmological questions and theoretical 
explanations of the origins and development of the natural world, the Greek sophists are 
wrestling with the foundational principles of the Greek way of life.   
Taking the normative facet of nature for granted whether defending φύσις or νόμος as the 
guide for human life, the sophists instead redefine φύσις in ways that depart significantly from 
the ideas of purposive nature that began to take shape in the natural philosophy of the 
Presocratics.  The power of prescription without end leaves a dangerous void: nature as such a 
guide may be used to justify despicable acts of aggression and injustice.  Understood in this way, 
the story of the idea of nature leads to a reading of the works of Plato and Aristotle as the 
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deliberate expansion and clarification of the purposive features of nature found among their 
philosophical predecessors into more clearly defined teleological nature.  In purifying and 
defending the concept of nature from the twists of the sophists, specifically by shoring up 
nature’s teleological features, Plato and Aristotle necessarily defend philosophy from charges of 
corruption.   
In the concluding section of this study, I offer a brief summary of the development of the 
concept of nature among the early Greek physiologoi discussed in the preceding chapters.  
Emerging through intense debate over the course of a century, in general terms the idea of nature 
becomes both a descriptive concept that provides the foundation for grasping the mysteries of the 
cosmos, and the entities in it, as well as a normative concept that is used as a guide for human 
action.  But the range of different interpretations is undeniable and of particular importance for 
the intellectual period following the age of the Presocratics.  Inheriting an idea of nature that is 
not solidly established, the thinkers of the mid-5th century, known as the sophists, undertake 
their own clarification of the scope and powers of the concept of nature.  No account of the early 
idea of nature would be complete without this part of the story.  As a result, in the middle section 
of this conclusion, I offer a reading of some of the key sophists’ ideas of nature, including some 
thoughts concerning how specific Presocratic theories of nature may have led to the sophistical 
“corruption” of the idea of nature.  Finally, I suggest the implications my account has for how 
the respective philosophies of Plato and Aristotle can be read as different approaches to the task 
of defending philosophy through the idea of purposive nature.    
CONCEPTIONS OF PURPOSIVE NATURE 
 
Through two centuries of thought and argument, those thinkers known as the Presocratic 
philosophers took a general idea on the periphery of Greek thought, and transformed it into a 
philosophical concept robust enough to explain a remarkable array of phenomena and central to 
 208  
 
the Greek understanding of themselves and their place in the cosmos.  As with other similar 
developments, one discovery spawned many more, and the “nature” of things began to be used to 
supply answers to all manner of new questions.  The development of a more sophisticated and 
diverse conceptual framework among the Presocratics also opened up the ability of early Greek 
thinkers to pursue such answers through argumentation and dispute.  The earliest conceptions of 
nature gave the Milesian thinkers a way to unite all phenomena under a universal concept--
everything had a “nature,” and was connected to the origin of the cosmos.  The first recorded 
physiologos, Thales, boldly asserted that everything was water, and by providing all things with 
a common nature, initiated the possibility of conceiving of nature as a series of transformations 
rather than births.  Although Thales emphasized the idea of nature as a source, his fellow 
Milesians, Anaximander and Anaximenes, emphasized the process element of nature to a much 
greater extent.  For Anaximander, the entities in nature exhibited fundamental relationships to 
one another, in particular an innate opposition that dictated specific kinds of behavior.  The 
cosmos was, in effect, steered by these natural relationships, by a process of natural reciprocity 
for Anaximander.  Anaximenes sought to combine Thales’ idea of material source as nature with 
Anaximander’s emphasis on process into a single material constituent imbued with a specific 
process of alteration.  Air, for Anaximenes, is the source of all things, even the gods, and it 
becomes all things through the alternating processes of condensation and rarefaction.  Although 
they think about nature in significantly different ways, the earliest philosophical conceptions of 
nature all assume a unified cosmos that is guided by means of natural processes.  
But the idea of nature does not begin to classify different entities within the world until 
Xenophanes uses it in this way.  The wandering poet from Colophon diversifies the universal 
quality of nature by frequent use in connection with “all things,” that is, nature begins to apply to 
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specific groups of entities, marking them out from others.  Although he uses the idea of nature to 
classify natural things by the fact that they “come into being and grow,” his use of nature as a 
method of clarification is most readily apparent in his fragments on the divine.  There he goes to 
considerable lengths to distinguish the features of divine nature from human nature.  Broadly 
speaking, Xenophanes uses the idea of nature dynamically, sometimes aligning the “nature” of 
the thing by what it does, other times more simply with what it actually is.  Eschewing the 
Homeric tendency to blur the lines by describing certain mortals as “godlike” and certain gods as 
behaving as humans do, Xenophanes holds that divine nature must be different from mortal 
nature because their activities are so different.  The divine knows all and shakes all things by the 
thought of his mind, while man is constrained by the necessary processes of learning and 
discovery.  Yet Xenophanes suggests hope for humanity, a “faith in progress” toward greater 
understanding and application of this knowledge to improve human life.  Xenophanes uses the 
idea of nature to craft a theory of everything that weaves together natural philosophy, social 
commentary, theological questions, and epistemological considerations, that assigns a particular 
place to mankind but holds out the promise of something more.       
Heraclitus, though no fan of Xenophanes’ polymathy, develops his own version of a 
theory of everything through a strong connection between the φύσις of things and his famous 
λόγος that “steers all things.”  For Heraclitus, φύσις is a riddle that requires a new approach that 
embraces paradox, subtlety, and dogged investigation of what lies beneath the surface.  Instead 
of a simple means of classification of natural things, Heraclitus develops a notion of φύσις as a 
ἁρμονίη of fundamental opposites.  Ubiquitous throughout his fragments, φύσις as ἁρμονίη is 
what gives each individual thing its particular identity while also serving as a pattern that runs 
throughout the cosmos.  Recognized only by those few who have taught themselves how to 
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“listen” to the riddle and see beyond the obvious conflict of opposites, φύσις as ἁρμονίη is the 
basic pattern underlying the λόγος, that divine plan by which the cosmos is steered.  Thus it is 
that humans gain access to the divine through the idea of nature.       
But nature as a principle of unity of opposites fails to really describe what something is, 
or so we can easily imagine Parmenides saying in response to Heraclitus.  To reveal the 
connection between truth and reality in the cosmos, nature as a concept must “show forth” what-
is.  It must get to the heart of what is real not by guesswork or observation but through reason.  
Parmenides thus reconceives of the starting point of the study of nature from the entities in the 
world, as his predecessors suppose, to the basic metaphysical criteria for anything that exists.  
Only those things that possess these attributes have natures, properly speaking, and only these 
are “real.”  Although some scholars interpret Parmenides as seeking to “purify” the idea of 
nature by removing its dynamic components, thus relegating φύσις to “mere opinion,” a better 
understanding is that Parmenides effects a division between the “being” and “becoming,” or the 
identity (τὸ ἔον) and activity (φύσις), facets of nature.  Using the idea of limits and the recurring 
analogy of paths, Parmenides establishes a firmer foundation for cosmological inquiry by first 
establishing the metaphysical and epistemological criteria for what exists.  Conceiving of nature 
and inquiry in terms of limits and paths illustrates the fundamental purposiveness in Parmenides’ 
theory.        
A broadly typical reading of the Presocratic period is that the pluralists that follow him 
are, in various ways, responding to Parmenides.  The reading I have presented here argues that 
this happens in an unusual respect.  In separating what is “real” from what “becomes,” 
Parmenides effects a divide in the idea of nature that bears itself out in the subsequent pluralist 
theories.  The structural aspects of real identity are separate from, but connected with, the motive 
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forces that shape the growth of entities.  This basic bifurcation is replicated alternatively by 
Empedocles as roots and Love and Strife, by Anaxagoras as homeomerous ingredients and Nous, 
and by Philolaus as limiters, unlimiteds, and ἁρμονίη.  In such theories, the latent purposiveness 
in earlier conceptions of nature is replaced by much more explicit discussions of the role of these 
forces in shaping the nature of things.     
Finally, Democritus sits at the crossroads as both physiologos and humanist.  Famous for 
advancing the physical theory of atomism, Democritus provides the most elaborate account of 
the physical structure of reality, largely consistent with the Parmenidean principles of the real.  
The true “nature” of reality is atoms and void and all events are subject only to necessity.  And 
yet, whereas in many ways the earliest Greek philosophers understood man and cosmos to 
operate through the same principles, a new idea of nature as related to a specifically human 
nature comes upon the scene in the fifth century.  Democritus, if he is not at the forefront of this 
new way of thinking, is at least swept along by it in certain characterizations he offers that depart 
significantly from nature reducible to atoms, void, and necessity.  For Democritus, atoms and 
void are ἐτεή, a “reality” that is set apart from mankind, while φύσις is instead reserved by 
Democritus for descriptions of nature with recognizably purposive features.  Rather than 
conceiving of these facets of nature as linked, Democritus seems poised to keep them largely 
distinct as two entirely different ways to think about the nature of things.       
The idea of nature is thus far from a monolithic construction that is universally agreed 
upon by the earliest Greek philosophers who instead embrace a wide range of conceptions of 
what nature means and the implications for physical and metaphysical knowledge.  Yet each 
conception bears the hallmarks of purposiveness, and it is this teleological undercurrent in the 
earliest strands of philosophy that helps give rise to the prescriptive concept of φύσις that plays 
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such a dominant role in subsequent philosophical debates in ancient Greek philosophy.  The 
conceptions of nature among the sophists are in some ways just as diverse as those among the 
physiologoi, leading, in part, to the struggle of modern commentators to articulate what unifies 
these disparate thinkers in a cogent way.356  The void left by the lack of consensus among the 
Presocratics leads to the problematic, and possibly corrupted views of nature found in the 
sophistic movement.  Nature may be interpreted in various directions that represent significant 
departures from the conceptions of nature offered by the physiologoi that center on notions of 
harmony or other various imminent ends in nature.  Further still, the theories offered by the 
physiologoi lack a kind of tangible reality, perhaps leading the sophists to grasp at more tangible 
sources and definitions of nature.  Easily identifiable aspects of the human experience like 
advantages and desires would have seemed far more real than elusive notions of natural ends.  
The route to understanding purpose in nature may have seemed much closer to home.  As a 
result, many of the thinkers of the sophistic movement continue the trend of innovation by 
exploring the implications of the idea of nature in new ways.  In Protagoras’ case, this amounts 
to an attack on previous notions but in others it is simply an expansion of the concept of nature in 
ways that are perhaps both more relevant and more readily identifiable.  In the following section, 
I explore the notions of nature offered by key thinkers of the sophistical movement. 
THE SOPHISTIC “CORRUPTION” OF PHYSIS 
 
The earliest member of the sophistical movement is Protagoras, a student of Democritus.  
Protagoras famously claims: “Of all things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, of 
things that are not that they are not” (πάντων χρημάτων εῖναι μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν 
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ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, A14).357  In the Theaetetus, Socrates clarifies 
this view by saying: “he means something like this: that as each thing appears to me, so it is to 
me” (152a).  In the Cratylus, the relativism is expanded to include others in an obvious way: “as 
they seem to be to me, so they are to me; as they seem to you, so they are to you” (385e).  
Reduced to mere appearance, the nature of any given thing is entirely relative to the perceiver.  
As a result, nature lacks the universal, prescriptive power attributed to it by most other early 
Greek thinkers.  Rendering the concept of nature powerless and meaningless, Protagoras calls 
into question the entire project of early Greek philosophy.  Seeking the “real” outside of 
ourselves, as something apart from the perceiver, is a waste of time.358  Such conclusions were 
derived from familiarity with the ideas of the early Greek physiologoi whose “contradictory 
speculations” neglected “the one thing that mattered, how to take care of one’s own affairs and 
the business of the state.”359  The natural philosophers  “claim[ed] to possess the secret of the 
universe” but in reality were only “chasing chimeras” and “pitting one opinion against another, 
each more incredible than the last.”360   
Beyond the diversity in conceptions of nature, however, the lack of a clear, determinate 
reality in the conceptions of nature offered by the physiologoi also contributed to this hostile 
reaction by the “practical men.”  The portrayal by Empedocles and Anaxagoras of the nature of 
something as a shifting mixture of roots or homeomerous stuffs may have led Protagoras to draw 
the inference that things lacked a fixed and enduring nature.  In a similar fashion, Protagoras may 
have been simply extending his teacher Democritus’ skepticism relative to the nature of things to 
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its logical conclusion.361  If we cannot know the true nature of things, perhaps this is because no 
enduring nature in fact exists; the supposed division between the “real” and the perceptible 
collapses in on itself.  Protagoras’ approach thus consists of “abandoning physiologia” and as a 
result he “knocks down the physical scaffolding of truth.”362  Richard McKirahan offers a 
different interpretation of Protagoras’ thought, based primarily on the myth in Plato’s 
Protagoras.  He suggests that it is “possible that Protagoras intends aidōs and dikē [which Zeus 
has given to humans] as part of human nature and that if human nature lacked these moral 
qualities life as we know it would not be possible.”363  On this view, man is still the measure of 
all things, and “the nomoi of a community have some basis in human nature, that is, in 
(distinctively human) phusis.”364  Even if McKirahan’s tentatively offered thesis is correct, 
however, Protagoras is clearly rejecting the more substantial role Democritus suggests for φύσις 
in human affairs, in favor of the more significant roles for law as the primary source of proper 
action and justice.  At best, on McKirahan’s reading, φύσις means a few generic traits that 
historically separated humans from other beasts, but offers little in the way of an ethical guide 
for current individual or communal decisions.  In short, even if φύσις does “exist” for Protagoras, 
it is a relic of a previous age, an outmoded means of interpreting being and knowing.  In 
establishing man as the “measure of all things” in fundamental opposition to the supposition by 
the Presocratics of natural principles which govern all things, Protagoras thereby sharpens the 
divide between justice “by nature” and justice “by law.”  
The relationship between the concepts of nature and justice becomes far more central as 
the sophistical movement flourishes, and prominent sophists offer different accounts of which 
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idea of justice is superior based upon different accounts of nature.  While Protagoras dismisses 
the idea of φύσις, Antiphon staunchly defends nature in his stark presentation of the contrast 
between nature and law.  Aristotle reports that Antiphon argues for the idea that the nature of 
physical things is their primary component (Physics 193a9-17).  Of course, a primary component 
is more difficult to identify when it comes to human nature, but Antiphon defends the idea of 
human nature by using biological and behavioral commonalities that affect all members, 
stretching across communities: “For we all breathe the same air through our mouth and our nose, 
and we laugh when we are happy and cry when we are sad” (γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀέρ[α] ἅπαντες κατὰ τὸ 
στόμ[α] [κ]αὶ κατ[α] τὰς ῥῖνας κ[αὶ γελῶμε]ν χ[αίροντες καὶ] δακρύομε[ν] λυπούμενοι, B44).  
Referring to the common traits of human nature, Antiphon claims that we are able to “learn from 
these things”; law and custom, on the other hand, are relative to location and community such 
that “[the laws and customs of those who live nearby] we know and respect; those of people 
dwelling far away we neither know nor respect” ([τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἐγγυτέ]ρων ἐπ[ιστάμε]θα τε 
κ[αὶ σέβομεν], τοὺς δὲ [τῶν τῆλοῦ οἰκ[ουν]των οὔτε ἐπι[στ]άμεθα οὔτε σεβόμεν, B44).  Placing 
too much value on custom leads us to “become barbarians to one another,” when instead humans 
ought to realize that “in all ways we are all equally fitted by nature, at least, to be both barbarians 
and Greeks” (ἐν τ[ο]ύτωι οὖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους βεβαρβαρώμεθα, ἐπεὶ φύσει γε πάντα πάντες 
ὁμοίως πεφύκ[α]μεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλλην[εσ] εἶναι, B44).   
Expanding on this idea, Antiphon suggests an essential difference between nature and 
law with respect to justice when he says, “Thus a man would use justice in a way most 
advantageous to himself if, in the presence of witnesses, he held the laws in esteem, whereas 
when he was alone, he valued the works of nature” (χρῶιτ᾿ ἄν οὖ ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα ἑαυτῶι 
ξυμφ[ε]ρόντως δικαιο[σ]ύνηι, εἰ μετὰ μὲν μαρτύρων τοὺς νόμους μεγάλους ἄγοι, μονούμενος δὲ 
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μαρτύρων τὰ τῆς φύσεως, B44).  Juxtaposing the “factitious” laws with the “necessary” works of 
nature, Antiphon develops an idea of nature associated especially with the notion of advantages 
and disadvantages for human beings.  While laws are to be observed, one only need to do so in 
order to avoid conflict with “those who agreed on them.”  Any violations of the prescriptions of 
φύσις, on the other hand, will have adverse consequences since “even if he eludes all men, the 
evil that results is no less; even if all observe, it is no more” (ἐάν τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους λάθηι, 
οὐδὲν ἔλαττον τὸ κακόν, ἐάν τε πάντες ἴδωσιν, οὐδεν μεῖζον, B44).  In the final analysis, he who 
violates the laws of nature “is harmed, not because of opinion, but in truth” (οὐ γὰρ διὰ δόξαν 
βλάπτεται, ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἀλήθειαν, B44).  Jonathan Barnes argues that “Antiphon means to urge the 
claims of phusis above those of nomos” but denies that the sophist is doing more than simply 
asserting a “statement of fact.”365  There is, Barnes suggests, no indication of an “injunction or 
recommendation” on Antiphon’s part; he does not say, “follow nature when you can get away 
with it,” nor does he establish this as a view that he is “concerned to refute.”366  Alternatively, 
G.B. Kerferd believes Antiphon asserts a normative claim, though not one so simple as to 
suggest that φύσις is a better guide in all situations.  The normative claim instead comes about 
since “it is what advantages man and his nature that is viewed as good”; as a result, since “laws 
and the norms of society” are instead “fetters and bonds imposed on [nature]” that fail to 
“contribute to what is required,” φύσις rather than νόμος provides the key to the best life.367  The 
“natural indicators” for what should be considered advantageous are pleasure and pain, thus 
Antiphon can be considered “the earliest advocate of hedonism in Greek philosophy.”368  Nature 
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guides our choices by pleasure and pain, steering us toward what is advantageous and away from 
what is disadvantageous.   
The essential link that Antiphon uncovers between φύσις and the advantageous is 
expanded by key sophists in some of Plato’s dialogues, particularly as they relate to political 
questions.  Plato’s characterization of the sophists is remarkably varied, but could hardly be 
described as charitable. In the Sophist, he presents them as masters of a question and answer 
approach, while more characteristically in the Protagoras as dedicated speech-makers.369  But it 
is in the Gorgias and the Republic that Plato frames the sophists by their views rather than their 
methods.  The two chief antagonists in those dialogues, Callicles and Thrasymachus, offer 
substantially different accounts of justice grounded in particular conceptions of φύσις and its 
relation to νόμος and δίκη.  While Antiphon had suggested the basic hedonistic connection 
between nature and pleasure based on the idea of pleasure as advantageous, in the Gorgias, 
Callicles unabashedly expands the pleonectic component of human nature.  In short, human 
nature necessitates that we “strive to have more (pleon echein) of the good, understood as wealth 
and power and the pleasures they can provide.”370  Collapsing the distinction between custom 
and nature, Callicles speaks of this striving as nomos physeos, the law of nature, in a way that 
invariably governs the behavior of all men.371  Some men are strong by nature and able to take 
more of what they want, others are unable to do so.  Nevertheless, in seeking to ensure they at 
least have an equal amount of wealth and power, the weak inevitably resort to laws.  The 
inescapable pursuit of advantage over others necessitates that the weak use νόμος as a tool in 
order to subjugate the strong and mitigate the advantage they enjoy by nature.  Human nature as 
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an endless striving for more, for the satisfaction of particular desires, is an unprecedented view in 
the history of the concept.372  Living well for humans means fulfilling φύσις as desires, and the 
resulting view is that what is just by nature, that is, taking as much as one can for himself, is 
declared unjust by law.    
Thrasymachus, the representative sophist in the Republic, presents a more intricate 
position that extends the sophistical views of Antiphon and Callicles to their logical conclusion.  
In so doing Thrasymachus challenges the value of philosophy.  Taking up the now familiar idea 
that “the ultimate standard...is one’s own advantage,” Thrasymachus confidently asserts that 
“justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (Republic 338c).373  Pressured by 
Socrates for clarity, Thrasymachus retreats under the barrage of Socratic questions and departs 
from Callicles’ stated view when he revises his position to suggest that it is actually injustice that 
is “to one’s own profit and advantage” while justice bids us do what is better for others (Republic 
343b-344c).  Thrasymachus draws the obvious implication: “Injustice, if it is on a large enough 
scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice” (344c).  Nature, in a way, sanctions 
injustice and men delude and weaken themselves if they seek justice or spend much time at all 
contemplating it.  Presenting a more “general” depiction of human nature than the pleonectic 
version offered by Callicles, Thrasymachus avoids limiting advantages to satisfaction of desires 
and thus “cannot be refuted just by attacking hedonism.”374 Although explicitly challenging 
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Socrates with showing that justice has greater value than injustice, Thrasymachus also issues an 
implicit challenge as his argument “calls for an answer to the question of what our interests and 
advantages really are.”375  This, I take it, is one of the reasons that φύσις plays such a prominent 
if underappreciated role in the Republic. 
 
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: DEFENDING AND EXPANDING PHYSIS 
 
In this final section, I want to offer some tentative thoughts on the implications this 
account of the development of the idea of nature through the Presocratics and sophists has on 
subsequent Greek philosophy.  One way to read Plato, in light of the foregoing account, is to 
understand certain dialogues and arguments contained therein as an attempt to safeguard 
philosophy, and the idea of φύσις, from relativistic impulses or corrupt accounts of nature that 
make the pursuit of wisdom a useless or childish endeavor.  In response to Thrasymachus’ 
challenge in the Republic that injustice is superior to justice, Socrates grounds the idea of justice 
on an idea of purposive nature that goes beyond individual advantages.  In doing so, he fashions 
an understanding of φύσις by expanding certain purposive features of the various concepts of 
nature among the physiologoi.  The “best interests” for human beings extend beyond personal 
advantage with nature prescribing what is the “best” or just for all.  Thus philosophy as the 
pursuit of wisdom in connection with what nature prescribes is more than worthwhile: it is vital 
to living the good life.   
Plato’s attempt to defend and define φύσις thus pulls specific facets from both the 
sophists and the physiologoi.  The idea that nature establishes advantageous norms is not a 
conception taken from the physiologoi; the source for this appears to be the sophists.  In the 
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Phaedo, however, Plato recounts Socrates’ description of his initial encounter with the ideas of 
Anaxagoras.  Presenting himself as a kind of self-confessed physiologos, fascinated by 
Anaxagoras’ suggestion that all things are arranged by Nous for the best, Socrates is inevitably 
disappointed when Anaxagoras does not follow through in providing accounts of how this is so.  
Instead of discussing salient features of the cosmos and clarifying why they are such instead of 
possible alternatives, and in particular elaborating on how this is “for the better,” Anaxagoras 
lapses into explanations that resort to minute physical causes.  Socrates then describes the turn he 
made, suggesting a “second sailing” in which he abandons the study of the natural world through 
the use of his senses and turns instead to discussion and the investigation of truth through words 
(Phaedo 99d-e).  In short, the aim of the project of the early Greek philosophers is right; it is the 
method that is flawed.  While Plato’s Timaeus may deal with purposive features in the 
construction of the cosmos, the practical effect of a purposive φύσις that can serve as a model for 
human society is found in the Republic.  In laying out the just city in the early parts of that 
dialogue, Plato returns time and again to what is best by nature.  Oftentimes, in alarming fashion 
for his interlocutors, what is best by nature is in stark contrast to human desires.  Plato seems to 
understand φύσις as it applies to humans, more in terms of capacity; that is, closely, but not 
exclusively, connected with desires and emotions. One striking example, and a likely application 
of Heraclitus’ notion of φύσις, is the discussion of the nature of the best soldiers in Republic II.  
The discovery of justice in Plato’s Republic hinges on the determination of roles in the 
just city according to the idea of nature. Given the importance of the guardians’ role, Socrates 
contends, these soldiers should be free from other kinds of labor and possess “the greatest skill 
and devotion” (374e).376  Equally important, however, is that this kind of work “also requires a 
                                               
376 Translations from Plato’s Republic come from G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve as found in Plato: Complete 
Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).  
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person whose nature is suited to that way of life” (374e).  Comparing the guardian with a dog, 
Socrates makes the case that these guardians need an “invincible and unbeatable spirit” in 
addition to keen senses, notable speed, and superior strength.  Such natures, however, may be far 
too savage toward the soldier’s own citizens.  What is necessary, it seems, is to find a nature that 
is “both gentle and high-spirited at the same time” (375c). Laying out the problem, Socrates says 
that “a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one” and that since these natures cannot coexist 
in a single individual, it seems there can be no such thing as a good guardian. Socrates is not 
stalled long, however, referring back to the analogy of good soldiers with well-trained dogs, as 
he points out that seemingly paradoxical natures do exist “in which these opposites are indeed 
combined” (375d).  The well-trained dog is “gentle as can be to those he is used to and knows, 
but the opposite to those he does not know” (375e). Thus, Socrates adds a philosophical 
component to the guardian’s nature because it guides the individual in judging well and 
distinguishing based on knowledge. Helpfully, Plato specifies the nature of a “fine and good 
guardian” for us: it contains the attributes of philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength (376c). 
There is no conception of nature as the unification of opposites before Plato except in 
Heraclitus; the Ephesian sage is the source for this idea.377  Socrates here plays the role of a 
Heraclitean sage who is able to recognize the unity in opposites--the existence of an underlying 
“fitting-together” (ἁρμονίη) of opposite traits. Broadly speaking, the mark of the philosopher as a 
leader is the ability to recognize the logos that nature has laid out for a just society, but more 
specifically through the crucial ability to, in Heraclitus’ words, “distinguish each according to its 
                                               
377 One may attempt, as Seth Benardete has done, to tease such an idea out of the single use of φύσις regarding the 
Moly flower in the Homer’s Odyssey since the flower is white while the root is black and “to dig up the Moly is to 
expose to the light its flower and its root; they belong together regardless of the contrariety in their colors,” The Bow 
and the Lyre, p. 86.  Benardete contends that it is this knowledge of nature as opposites specifically applied to the 
link between “the mind of man together with his build” that ultimately saves Odysseus from Circe, but this strikes 
me as straining the interpretation beyond plausibility for the sake of finding connections in the text.     
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nature and tell how it is” (22B1).  Recognizing such natures and establishing an accompanying 
system of task assignment is essential to the establishment of a just society for Plato.  Not only 
does nature operate in recognizable patterns, but these serve as prescriptive models for the best 
society.  The idea of nature can be used to answer political questions.      
Aristotle’s approach to defining and understanding φύσις is decidedly more systematic 
than Plato’s, beginning with the Physics.  But Aristotle’s approach may be less about defending 
philosophy against corrupting influences by purifying central philosophical concepts like φύσις.  
Instead, Aristotle seeks to develop an appropriate philosophical method that can redefine 
philosophy as a way of life while achieving a more comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of things.378  Rather than broad theorizing or a priori generalizations in his attempt to give a 
comprehensive account, Aristotle’s derives his method from the careful study of natural 
beings.379  Philosophy as such becomes the study of natures since these are the “sources of 
change in natural things.”380  Aristotle’s understanding of the different “parts” of his “unitary 
project of investigation” is thus “strongly dependent upon a specific conception of the natural 
world.”381  Derived from close and careful observation of all manner of natural beings, 
Aristotle’s specific conception of the natural world is fundamentally defined by the teleological 
quality found in all things.  Purposiveness is found not only in the large-scale construction of the 
cosmos, and the prescribed advantages, or what is “best” in human affairs, but within every 
natural being as final cause.  Aristotle’s objection to the ideas of purposive nature offered by his 
                                               
378 James G. Lennox, “How to study natural bodies: Aristotle’s μέθοδος,” in A Critical Guide to the Physics, ed. 
Mariska Leunissen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
379 See Chelsea C. Harry, Chronos in Aristotle's Physics : On the Nature of Time, (Cham: Springer Press, 2015), p. 
2.  Harry notes that “Aristotle explicitly distances himself from Platonic-style natural philosophy,” citing Physics 
203a16 and Metaphysics 1001a12, p. 2. n5. 
380 Lennox, “How to study natural bodies: Aristotle’s μέθοδος,” p. 16. 
381 Andrea Falcon, Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 1.  
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predecessors center on poor understanding of the precise nature of final causes: “That for the 
sake of which actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to be a cause in a way, 
but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is its nature to be a cause” (Metaphysics 
988b6-8).382  Referring to Anaxagoras and Empedocles without naming them, he says, “For 
those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, 
as if anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if the 
movements started from these” (986b8-10).  As Aristotle makes clear, his conception of the 
natural world is framed in terms of causes.  The error of his Presocratic predecessors is that they 
had not adequately conceived of, and clearly articulated, the precise idea of nature as a cause “for 
the sake of which.”  As final causes, that is, as a truly teleological nature in Aristotle’s view, not 
only natures but their ends themselves become objects of study.  Aristotle’s defense of φύσις and 
the pursuit of wisdom is in some ways a secondary effect of his quest for precision and clarity in 
explanations and understanding of the natural world.  Reorienting φύσις to be understood more 
clearly through the lens of causality, and all that entails, provides a more comprehensive and 
reliable account of all things.  How far one might extend the parallels is certainly debatable, as 
the relationship between Aristotle’s different works remains one of the more disputed points in 
recent scholarship, but his specific conception of nature and natural beings may shed light 
beyond the biological works to provide better answers to the role of nature in political and ethical 
questions.      
This study has only engaged with the earliest conceptions of nature, but it should be clear 
that the range of possibilities for what nature means is vast and perhaps part of the charm of early 
intellectual pursuits.  The various conceptions of nature at the outset only foreshadow the extent 
                                               
382 Emphasis in the translation by W.D. Ross. 
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to which the idea of nature will continue to evolve through theoretical study and debate 
throughout antiquity.  Likewise, the connection between nature and purposiveness remains a 
prominent feature of philosophical discussion and debate over the centuries.  Plato and Aristotle 
may write the next chapters in the story of nature, but the debate continues through the medieval 
period and into early modern philosophy.  The Presocratic period marks a fascinating shift in 
epistemological framework; the shift is marked above by a willingness to offer new ideas 
grounded on radically new concepts.  In the end, we should, as Nietzsche suggests, celebrate the 
“polyphony of nature” initiated first by the earliest Greek philosophers, but which also inevitably 
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